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Summary 
This thesis seeks to explain the development of the British Conservative Party’s 
immigration policy from 1945 to 2015. It draws on Gamble’s contrasting of the ‘politics 
of power’ versus the ‘politics of support’ to consider the extent to which Conservative 
immigration policy is influenced by periods in government and periods in opposition. 
Harmel and Janda’s three ‘drivers’ of party change – electoral motivations, the leadership 
of the party, and factions within the party – are built upon to explain changes to the 
Conservatives’ immigration policy. 
 
An interpretivist approach is conducive to the making of an empirically-rich ‘thick 
descriptive’ account of the Conservative Party’s immigration policy-making. The account 
is based on interviews with key actors – including current and former politicians and 
senior civil servants – combined with analysis of archive material and contemporary 
media sources and memoirs. 
 
This thesis concludes that periods in government and periods in opposition do influence 
the making of immigration policy in different ways. During the 70-year period, what was 
implemented by the Conservatives in office was less far-reaching – and less restrictionist 
– than what had been proposed in opposition. Within this key contextual difference, a 
modified version of Harmel and Janda’s three drivers of change is useful in explaining 
the development of Conservative immigration policy – with some exceptions. 
 
Through tracking changes to the Conservative Party’s immigration policy over many 
parliaments, this thesis provides three main contributions. First, it emphasises the 
significance of political parties to the development of immigration policy. Second, in 
focusing on periods in opposition – which are often overlooked – as well as periods in 
government, this work offers a basis for reconceptualising policy-making. Third, in 
bringing together existing theories into a synthesis framework of party policy-making, 
this thesis offers a new approach to the theoretical literature, which could be modified 
and tested in other contexts. 
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Timeline 
This diagram is a visual timeline of the research period.  
 
The 70-year period from 1945 to 2015 has been divided into four 
sections. 
 
Period 1 – 1945 to 1964 
Period 2 – 1964 to 1979 
Period 3 – 1979 to 1997 
Period 4 – 1997 to 2015 
 
The year of every general election in this time is marked on the 
diagram. 
 
‘OPP’/ ‘O’ and ‘GVT’/ ‘G’, refer, respectively, to episodes in 
which the UK Conservative Party was in opposition and in 
government. 
 
The leadership of the Party is represented on the diagram by the 
initial of the leader. 
 
WC – Winston Churchill 
AE – Anthony Eden 
HM – Harold Macmillan 
ADH – Alec Douglas-Home 
TH – Edward ‘Ted’ Heath 
MT – Margaret Thatcher 
JM – John Major 
WH – William Hague 
IDS – Iain Duncan Smith 
MH – Michael Howard 
DC – David Cameron 
 
For an explanation as to why the period in question has been 
divided in this way, see Chapter 3: Theoretical and 
Methodological Frameworks. 
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‘Let sleeping dogs lie’ can be a dangerous motto 
if the dogs in question are growing as they sleep.1 
 
Letter to the Foreign Secretary on  ‘Immigration Control 
and Race Relations in Britain’, 1979. 
 
  
                                                 
1 The National Archives of the UK (TNA): FCO50/664, Letter from the High Commissioner in India to the 
Foreign Secretary, titled ‘Immigration Control and Race Relations in Britain’, 25 July 1979. 1979f. 
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Introduction 
 
1.1 Field of research 
The consequences of immigration policy – social, economic and political – are hugely 
significant. In a globalising world, the issue of immigration continues to be divisive, stirring 
up debate about identity, citizenship and rights. While scholars have examined migration 
flows (‘push-pull’ factors, among others) and there has been some attempt to identify the 
forces which influence policy-making, few have explained the continuing developments in 
immigration policy within a critical historical context.1 The policies that determine who is 
allowed in and who is kept out are designed by governments, which generally comprise of 
mainstream political actors rather than the extremist politicians or populist media platforms 
that many researchers choose to focus on.2 In order to really understand immigration policy, 
and what drives it in a democracy, the focus needs to be on major – and mainstream – political 
parties. Until now, political scientists in the comparative tradition have mostly focused on 
the impact of extremist parties or on the administrative side of the equation (both at the 
European and at the national level), possibly because of the lack of collaboration and overlap 
between political scientists working on immigration and those working on mainstream 
parties.3 
Outside of Scandinavia, European centre-right parties have traditionally enjoyed long periods 
in power, and are therefore in a position to formulate and implement policy. However, they 
are relatively under-studied compared to their centre-left counterparts. Conservative parties 
have tended to enjoy a strong electoral lead over the centre-left on immigration and asylum: 
immigration, after all, is linked to issues of national identity and upholding the existing ethnic 
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composition of society as well as conserving established ideological traditions.4 Yet 
immigration is also a source of tension for centre-right parties.5 Traditional conservatives 
should, in theory, oppose immigration for its impact on established traditions and forms of 
social cohesion. Neoliberal conservatives, should, in theory, welcome immigration as a 
means of replenishing the labour force, offering greater choice to business, limiting wage 
inflation and weakening the trade unions. However, in practice different considerations are 
emphasised as political priorities change.6 Furthermore, immigration policy needs to be 
nuanced — a more hard-line stance will satisfy core voters, but risks alienating more 
moderate supporters and undermining party cohesion. It is a difficult balance, and some 
academics have argued that immigration policy involves dealing with such conflicting 
dynamics (the benefits to the economy versus the greater costs associated with policing mass 
immigration) that in practical terms policy is more about ‘managing’ immigration than 
implementing some of the bolder objectives that parties promise while in opposition.7 
Britain has been referred to as Europe’s would-be zero immigration country for its relative 
success in limiting unwanted migration.8 Partly for this reason, the UK has been labelled a 
‘deviant case’ in terms of immigration policy.9 Over the post-war period, the country has 
undergone a substantial transformation: from a state with a liberal, somewhat extensive 
notion of citizenship (which was open, at one point, to 600 million people), to a much more 
restrictive regime with an infrastructure to fine, detain and deport those who enter illegally, 
or outstay their welcome, while sifting the well-paid high-flyers from the low-paid unskilled. 
During this time immigration into the UK has been driven by several factors: rapid economic 
growth, which resulted in labour shortages, with a consequent demand for migrant workers; 
decolonisation with the end of British rule in overseas territories; serious conflicts around the 
world, which have generated migration by asylum-seekers; and globalisation as well as 
greater co-operation between states (especially since Britain joined the European Union, or, 
as it was then known, the European Economic Community) both of which have led to easier 
travel and greater awareness of conditions in other countries.10 This has resulted in ‘waves’ 
of immigration, with each characterised by a predominant type, from economic migrant to 
reunited relative, from asylum-seeker to ‘illegal’ immigrant. 
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By examining how the UK Conservative Party has developed its immigration policy, this 
project will adopt a different approach from that used by many researchers, who have tended 
to overlook the role of mainstream political parties in influencing immigration policy. This 
thesis will therefore consider party policy as the dependent variable with a number of factors 
acting as independent variables. There is much to be examined in this field: the ‘standard’ 
response of the Conservative Party to the ‘waves’ of immigration has been to call for, and 
legislate for, restrictions on the means of entry that permitted that particular type of 
immigration.11 The policy of introducing restrictions began when the Conservative 
government brought to an end the relatively liberal immigration regime in 1962 with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act. Less than a decade later, the 1971 Immigration Act gave 
government much greater control over regulating immigration, with the exception of 
‘patrials’ — those with close family connections to the UK. The policy of increasing 
restrictions continued under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Although certain 
commitments from the 1979 manifesto were dropped, legislation was introduced to tighten 
up immigration rules. The 1981 British Nationality Act narrowed the concept of citizenship 
and signalled a clear break with the UK’s imperial legacy and consequent obligations. During 
the late 1990s, the Conservative Party once again turned up the volume on immigration, with 
only a brief hiatus during David Cameron’s early years in the leadership. In 2010, Cameron’s 
coalition government signalled their intention to reduce net migration to below 100,000 a 
year, tightened up the existing points-based visa system and set a cap on the number of non-
EU migrants.12 
It is a puzzle that while Britain has become increasingly open to the free movement of 
services, goods and capital, it has adopted more restrictive immigration policies, continuing 
to filter the movement of people and differentiating between ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ forms 
of migration.13 It is by no means clear how this transition has occurred, nor the extent to 
which influences within and outside the Conservative Party have impacted on the 
development of policy. At a time when immigration remains a priority for both parliamentary 
debates and news bulletins, when expenditure on border staff, the visa regime and other 
documentation, health checks for migrants, detention centres and related infrastructure is 
higher than before, it is more critical than ever to understand the complexities of this issue. 
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This thesis also seeks to examine whether the post-war Conservative Party succeeded in 
narrowing the gap between rhetoric and reality in its approach towards immigration and 
asylum. This ‘gap’ refers to the concept that Conservative immigration policy is tough in 
rhetoric when the Party is in opposition, but more moderate in action when the Party is in 
government. In 2005, the Conservative Party under Michael Howard pledged to take back 
control of asylum policy and withdraw from the 1951 Refugee Convention.14 In practice, 
such a proposal would have been nearly impossible to implement and it was later quietly 
dropped. More recently, David Cameron’s Conservatives promised to reduce net migration 
to the ‘tens of thousands’, an outcome which experts claimed – publicly and privately – to be 
extremely unlikely, and which was not met by 2015. Such examples raise the question of 
why the Party would make pledges that it (most likely) cannot keep. The project will 
therefore scrutinise the processes involved in the formation of immigration policy, within the 
Party (representatives, officials, ordinary members) as well as within government and via the 
civil service, without ignoring the impact of the media and voluntary organisations.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
Consequently, this project focuses on the following question: 
 
What has driven and continues to drive the development of post-war Conservative 
Party immigration and asylum policy?  
 
The following sub-questions will be considered in order to answer the main question: 
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1. To what extent is the policy-making process influenced by periods in government and 
periods in opposition?  
 
2. In what sense do the following factors drive immigration policy?  
a. The Party’s fear of electoral defeat 
b. The different leaders of the Party 
c. The Party management, or, in other words, the extent to which the different 
factions leading – or aspiring to lead –  the Party can be controlled 
 
3. What is the impact of the perceived divide on immigration policy between elites and 
the general public? Is the policy-making process influenced by public opinion; Party 
activists and members; think-tanks and interest groups?  
 
 
1.3 Main contribution and relevance 
This thesis argues that the Conservative Party’s immigration policy-making is dependent 
firstly on whether the Party is in government or in opposition, and secondly that subsequent 
policy is heavily influenced by electoral calculations as well as by the leadership and the 
management of the Party. As a result, it is possible to explain past policy decisions, if there 
is information on the Party’s electoral performances at a general and local level and its 
composition (that is, who is the leader, and which groups of Conservative politicians to a 
greater or lesser extent run the Party). This thesis makes four contributions to existing studies.  
First, the thesis will help us to understand the significance of political parties in the process 
of formulating immigration policy. Parties are much more than a mere platform for filtering 
up policies to government for implementation. Although it is increasingly recognised that 
parties make a difference, few political scientists or historians of immigration have looked in 
detail at how immigration policy is made within parties – complex coalitions of competing 
interests and tensions – as well as within governments.15 In undertaking a ‘thick-descriptive’ 
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look at the making of Conservative immigration policy, this thesis will make clear the 
enduring impact of political parties on policy-making, be they in office or in opposition.  
Second, the thesis will examine why there often exists a gap between a party’s promised 
immigration policy, and its implementation of that policy, and to what extent senior party 
figures are aware of this during the policy-making process. This thesis will consider, if a 
party does compromise once in power, why it does so, and in what ways it is influenced by 
organised interests. These influences may be within the party (from certain backbenchers, or 
supporters’ groups for example) or from outside (from business groups, professional 
organisations, such as trades unions, or even other political parties). The use of the 
Conservative Party as a case study is fitting given the Party’s longevity in office and its 
significant influence on the direction of UK policy.  
Third, the thesis will consider the degree to which electoral positioning is an influence on 
immigration policy, and to what extent parties’ policies are developed in relation to their 
position relative to other political parties. This is particularly interesting given the dynamics 
of immigration for a mainstream, centre-right party, which considers immigration policy as 
its ‘territory’ and a seemingly obvious vote-winner, and yet consistently tough rhetoric may 
not be the best option: a more hard-line stance will satisfy core voters, but risks alienating 
more moderate supporters and undermining party cohesion. It has been argued that this 
antipathy to immigration may cost the Conservatives enough seats to deny them a majority 
government in future general elections.16 The project will also examine the extent to which 
parties adopt policies on immigration in the hope of attracting support at the ballot box or are 
motivated by broader concerns and hence seek to rally the electorate around policies in tune 
with those concerns.  
Finally, this thesis contributes to the theoretical literature by bringing together existing 
theories into a new hybrid framework to explain policy-making. Given that few scholars who 
have looked at immigration policy have used both a political science and a migration studies 
approach, and given that it is rare for their work to draw on literature within the ‘political 
parties’ and the ‘policy’ fields, the research project will make a much-needed intellectual 
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contribution. This thesis deepens our understanding of how policy-making can be tracked 
and investigated. The approach could potentially be applied to other political parties or policy 
areas.  
 
1.4 Outline of thesis 
This thesis examines the development of the Conservative Party’s immigration policy as 
follows. A critical examination of the existing literature on political parties, policy-making 
and immigration is outlined in Chapter Two. This section considers the concepts and debates 
which are key to a greater understanding of immigration policy change. In order to situate 
this research within a wider context, this chapter offers an overview of the most frequently 
used explanatory frameworks. While the existing approaches are useful, they are often 
lacking in some way. The key point of this section is that political parties have rarely been 
studied as agents of migration policy change, because most research has tended to focus on 
economic factors and institutionalist accounts.  
The theoretical and methodological frameworks which underpin this research are presented 
in Chapter Three. This is a political-historical thesis, which takes on an interpretivist 
approach as a conceptual framework for analysis, with the approach defined here as a socially 
constructed space in which policy-making is a result of opposing views taking place within 
webs of meanings that are in continuous conflict. The work develops and builds on a 
theoretical synthesis that is derived from existing theories from within political science and 
migration studies. By looking at how these concepts and theories can, for the first time, work 
together and complement each other, the propositions of the project are drawn out. The thesis 
then introduces and justifies the mixed methodology and methods which have allowed for 
the effective collection of data using elite, semi-structured interviews and analysis of both 
archival sources and grey material as well as contemporary media sources and memoirs. 
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The main findings of the research – based on empirical analysis – are presented in Chapters 
Four, Five, Six and Seven. The decision to divide the period from 1945 to 2015 into four 
roughly equal chronological chapters, and within each chapter, by parliamentary terms, is 
justified by the focus on policy-making in periods of government and periods of opposition. 
Each of the four periods is characterised by a dominant ‘type’ of immigration to the UK (such 
as economic or secondary migration/ family reunification), followed by a particular 
Conservative Party ‘response’ (such as administrative controls or legislation). The 
segmentation means that each period can be considered as a separate case study within a 
longitudinal, comparative historical analysis. A time frame shorter than the 70 years under 
review would not allow for the examination of the Conservative Party on multiple occasions 
as it transitions into and out of government. Each of the empirical chapters is divided into 
two sections: the first half gives a sense of the development of the Conservative immigration 
policy within a historical context. The second half provides an analytical explanation for 
these changes to policy. 
The immediate post-war period, from 1945 up to 1964, as the UK moved from post-war 
reconstruction to economic recovery, is examined in Chapter Four. First, the more important 
changes in the Tories’ approach to immigration are considered. The Party’s policy-making 
is then explained using the theoretical framework expounded previously. Over six general 
elections and under four different leaders, the Party became gradually concerned by the 
immigration issue, sought to do something about it, commissioned committees and reports, 
resolved to let the matter stand, and then, finally, brought in legislation to limit the numbers. 
In 1955, the Home Secretary told Cabinet that it would be ‘necessary to pass some legislation 
sooner or later’.17 It was not until 1962 that legislative controls on immigration were 
introduced. 
The Conservative Party’s immigration policy from 1964 to 1979 is analysed in Chapter Five. 
The key developments in the Tories’ approach to managing immigration are presented first, 
followed by an analysis of the changes to policy which considers the validity of the 
propositions in question. Over five general elections and under three different leaders, the 
Conservatives struggled with the issue as it exposed – and widened – fault lines within the 
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Party, before eventually settling on a severe tightening up of immigration control. A 
contemporary report on the election of 1964 dismissed the arguments used by the minority 
in favour of further controls as ‘based more on fear than on facts’.18 These arguments would, 
in time, become widely accepted – and not only within the Conservative Party. 
The changes made to the Tories’ immigration policy from 1979 to 1997 are investigated in 
Chapter Six. Beginning with an examination of the more significant developments in the 
Conservatives’ dealings with the immigration issue, there is then an explanation for such 
changes. Over four parliaments, and under two different leaders, the Conservatives held on 
to office for an uninterrupted period of nearly two decades. By the 1990s, the Conservative 
Party had switched its focus; no longer were the Tories so concerned by the family 
reunification route, instead, they turned their attention to asylum seekers, of whom many 
were suspected to be fraudulent – a reaction to economic routes to the UK having previously 
been tightened up. Conservative policy was – to the frustration of ministers – a response to 
migrants entering the country under different labels.  
In the final empirical chapter, the development of the Conservative Party’s immigration 
policy from 1997 to 2015 is examined. The Party endured three long periods in opposition 
and one period in government (albeit in coalition), five general elections, countless by-
elections and four different leaders. The influences and the restraints on policy over a period 
of 18 years, during which there was considerable expansion of the European Union (from 15 
to 28 member states) and growing public concern about the impact and implications of 
immigration, are examined. The context is one of frequent bouts of international instability, 
which have created new refugees in Syria, specifically, and the Middle East, more generally. 
By 2015, the Conservative Party had developed a system of managing immigration that was 
more restrictive, more extensive and more comprehensive than ever before. 
Lastly, Chapter Eight summarises the findings from the empirical research in the previous 
chapters with the objective of providing a response to the main research question of this 
thesis: namely, what has driven and continues to drive the Conservative Party’s immigration 
policy? The findings that this thesis has identified through empirical analysis are presented. 
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The first section considers what can be understood from separating policy-making into 
periods when the Conservatives were in government and when they were in opposition. The 
second section assesses the ‘drivers of change’ (electoral considerations; the impact of 
leadership; the influence of factions) with regard to how they can explain the developments 
in Conservative Party immigration policy. Next, it moves on to the substantive and 
methodological findings of the study in terms of its contributions to knowledge and considers 
the applicability of the findings for a wider research context. Finally, this chapter 
acknowledges the limitations of this thesis, the challenges that have been identified during 
the research process and puts forwards suggestions for future work. 
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Party Positions on Immigration  
 
The politics of immigration is deeply contested, and policy-making in this field is no less 
controversial. In order to explain changes to immigration policy, it is worth considering how 
existing research has sought to explain such developments. This chapter reviews the 
academic debates so as to identify the major findings and to assess what is missing from 
existing literature. Generally speaking, research in this field has tended to emphasise 
economic and social factors and to privilege institutionalist accounts. While political parties 
might be regarded as falling under the broad category of institutionalism, parties have rarely 
been studied as agents of immigration policy change. Existing work in this field is generally 
explanatory or technically-focused, and there is space for an interpretivist approach which 
seeks to find out how party policy-making really works. This chapter argues that political 
parties – and more specifically, elite understandings and interpretations of immigration – 
must be brought into explanations of policy change. 
In order to situate this research within a wider context, this chapter offers an overview of the 
most frequently used explanatory frameworks. First, it begins by looking at political 
economy models, which generally argue that a country’s system, or ‘type’, of political 
economy dictates its migration policy. Next, the chapter explores institutionalist accounts, 
which argue that immigration policy is defined by the relative strengths and weaknesses of a 
country’s executive, legislative and judiciary. The chapter then moves on to discuss the 
interplay between public opinion and policy-making as a key part of the democratic process, 
but one that is not without its problems. While these approaches – and variants of them – are 
useful to scholars of migration policy, each of them is lacking in some way.  
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In order to get a fuller understanding of the making of policy, the focus must be on political 
parties. They do, after all, make up the governments which implement policy. Political parties 
do not exist in a vacuum: they act, and they are acted upon. They structure the process of 
policy-making by bringing together issues and ideas. Finally, the chapter tightens its focus 
by providing an overview of the existing research on political parties and immigration policy-
making in the Western world. 
 
2.1 Political economy models 
Within the last 20 years or so, scholars of migration policy and politics have sought to 
emphasise the importance of the interaction between economic, social and political factors. 
Writing in 1992, James Hollifield said there had been no ‘clear attempt to examine the way 
in which the interaction of politics and markets affects migration’.1 Instead, scholars had 
looked at these factors in isolation, concentrating on ‘the economic (push-pull) or the politics 
(policies) of migration’.2 Hollifield called for a move towards a political economy of 
international migration. Since then, scholars such as Georg Menz and Alex Caviedes have 
argued, respectively, that migration policy is strongly influenced by different systems of 
political economy and that research in this field must deal with political-economic factors.3 
Caviedes refers to his work as ‘an economically-informed viewpoint to the body of 
scholarship on immigration policy’.4 If anything, it looks as if political economy is likely to 
become more important to the development of migration policy in the Western world. Terms 
such as ‘managed migration’, in which the economic argument is critical, have become 
commonplace in the literature. The ‘core’ of managed migration is ‘managerial, economic 
and restrictive, focusing on the potential economic and social contributions by immigrants to 
host societies’.5 Menz predicts a future in which policy will be ‘less influenced by 
humanitarian factors and more by economic rationale’, and policy proposals will pay lip 
service to both populists and pragmatists.6  
25 
 
Many scholars of the political economy tradition concentrate on the tensions that liberal 
democracies hold for the policy-maker in terms of limiting policy options – but this territory 
is not limited to political economists. In his 2013 text, James Hampshire contends that there 
are four key features of the liberal state – representative democracy, constitutionalism, 
capitalism, and nationhood – which produce conflicting imperatives for policy-making.7 The 
result is policy that is muddled or inconsistent.8 In a study on immigration and the political 
economy of post-war Europe, Hollifield considers those political and economic factors (such 
as globalised labour markets and greater rights for minority groups) which have influenced 
the rise in immigration levels in the Western world.9 Caviedes argues, however, that 
globalisation is not the answer in itself, or at least not the primary force. He says that 
migration should not be perceived as a ‘symptom’ of globalisation but ‘an economic policy 
tool for mediating the effects’ of globalisation.10 It is less difficult to control the flow of 
migrants than the flow of capital.11  
For scholars such as Caviedes and Menz, the system, or type, of political economy is a 
determining factor in a country’s migration policy.12 In his 2008 text, Menz considers how 
European countries are seeking to combine more permissive channels for those desirable 
migrants (the highly-skilled and well-paid) with increasingly tough policies for those 
migrants deemed to be less in demand (the unskilled or asylum seekers).13 He finds that the 
relative success of non-state actors (such as employer organisations and trade unions) in 
influencing immigration policy depends on the system of political economy and the relative 
size of elements of the economy which they inhabit.14 Caviedes argues that ‘the labour market 
preferences of firms cannot be understood in isolation from their national market 
institutions’.15 This is, in part, a follow-up to his line of argument that labour migration policy 
is ‘increasingly determined at the sectoral level’.16 However, it is not the case that sectoral 
preferences lead directly to the sectoral policy outcomes; the state’s type of political economy 
shapes its immigration policy.  
Similarly, Gary Freeman’s typology of interests (see Table 1) finds that immigration policy 
is a result of both the substance and the relative power dynamics of (economic) interests 
within society. In his 1995 paper, Freeman looked at the political process in liberal 
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democracies as one major element of self-limited sovereignty.17 Some scholars, such as 
Joppke, argue that interest groups, or ‘immigration clients’ are responsible for changes to 
immigration policy.18 Building on his 1995 work, Freeman proposes a typology in which 
‘immigration policy can be disaggregated into […] components which are associated with 
different issues and patterns of benefits and costs that elicit distinctive modes of politics’.19 
By bringing together the work on policy of Lowi and Wilson, who respectively, argue that 
there are three categories of policies (distributive, redistributive and regulatory) and that 
policies have distributional consequences (benefits and costs can be concentrated or diffuse, 
which leads to different types of politics), Freeman is able to refine these frameworks to 
differentiate between four types of policy.20   
Table 1: Four types of Policy and Politics21 
 
 
Thus, for example, policies which have concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, such as 
permanent residence visas, are likely to lead to ‘client politics’, in which ‘relatively small 
and easily organised groups lobby […] for policies that provide them with direct benefits’.22 
Policy type Migration type/policy Mode of politics 
Concentrated distributive  
(i.e. concentrated benefits/ 
diffuse costs) 
Permanent residence visa 
 
Client 
Diffuse distributive 
(i.e. diffuse benefits/ diffuse 
costs) 
Non-immigrant visas for 
purposes other than work 
Majoritarian 
Redistributive  
(i.e. concentrated benefits/ 
concentrated costs) 
Non-immigrant visas for 
work, welfare for immigrants, 
non-immigrants and asylum 
seekers 
Interest group 
Regulatory  
(i.e. diffuse benefits/ 
concentrated costs) 
Asylum claims Entrepreneurial 
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Freeman finds that the policy types tend to produce the predicted modes of politics; at times, 
depending on the economic situation, for example, some follow his model more closely than 
others.23  
In something of a test of Freeman’s model, Paul Statham and Andrew Geddes, in their work 
on interest groups and NGOs (non-governmental organisations), find that the direction of 
immigration policy is highly institutionalised and dominated by elites, rather than the 
‘outcome of an organised pro-migrant lobby winning over a resource-weak diffuse anti-
migrant lobby’ as Freeman suggests.24 In his text of 2000 on immigration in post-war Britain, 
Randall Hansen attributes importance to the influence of elites. He notes that when UK 
immigration policy was restrictive, this was because ‘elite preferences were channelled into 
policy outcomes more directly in Britain than in any other liberal democracy’.25 
In much of the political economy and migration literature, there is a new-found emphasis on 
businesses and employers’ groups. Caviedes refers to employers as the ‘initiators of policy 
reform’, ‘key actors’; Menz says that employers’ interest in certain types of migrants 
‘strongly condition[s] government policy’.26 The literature argues that businesses are entities 
which directly experience worker shortages (or surpluses) and which have no hesitation in 
making their needs known to government. Furthermore, there are few barriers to employers 
being involved, or even being seen to be involved, in helping develop labour migration policy 
– and many benefits. Caviedes argues that employers want flexibility: their policy 
preferences are strongly informed by the flexibility needs which vary from sector to sector, 
and which reflect changes in the labour market.27 He identifies four types of flexibility: 
‘numerical’, which is the extent to which management can take on or dismiss workers in line 
with fluctuations in demand; ‘temporal’, which is the freedom to adjust the amount of labour 
in responses to shifts in economic demand (e.g. seasonal); ‘wage’, which is the extent to 
which employers can set salaries, independent of collective bargaining agreements or 
statutory pay scales; and lastly, ‘functional’, which is the degree of effort required to switch 
employees’ tasks in response to changes in demand, which depends also on how rigidly duties 
are described in employment contracts and collective agreements.  
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Some scholars look specifically at the UK and how ‘the acceptance of immigration [has] 
historically hinged on economistic calculations’, which Menz argues is a ‘thread of 
continuing importance’.28 Caviedes uses the UK as a case study to support the argument that 
employers are the key actors in driving immigration policy, even if it is the government which 
often takes the lead in initiating policy changes. He finds that there has been ‘a close 
alignment between business preferences and British policy decision decisions’.29 However, 
this comes with a caveat. Until fairly recently, he argues, little effort has been spent on using 
labour migration in a systematic way to deal with specific skills shortages in particular 
sectors. This is down to peculiarly British reasons: UK immigration policy in the post-war 
period has concerned itself mostly with political and social, rather than economic, 
implications. British industrial relations have been characterized by ‘decentralized and a-
sectoral patterns’, while employers have engaged in ‘atomized lobbying practices’, meaning 
that only very large, and often public, enterprises (for example, see the National Health 
Service in the post-war years) can force policy change.30 Business organisations such as the 
CBI have maintained a lower lobbying profile; they have done little more than make ‘general 
appeals for expanded schemes for short-term, seasonal and casual migrant labour’.31 The 
difficulty for Caviedes is that, in the absence of a cohesive business community actively 
agitating for distinct policy preferences, it is the British government which must be viewed 
as the key actor in the development of labour migration. But if one goes down a level, ‘it is 
employers and employers’ associations at the sectoral level that provide the necessary 
information concerning labour needs’ (my italics).32 
While the fields of policy-making and migration studies can benefit from an economically 
informed viewpoint which considers the interactions between politics and markets, the 
political economy model is not without its problems. Christina Boswell argues that political 
economy approaches to migration, while ‘theoretically robust’, come at the cost of over-
simplification.33 Although the emphasis on businesses and employers’ groups as a factor in 
migration policy development is to be welcomed, there is little to no acknowledgement that 
these organisations are products of their environment, and do not necessarily behave in a way 
that seems, logically at least, in their own interests. It is questionable too whether the political 
economy model is sophisticated enough to accommodate different political ideologies when 
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generally all governments (of different colours) within one ‘type’ of political economy are 
regarded as being, in effect, the same and pursuing the same policies. Finally, while political 
economists acknowledge that governments are the key agents in the development of 
migration policy, there is no attempt to examine the institutions that make up the government. 
 
2.2 Institutionalist accounts  
Institutionalist scholars generally emphasise the formal organisations or bodies of 
government as moderators of immigration policy. Frequently, institutions apply an 
expansionary pressure to often restrictive policies. Institutionalist scholars tend to regard 
institutions (such as the civil service and the judiciary) as relatively independent bodies, at 
least in democracies; the actors within such institutions can – and do – exercise a reasonable 
degree of power, and they are obliged to do so in a supposedly non-partisan way. Their 
actions may well go against the immigration control policy objectives of the governing 
political party.  
The judiciary in liberal states, as Christian Jopkke conceives it, is supposedly independent 
from political pressures, and obliged to act according to the principles of non-discriminatory 
law – thus, the legal process is seen as a relatively expansionary influence on immigration 
policy, in the face of a (generally) restrictive executive.34 Actors within such institutions can 
rely on legal texts which tend to be ‘neutral’ with regard to the nationality of those involved.35 
Virginie Guiraudon’s ‘institutional sociology’ approach seeks to explain how bureaucracies  
as well as the judiciary have played a role in expanding rights to non-national residents, 
simply through the inclusionary, non-discriminatory nature of the law and the welfare state.36 
Her approach emphasises a struggle to exert control among actors. It is this conflict that 
means that developments in policy may appear to be ‘contradictory and adhocratic’.37 
The institutional argument operates within a sphere in which bodies are actively trying to 
bolster their own power, and undermine that of their competitors (or ‘escape domestic 
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adversaries’).38 Guiraudon portrays the civil service as acting in their own interests and trying 
to reclaim lost land; referring to one episode she says that ‘migration control bureaucrats 
went transnational at that particular moment because they had seen their action increasingly 
constrained in the early 1980s’.39 She argues that policy actors seek venues that are conducive 
to their own interests, so they appeal to international organisations and existing legislation. 
By avoiding the creation of an international migration regime with precise mechanisms, civil 
servants could evade legal limitations and scrutiny.40  
The argument of convenience is a variation on this concept of competing institutions and 
organisations. In her case study of France, Germany and the Netherlands, Guiraudon argues 
that ‘incorporating migrants into existing legal and bureaucratic structures seems more 
politically acceptable than setting up special programmes and special rules for migrants’ and 
is also less costly in economic terms.41 Furthermore, incorporation into existing systems 
works well for the courts: their legitimacy, Guiraduon argues, is bolstered by an appearance 
of consistency in passing judgements. This is because ‘if [courts] treat different groups/ 
constituencies differently, they will not be credible as neutral arbiters’.42 
Britain, however, is more immune than most liberal states to interventions of this kind. 
Hansen argues that Britain’s institutional framework makes it unusual: ‘the UK succeeds 
where others fail [in implementing policies to control migration] because its self-imposed 
constraints are weaker’.43 By this he means that the UK has a ‘strong’ executive, a ‘weak’ 
legislature and a ‘timid’ judiciary which has meant that governments, once they respond to 
public demands, are able to restrict immigration relatively quickly and effectively.44  
Institutionalist accounts often subscribe to a path-dependent view, highlighting the notion 
that changes to policy, and more generally, institutions, limit what can be done in future. 
Once an arrangement has been put in place, or a particular group has been provided with 
concessions, this is very difficult to undo.45 Hansen refers to a kind of ‘stickiness’ which acts 
as an obstacle to change.46 This is one explanation for variance within countries’ immigration 
policies: ‘original policies proved difficult to reverse or modify’.47 Thus, he argues that the 
Kenyan Asians who entered the UK in 1968 ‘would have had no legal right of entry without 
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the combined feedback effects of 1948 and 1962 legislation’.48 The concept of a ‘feedback 
loop’ which restricts the direction of policy and related events is alluded to in accounts which 
emphasise the importance of legacy in restricting policy-making. As Stephen Castles and 
Mark Miller put it, the UK is the exception to the West European pattern in that most post-
war immigrants entered with full citizenship and voting rights, in part because of the UK’s 
obligations to the Commonwealth and Ireland.49  
Institutionalist accounts provide an important focus on institutions as (generally) moderating 
influences on immigration policy. However, Boswell is sceptical of accounts which stress 
institutional resistance to executive policies; she says that ‘this begs the question of the 
origins of organisational capacity to resist the interests of politics’.50 Could these institutions 
be dismantled by other institutions within the state, should their actions be in conflict with 
(higher) interests? She argues that these characteristics, say, the separation of powers, or 
judicial independence, are such fundamental components of a liberal democratic system that 
‘the state cannot simply roll back these provisions where the actions of these bodies conflict 
with its own political interests’.51 However, she does not consider that these traits can be 
undermined by the executive, if not fully dismantled. In focussing so heavily on institutions, 
there is also a tendency to overemphasise the power of institutions with regard to the pressure 
that they are under from executive policies. Institutionalist accounts rarely acknowledge the 
political parties, whose members make up parts of the executive and the legislature and, 
sometimes, the judiciary, nor do they consider the influence of public opinion. 
 
2.3 Public opinion as a driver of policy-making 
Public opinion is considered by some scholars as fundamental to the development of public 
policy, and, indeed, a functioning democracy. Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien argue 
that ‘representation of the public’s policy preferences remains a – if not the – central concern 
in electoral and inter-electoral politics’.52 Given that (elected) politicians must satisfy the 
public in order to retain their position, ‘politicians have both a keen interest in representing 
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the public and the seeming means to do so’; or at least they are better able to do so, following 
the development of more sophisticated tools for capturing public opinion.53 Soroka and 
Wlezien’s model of ‘opinion-policy dynamics’ works along these lines: ‘a responsive public 
will behave like a thermostat […] adjusting its preferences for “more” or “less” policy in 
response to what policymakers do’.54 The direction of influence works both ways, that is, the 
link between public opinion and policy is a reciprocal one – ‘policymakers respond to 
changes in public preferences over time’.55 After all, if it was not for voters’ responsiveness 
to policy, there would be ‘little basis for policy responsiveness to public opinion. Politicians 
not only would have little incentive to represent preferences in policy; they would have little 
information to go on, as public opinion would be an essentially meaningless signal’.56  
Other scholars also posit that there is a two-way transfer, or even a theoretical interconnection 
between the policy-makers and public opinion. In many ways, these concepts and models 
have much in common with the work of David Easton and Karl Deutsch on public 
responsiveness (or how processes can be applied to societies and governments) as an 
important part of modern democratic systems. Easton emphasises the idea of a ‘feedback 
loop’, or a connection between inputs and outputs, in which a system can take on preferences 
(or public opinion) and respond (with policy), perhaps ad infinitum.57 Deutsch’s 1966 text, 
The Nerves of Government proposes an equally mechanistic model. Feedback is ‘a 
communications network that produces action in response to an input of information, and 
includes the results of its own action in the new information by which it modifies its 
subsequent behaviour’.58 Thus there exists ‘goal-changing feedback’ in which the goal can 
change over time based on new information coming in. Of greater direct relevance to work 
on policy-making and public opinion is Deutsch’s concept of a ‘representative government’ 
and a ‘reactive public’ which exist in a system that involves both lag (‘whether governments 
react in a timely manner to preferences for change’) and gain (‘whether the extent of the 
change is less, more, or exactly what the public wants’).59 
Such models make assumptions on the capacity of ordinary citizens to understand policies 
and policy development, and are open to the criticism that too high expectations are being 
laid upon the public. Soroka and Wlezien acknowledge this, and state that it would be an 
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‘extreme’ case if ‘voters [were] continuously monitoring the world, looking for evidence of 
policy activity’.60 In Page and Shapiro’s 1992 text, The Rational Public, ordinary citizens are 
portrayed as individuals with sensible and coherent preferences, which change over time in 
response to events and information.61 In much the same way, Zaller’s ‘reception-acceptance 
model’ relies on a general public receiving and accepting new information and updating their 
preferences accordingly.62 This processing of relevant information regarding policy is critical 
if the policy-opinion thermostat model is to work properly.  
Other scholars argue that the expectations on the public regarding policy changes are, in fact, 
rather low. After all, the thermostatic model is not a particularly nuanced or complicated one; 
it requires only ‘that people can tell whether policy has gone “too far” in one direction or 
“not far enough” given their preferences’.63 (Of course, they must be aware of their 
preferences.) However, in their defence, Soroka and Wlezien refer to a ‘growing body of 
work [which] suggests that public responsiveness to policy is within the realm of 
possibility’.64 Despite these seemingly vague impressions of policy, relative preferences will 
change over time. The model does not require a body of totally committed and informed 
individuals armed with a comprehensive knowledge of all policy areas either. Instead, all that 
is necessary is that ‘some meaningful portion of citizens have a basic preference for policy 
change in one direction or the other and that they adjust this preference over time in reaction 
to what policymakers do, based on the information those citizens receive’ (my italics).65 
Some scholars suggest that elites make use of public opinion to use techniques which border 
on manipulation in order to further their agendas. Jacobs and Shapiro’s 2000 text Politicians 
Don’t Pander argues that elites do not follow the public’s policy preferences and that they 
follow public opinion in order to understand and change public opinion so that they may win 
support for their policies.66 Scholars such as Soroka and Wlezien refer to a kind of feedback 
involving political elites. So, it may not be the case that the public – at times – responds well 
to policy changes, or the cues that correspond to such changes. Instead, ‘politicians […] 
effectively mobilize opinion in advance of policy change, in effect to create the support that 
they then can represent’.67  
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The mobilising of public opinion is considered by some scholars in conjunction with the 
development of Western immigration policy.68 Gallya Lahav finds evidence that public 
attitudes within Europe are both ‘informed’ and ‘stable’ and that there is ‘a predictable and 
systematic attachment to immigration issues that expose a fairly sophisticated European 
public and that are reflected in EU policy developments on immigration and asylum’.69 Lahav 
argues that there is a particularly nuanced relationship between public opinion and policy-
making, one which other scholars may have been sceptical of for some time, given, as she 
puts it, that immigration policy has long been made ‘in the absence of public debate’.70 
However, she finds evidence that public opinion, while not the ‘decisive factor’ in policy-
making, may be used by leaders who can ‘convert’ and ‘translate’ issues such as immigration 
on to the agenda.71  
Public opinion is cited to be a driving force behind the development of immigration policy 
in the UK. Looking at the Churchill leadership of the Conservative Party in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, Andrew Roberts gives an account of the formation of immigration policy as 
a response to growing public concern about rising numbers of immigrants: ‘there was no 
premeditated political programme’.72 Instead, short-term expediency and constituents’ 
correspondence to MPs guided the 1950s Conservative governments on immigration 
policy.73 Some 20 years later, the situation had changed little; public opinion continued to 
influence immigration policy making.74 Studlar’s text, which looks at the 1970 general 
election, strongly suggests that the wholly unexpected victory of the Conservative Party was 
in part down to the public’s perception that the Tories were tougher on immigration than their 
Labour opposition. In fact, despite the British public finding clear differences between the 
two parties, there was little difference: the 1970 manifestos of the Conservatives and the 
Labour Party did not differ significantly.75 The public’s belief that the Conservatives were 
tough on immigration reflected the impact of Enoch Powell’s hard-line speech of 1968; it did 
not seem to register with voters that the speech had led to his dismissal from the Conservative 
frontbench.  
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Referring to this episode, Studlar suggests that ‘people bring their perceptions of the parties 
and their opinions on immigration into line with their votes, rather than the reverse’.76 
Memories of Powell’s infamous speech served to ‘reinforce the perception that the 
Conservatives, alone, understood the make-up of public attitudes on the issue’.77 So much so 
that the Conservatives became known by voters as the ‘party of Powell’.78 McLean suggests 
that it was ‘only because of Powell’ that the Tories were considered to be ‘the party most 
likely to restrict coloured immigration’.79 In fact, as Studlar puts it, ‘the events of the [1970] 
parliamentary campaign […] worked to associate Powell’s position with the Conservative 
party, however much the party may have balked at the notion’.80 McLean argues that the 
unforeseen Tory victory at the 1970 general election was due to ‘the popularity of Powell’s 
view[s]’.81 
More recent work has continued to argue that public opinion is critical to, and constrains, 
immigration policy-makers, despite evidence that there is a great deal of ignorance regarding 
immigrants and immigration.82 It is commonly reported that citizens consistently 
overestimate the actual number of immigrants living in their country.83 In Ipsos MORI’s 
report of 2013, the mean estimate of the proportion of foreign-born people in the UK was 31 
per cent, compared to an actual proportion of around 13 per cent.84 Such erroneous 
perceptions have consequences – after all, ‘common majority sentiments identified in 
surveys’ consistently find that there are ‘too many’ migrants and thus ‘too few’ natives.85 
John Sides and Jack Citrin, who undertook analysis of respondents in 20 European countries, 
find that opinion about immigration is unrelated to the economic or demographic 
circumstances of the country: citizens of countries with greater numbers of migrants or a 
worse economic outlook do not display more resistance to immigration.86 What does seem 
to impact on public opinion are symbolic predispositions: there is a ‘significant relationship 
between a preference for cultural unity and opposition to immigration’.87 
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2.4 Political parties and policy-making  
Importantly, political parties are not left out from models of policy and public opinion; in 
fact, they often stand out. Political parties structure the process of policy-making by bringing 
together issues and ideas, in doing so, they provide a valuable service.88 Parties and 
politicians make the ‘cues’ – and for which they have a strong incentive to do – that the 
general public rely on to change their preferences. In other words, the ‘logic of party 
competition for votes encourages the structuring of policy alternatives – at least where 
citizens’ decision-making is concerned – in relatively simple ways’.89 Competition is 
fundamental to the functioning of the model because it is crucial to the transfer of information 
from government to voters.90 But it is not only fear of losing seats which compels parties to 
listen to a public that can reward or punish on the basis of how their personal preferences 
match up with the actions of the government. Some politicians may believe they are agents 
bound to represent public preferences in policy: Margaret Thatcher was ‘not in politics to 
ignore people’s worries […] [but] to deal with them’.91 Or perhaps, somewhat conveniently 
for elites, the public’s preferences sometimes tidily coincide with their own, and their party’s 
preferences. Regardless, parties are important: policy can [and does] diverge significantly 
simply because of party control of government’.92  
Political parties have a critical role to play in the making of public policy.93 Although in 
recent decades there has been some discussion of the degree to which political parties impact 
on policy, there is little evidence that parties’ impact on policy has declined.94 In Manfred 
Schmidt’s extensive review of the existing literature on political parties and public policy, he 
finds that parties do propose different options from those advocated by their contenders and 
they do drive policy-making.95 In trying to distinguish themselves from their competition, 
parties’ policy-making is influenced by elections and electoral results. This is the core of 
partisan theory (associated with Hibbs’ 1977 text), which hypothesises that policy tends to 
vary in response to electoral outcomes.96 Scholars have noted that applications of partisan 
theory to empirical data of OECD countries have generated very different results. 97 Imbeau 
et al posit that it is difficult to show impact: the ‘partisan effects would be too subtle to ensure 
sufficient robustness of cross-sectional statistical estimates’.98 The impact may be subtle, but 
37 
 
that does not mean that parties are not dynamic objects; parties ‘help to structure as well as 
reflect voter opinion – not only in terms of what citizens think but also what they think about 
[…] they respond to pressure but they also help to cue, channel and even ramp it up’.99 
Similarly, Triadafilos and Zaslove contend that parties have a ‘central role in representing 
competing societal preferences and, through participation in government, translating 
programs into public policy’.100 This, they argue, makes it all the more curious why so little 
research has been done on political parties and migration.  
In recent years, efforts have been made to consider political parties as agents of immigration 
policy-making.101 Earlier literature on parties and policy-making has tended to focus on 
parties’ influence on the generosity (or otherwise) of the welfare state or economic policies, 
in part because quantitative data on these topics was readily available.102 Previous research 
on immigration policy-making has concentrated on the state, and thus neglected to account 
for the role of political parties in determining immigration policies. Recent work has given 
political parties greater credit with regard to their impact on immigration policy. 
Writing in 1997, Lahav argues that parties continue to be significant in shaping the dialogue 
on immigration in Europe, but parties also act as a constraint on immigration policy-
making.103 She points out that political parties compete on the issue of immigration policy, 
yet there is little leeway for difference. Most political parties push for more restrictionist 
policies. Immigration policy is ‘marked by uneven political contestation’ because there are 
few votes for expanding immigration or extending the vote to immigrants.104 Despite this, 
parties do matter; ‘although the immigration issue has appeared to obscure ideological/party 
differences, party affiliation persists in differentiating attitudes towards immigration’.105 This 
fits with Lahav’s observation that ‘MEPs devalue the role of these traditional sources [parties 
or party groupings] in structuring their thinking, but their positions on immigration may be 
distinguished by party identification’.106 
Tomas Hammar takes a normative approach and argues that political parties function to solve 
social problems according to their party ideologies and the interests of voters. Immigrants, 
he says, as long as they remain foreign nationals, cannot vote, and so, parties, with no 
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prospect of electoral gain, may ignore immigrants’ interests. In such a situation, the logical 
line for a party to take will be based on their evaluation of how immigration will affect the 
welfare of their (non-immigrant) constituents.107 True, Hammar accepts that those 
immigrants who can vote – and very likely their descendants – are more likely to vote for 
left-wing, or social-democratic parties than conservative parties. However, nearly all political 
parties presume that (some of) their voters possess some degree of anti-immigrant feeling.108 
Parties must therefore walk a fine line between appeasing those with anti-immigrant views 
and not alienating new arrivals and their descendants. 
Along the same lines, Martin Schain regards political parties as a ‘driving force’ in the 
development – and politicization – of immigration policy, in part because the issue can be a 
useful one for parties.109 After all, political parties, he argues, are ‘responsible’ for the 
framing, shaping and placing on the political agenda of the issue.110 There are a number of 
reasons why the immigration issue is so valuable to parties. For one, the very process of 
immigration has an impact on the expanding, and changing nature, of the electorate. For vote-
seeking parties, immigrants are of particular interest because, Schain argues, they have not 
been ‘socialized’ within the system of their host country, and are thus more ‘available’ than 
native citizens.111 On the other hand, parties can exploit the issue of immigration, or make 
use of an opportunity to ‘shift committed native voters from one party to another’.112 
Immigrants then, exemplify a challenge to society, in terms of their very existence and their 
integration. Thus, for parties, the immigration issue may well possess a ‘usefulness in altering 
the electoral balance’.113 Ted Perlmutter focuses on the critical role that political parties play 
in politicising or depoliticising the issue. While he argues that political parties are 
‘autonomous actors’ and central to the development of immigration politics, he contends that 
‘the politicisation [of immigration] is deeper than Freeman has argued […] its roots lie in the 
inability of mass parties to control the political agenda’.114 Furthermore, he argues that 
Freeman’s portrayal of depoliticisation, while accurate in stituations in which ‘the national 
agenda of mass parties control the political agenda’ is less applicable to instances in which 
the narrative has been challenged.115 
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Triadafilos and Zaslove argue that political parties are ‘critical nodes’ connecting broader 
forces (such as ‘traditions of nationhood, international human rights, and liberal norms and 
procedures’) to political processes.116 They recognise that party politics plays an important 
role in determining policy-making and that a party-focused approach may result in a greater 
understanding of the dynamics of ‘changing preferences, their relation to strategic interests, 
and the means by which they are activated in policy-making processes and transformed into 
legislation’.117 Similarly, Adams et al conceive of what they call a unified theory of party 
competition which can account for party policy variation.118 Their theory brings together the 
spatial model of elections (associated with the rational choice tradition) in which policy 
considerations are the dominant influence of voter choice with the behavioural model 
(associated with empirical research) in which non-policy issues matter too. Triadafilos and 
Zaslove predict a more substantial role for political parties in migration as the issue becomes 
a means of dividing up political territory that is ever more contested.119 
Much research has shown that the party in office has a strong effect on shaping the state’s 
policy. Hansen’s book on citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain, which emphasises 
contingency and institutions as drivers of migration policy, contends that political parties 
have exercised their influence. He argues that ‘the deferral of migration restrictions until 
1962 […] resulted from the intersection of ideology and partisan power’, with the main 
political parties (and especially the Conservatives) showing a fondness for the 
Commonwealth and the rights of its citizens.120 Certainly, UK governments of the post-war 
years have been – on the whole – restrictionist in their approach towards immigration policy, 
but party political differences continue to matter. There are, it seems, ‘party political shades 
of elite restrictionism’; in the UK, Conservative governments took a much more restrictive 
stance than their Labour counterparts over the period from 1990 to 2004.121  
Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke look at the ‘variable role of political partisanship across 
different areas of immigration policy’ and come to an interesting conclusion.122 They 
hypothesise that ‘Left and Right parties are equally restrictive vis-a-vis policies to control 
immigration, but Right parties are more restrictive vis-a-vis policies to integrate already-
resident immigrants into society’.123 Research has found that the main UK political parties 
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push for similar policies on immigration control, but that there is variance on their policy 
positions for immigrant integration.124 Givens and Luedtke find some support for their 
hypothesis that as the immigration issue becomes more salient, the influence of ‘client 
politics’ decreases and immigration policy becomes tougher.125 Their research finds that 
party political differences ‘play a strong role in policies towards the integration of already-
resident immigrants’, but that they have less impact on immigration control policies.126 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out an overview of existing research in this field, which offers different 
explanations for the development of immigration policy. Research in this field has tended to 
focus on economic factors and institutionalist accounts, with a heavy emphasis on the 
technical detail of policy-making. Despite extensive research on migration policy-making, 
there are omissions within the literature, and there is space for an interpretivist approach 
which unpicks the ways in which elites have understood and managed the issue. This chapter 
has argued that political parties have not been studied fully as influential actors in their own 
right, and that researching the making of UK immigration policy by focusing on the 
Conservative Party serves to enhance existing research.  
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Theoretical and Methodological 
Frameworks 
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical and methodological frameworks which both 
underpin this research and help answer the research question: namely, what drives the 
development of the UK Conservative Party’s immigration policy? This thesis takes on an 
interpretivist approach as a conceptual framework for analysis, and builds upon a synthesis 
of theories. There are four parts to this chapter.  
First, the interpretivist approach is introduced. Interpretivism is taken here to mean that 
one’s understanding of reality stems from a socially constructed world in which actors and 
institutions constitute each other, in which policy-making is a result of opposing views 
taking place within webs of meanings that are in continuous conflict. Second, the 
theoretical framework, which synthesises three theories from within political science and 
migration studies, is set out. Each of the theories is of direct relevance to the study of policy 
and policy-making, and more specifically, to policy change. Third, the three propositions, 
which have been derived from the theoretical synthesis, are then discussed. The 
propositions are examined in each of the empirical chapters in order to assess whether they 
can explain immigration policy change over time.  
Finally, this chapter discusses the methodological framework of this thesis. This is a political-
historical study, which makes use of historical methods. A mixed-method approach is 
considered the most appropriate for this work, given several practical considerations. The 
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chapter then presents the methods behind the research that has been undertaken, namely, 
semi-structured interviews with elites and document analysis of both archival sources and 
grey material. Within each section, there is discussion of the issues that have been 
encountered during the course of research, and details of how the author has attempted to 
limit any difficulties. 
 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
3.1.1 Interpretivism 
While interpretivism has its roots in international relations and sociology, the interpretivist 
approach – and variants of it – can, and have, been used by innovative political scientists.1 
Interpretivism rejects the notion of fixed meanings of relationships; instead, individuals and 
organisations operate within socially constructed realities, in which ‘social facts’ are 
questioned and problematised.  
Epistemologically speaking, the interpretativist approach is anti-foundationalist. Facts do 
not exist on their own; they ‘develop’ within a context of prior meanings, beliefs and 
theories. Thus, the concept of ‘given truths’, whether based on logic or experience can be 
rejected.2 In ontological terms, as Alexander Wendt, a theorist of constructivism (one 
interpretivist approach) puts it, ‘material forces still matter and people are still intentional 
actors’.3 Meaning is dependent on the shared notions in which agents and institutions are 
embedded.4  Such an understanding elevates the notion of culture – environmental factors – 
which Wendt regards as ‘a condition of possibility for power and interest explanations.5 
The socially constructed world should be viewed as a by-product of opposing views taking 
place within webs of meanings that are in continuous conflict. It would be a mistake to 
regard concepts as permanent objects rather than unfixed and downright unstable concepts. 
For example, British citizenship has undergone great transformation – in intellectual work, 
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in legal terms and in popular culture – over the last 100 years, but even now, the concept 
can mean different things to different individuals in diverse environments. 
In research, the approach emphasises the necessity of structures to agency, and agency to 
structures, while regarding both as mutable concepts to influence and respond to, not 
‘reified objects’.6 More specifically, agents owe their interests and identities to structures 
with which they must interact, while structures exist and develop through the ‘discursive 
practices’ or ‘reciprocal interaction’ of agents.7 In summary, an interpretivist approach 
contains the assumption – and it is only an assumption – that ‘how people and states think 
and behave in world politics is premiered on their understanding of the world around 
them’.8 The crux is that individuals and institutions are self-reinforcing and self-producing; 
perceptions matter. 
 
3.1.2 Relevance to research 
Interpretivist research holds knowledge to be a more inter-connected concept than more 
traditional frameworks might allow for. The studying of political interventions and 
organisations as ‘atomised units’ which make sense on their own but which can be put 
together and studied as a coherent set, might be regarded by some interpretivist scholars as 
too rudimentary for the study of complex procedures or developments.9 The non-
interpretivist researcher might consider changes to immigration policy in a linear sense: 
there may be a ‘stimulus response’ approach (event X happens, which leads to event Y, and 
then event Z). By contrast, an interpretivist approach examines policy development as if it 
were a feedback loop of perceptions and prejudices, which work mutually and 
simultaneously. 
This dissertation argues that history – and process – do matter. The interpretivist approach 
(with its emphasis on ‘historical process’) allows for the continuation of ‘an argument 
about how the past shapes the way actors understood their present situation’.10 Of course, 
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decisions and events within the discipline of political science are seen as historically and 
socially contingent, but this in no way diminishes their importance. If anything, the 
interpretivist approach can ‘re-write’ and ‘re-tell’ history in distinctive and genuinely 
interesting ways. This thesis makes use of so-called thick description, which is often used 
by interpretivist scholars because it is one of the ‘best tools for constructing […] [a] story 
of other people’s constructions of what they are doing’.11 
 
3.2 Theoretical framework: hybrid 
Interpretivism is open to various disciplines, theories and methodologies; it can be a very 
open-ended framework. This dissertation refines the interpretivist approach further so that it 
is more relevant to the research. Thus, a hybrid theoretical framework – informed by three 
theories (or models) from within the political science and migration literature – is proposed. 
Each of the three is directly relevant to studies of policy, and more specifically, policy 
change. Though these three middle- to micro-range theories approach the subject from 
different perspectives, it is not inconceivable that they could work together coherently, and 
provide prompts or reference points during the research process. Two are situated within the 
political science wing (Gamble; Harmel and Janda) and one is from the migration studies 
field (Hollifield); it is expected that each of the three will provide a useful theoretical lens. In 
partnership with, and beyond, these theories, this thesis takes care to place politics ‘in time’ 
and to pay attention to the plurality of social processes, and the extent to which they show 
linkages across time, rather than disembodied ‘moments’ in history.12 
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The ‘politics of power’ versus the ‘politics of support’ 
Gamble’s theory, broadly speaking, states that a political party must gather popular support 
– ‘the politics of support’ – in order to govern – ‘the politics of power’. 13 A party in 
opposition is subject to different forces from when it is in government; it is these influences 
which construct distinct dynamics. Blake argues that for the party in office ‘[p]roblems come 
up one after another and are solved – or not solved – by empirical criteria’.14 The party in 
opposition, however, must ‘steer a tricky line between policy statements so clear that they 
give hostages to fortune or so vague that they offer no alternative at all’.15 There is a difficult 
balance of forces at work: parties that regard themselves as vote-catching operations prepared 
to promise anything will, once they are in office and limited by the constraints of the existing 
state, sorely disappoint the electorate, at the very least.  
In the context of this study, Gamble’s theory suggests that policy should be examined in 
segmented periods – when the Conservatives are in opposition and when the Conservatives 
are in government. With regard specifically to immigration policy, the theory would imply 
that the Party leadership in opposition makes policy according to what it perceives necessary 
to mobilise both grassroots and broader electoral support. However, by responding to the 
concerns of activists and voters (two distinct and at times – opposing – groups), policy may 
be hard-line, difficult to implement and inconsistent with the rest of the Party’s programme. 
Once in government, the Party’s immigration policy is more moderate because the Party 
reacts to interventions from the civil service, the judiciary and lobby groups by toning down 
the rhetoric and modifying policy. If Gamble’s theory does apply to this case study, this 
generates more questions. Do the Conservatives know at the time policy is being developed 
that they cannot deliver on their promises? If so, does the Party anticipate issues in the course 
of policy implementation and does it plan for compromise? If this is not the case, why do the 
Conservatives not realise that they cannot deliver? 
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The drivers of (policy) change in political parties 
In their work on political parties, Harmel and Janda also observe that the government/ 
opposition dimension can be a driver of party change, but they propose other factors too. 
Their work on change within political parties can (and has) been used to look more 
specifically at policy change within parties.16 Given the widespread agreement that change 
must be driven by something, it makes sense to focus on the impetus. The most commonly 
cited independent variables or ‘drivers’ of change, largely derived from the framework 
elaborated by Harmel and Janda and their co-authors, are first, external shock (essentially, 
electoral defeat or loss of office); second, a change of leader; and, third, a change in the 
dominant faction (or coalition) that, to a greater or lesser extent, runs the party in question.17  
The perception of electoral defeat (and hence, the impetus for policy change) may be much 
greater – or more heavily felt – in a party which has narrowly lost an election than in a party 
which has suffered a severe defeat. Indeed, recent work has found that, for the Conservatives 
a severe defeat (in terms of vote share and seats lost) may not necessarily result in more 
significant immigration policy change than a minor defeat.18 Investigating the impact of these 
drivers of change (in whatever combination) on Conservative Party migration policy allows 
for examination of the theoretical synthesis, at least as it touches on policy, and – if necessary 
– discussing drivers that it may have previously underplayed or missed completely. This 
thesis will build upon  Harmel and Janda’s framework in order to focus specifically on how 
political leaders perceive these factors, rather than provide a simple explanation based on 
these factors. 
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The ‘gap hypothesis’ in policy preferences  
First observed by Hollifield, the ‘gap hypothesis’ refers to the supposed gap between the 
objectives and the outcomes of immigration policy.19 This can partly be explained by the 
tension between elites’ rhetorical commitment to immigration control and the reality of 
continued immigration. In short, while elites push for and put in place immigration policies 
which are liberal and expansionist, the general public prefer policies which are more 
restrictive. While preferences are not the same as policy, it is the case that preferences can, 
and are, developed into policy proposals. Critics might well argue that the ‘gap hypothesis’ 
is no longer relevant. Certainly, in the 30 years since Hollifield published his text, the 
Conservative Party’s immigration policy could not be described as liberal or expansionist. It 
could also be said that there has been some degree of convergence in the immigration policy 
preferences of those governing and those who are governed. However, a general move in 
favour of more restrictionist policies does not mean that there is not a tension, between the 
elites and the electorate.  
During the 70 year period in question, the Conservative Party’s leaders had different views 
about whether the Party needed to be in accord with the electorate on immigration. However, 
political parties which try to follow public opinion in order to produce policies that win votes 
at the ballot box should be cautious. The ‘production’ of public opinion is revealed in studies 
which show survey answers to be dependent on how questions are phrased. Research by the 
IPPR on public opinion towards asylum seekers has found that answers were heavily 
dependent on how the issues were framed.20 Some researchers find that there is not much of 
a difference between elites and ordinary people in terms of opinions on immigration.21 While 
it is difficult to deny the existence of some differences, divergence may be down to how such 
attitudes are portrayed.  
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3.2 The working propositions 
Three propositions can be derived from the theoretical framework as a means of explaining 
the development of the Conservative Party’s immigration policy.  
P1  In power, the Conservative Party's policies have restricted levels of 
immigration and asylum to a lesser extent than it has promised when in 
opposition. The status of the Party – that is, whether it is in government or in 
opposition – is compounded by the domestic and international context in 
which it operates, and which impacts on policy. 
P2  The Party's immigration policies are dependent on:  
a. The Party's fear of electoral defeat  
b. The different leaders of the Party  
c. The management of the Party; the extent to which the different factions 
leading – or aspiring to lead –  the Party can be controlled 
P3  The Conservative Party's policies respond to a long-standing tension, which 
is the result of a widening gap between elites and the general public on the 
immigration issue. 
In the course of research, it became apparent that, while each of the three propositions is 
useful, there is some overlap between two of them. Namely, the third proposition, which 
holds that the Conservative Party is aware of, and driven by, a wish to close the gap between 
immigration policy goals and outcomes, is in fact, already covered. My second proposition 
contends that immigration policy development is driven partly by electoral motivations, that 
is, a need to win votes. This dissertation explores each of the propositions, but, to avoid 
repetition given the overlap, analysis of the third proposition is included in the second. 
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3.3 Research methodology and methods 
This section sets out the methodological framework that is used in this project. First, it 
summarises the multi-method approach and explains the rationale behind using several 
methodologies. Second, it presents the three main sources of information, namely: elite, 
semi-structured interviews; and document analysis on, respectively, archive material and 
grey literature. Details are given of how the methods were implemented along with the 
techniques that were used. In each section, issues relating to the use of, and methods 
involving, the data source in question are conveyed. 
 
3.3.1 Methodology 
This thesis is a political-historical study that makes use of historical methods, with reliability 
improved through corroboration of sources. A multi-method approach was used in order to 
exploit the strengths and reduce the weaknesses of various individual methods. The intention 
was to find, and develop, explanatory factors which are not always immediately apparent. It 
was expected that such a method would, through systematic analysis of documents, be 
appropriate for dealing with the processes of policy-making; for example, it would enable 
clearer identification of the processes behind decisions and the causal mechanisms in policy. 
More specifically, the approach to documents (including transcripts of interviews conducted 
specifically for this project, and those documents already available, such as grey material and 
archive sources) followed that of document analysis, which is a synthesis of historiography 
and discourse analysis. Historiography is the ‘writing of history based on a selective, critical 
reading of sources that synthesizes particular bits of information into a narrative description 
or analysis of a subject’.22  
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3.3.2 Method 
Semi-structured interviews 
This dissertation makes extensive use of the semi-structured interview as a data collection 
tool. The method enabled a reconstruction of the making of immigration policy, as told to 
the author by key actors, such as politicians, senior civil servants and migration scholars. The 
interview is a complex tool, practice or even philosophy in itself. Fontana and Frey say that 
traditionally, the researcher has seen the interview as an ‘informal conversation’ with the 
interviewee.23 The better interviews acknowledge their flaws, are reflective and open about 
the process. The epistemological question has a bearing on this. Kvale says that ‘a miner [or 
excavating] approach will tend to regard interviews as a site of data collection separated from 
the later data analysis’ while ‘a traveller conception leads to interviewing and analysis with 
an emphasis on the narrative to be told to an audience’.24 
The 28 interviews conducted for this research (see List of Interviewees in Appendix) led to 
a better understanding of the processes and the personal or collective philosophies that have 
shaped immigration policy across the period. The material gathered from interviews was not 
intended to provide a window into reality – if that were even possible – but to provide a range 
of perspectives on, and perceptions of, immigration and policy-making. While interviews did 
provide in-depth contextual information to factual events, of greater significance was the 
disclosure of the interpretations, understandings, and motives of the interviewees. Interviews 
also allowed for the pursuit of unforeseen lines of inquiry.25 The interviews were used to help 
identify (more clearly) who held power and who influenced decisions within a multi-actor 
model, meaning the individuals and organisations both within and outside the Conservative 
Party. In order to guard against the inevitable bias which interviewees offer, the data was 
corroborated by triangulation against documents and a wide sample of interviewees. 
The importance of interviews with elites to this research is partly based on practical 
considerations. As the research covers a relatively recent period (the post-war decades, that 
is, 1945 to 2015), it was expected that the work might be hindered by the need for reliance 
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on methods other than analysing ‘released’ government documents, which are only put into 
the public domain after a set period. Having said that, the period in question has recently 
been reduced to 20 years, from 30 years, and will be phased in over the next decade.26  
Strategic sampling was used in order to identify those who might be potential interviewees. 
A list was produced based on those with influence and experience of the issue under research. 
It was expected that access to elite participants, namely politicians and policy-makers, would 
be a problem. Some potential participants may see interviews as a possible threat to their own 
or their organisation’s reputation, some may simply be too busy. Others may have misgivings 
about what they will gain from being interviewed, and some organisations (such as the civil 
service) may have policies against on-the-record interviews for fear of bringing their 
impartiality or reputation into question. Given that it is usually easier to obtain interviews 
with politicians when their party is in opposition, or they have left power, it was something 
of an impediment for this thesis that the Conservatives were in government during the course 
of this research.  
One means of gaining access was to use the networks of contacts of previous participants in 
the research, but this was not without its problems. Each interviewee was asked if they could 
suggest colleagues or contacts who may able to assist with the research. While this was 
generally a successful practice, as it confers trust and respectability on the researcher, it has 
serious implications. Divulging the names of other interviewees would not only reveal 
identities; to do so could breach confidentiality and even disseminate private information. 
Some interviewees made suggestions, but asked the author not to disclose their names for 
fear it might prejudice their contact. Those interviewed were current and past policy-makers 
(including former Secretaries of State and ministers), prominent backbenchers, current and 
former senior civil servants, retired Conservative Research Department staff, as well as 
academic experts in the field of British immigration policy.  
It was understood that the format of the interview (the structure and how issues are framed) 
would strongly impact on the research because, from an epistemological perspective, it is 
questionable what format is the ‘best’ way of producing knowledge. Kvale says that 
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‘presupposing that knowledge emerges from a collection of given data will naturally lead to 
a view of leading questions as a bias in qualitative interviewing [which is] detrimental to the 
process of acquiring objective knowledge’.27 And yet, for a researcher who thinks that 
‘knowledge is socially constructed [it] can lead to a view of leading questions as one way of 
inquiring into the strength and justifiability of a subject’s beliefs, perhaps even yielding 
another form of objectivity in the sense of provoking the object to object’.28 
Bearing in mind such issues, interviews were conducted with participants in their offices or 
in public places, that is, in spaces in which they were likely to feel comfortable and confident. 
The interviews were semi-structured and loosely based on a list of suitable questions (some 
interviewees asked to see these in advance). Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, 
and a few were undertaken by telephone, and a further few by email. Time was also spent 
researching each interviewee’s career and public statements so as to allow for a more 
productive interview. Interviews were, where possible, audio recorded, transcribed and coded 
according to themes that became apparent during the course of the research. It was important 
that the structure was flexible because the author had to be able to quickly adapt if the 
situation changed, as happened several times. Many of the interviewees were under time 
constraints which meant sudden changes to a schedule. The format was also flexible to allow 
the author to continually revise her assumptions. It was necessary to consider whether the 
view was consistent with interpretation and, if not, to amend it. Rosenblatt refers to an 
unstable, metaphorically physical process: ‘I try out my interpretations on the people I 
interview, I push as I interview for more information consistent and inconsistent with my 
changing interpretations’.29  
 
Grey material/ document analysis  
This thesis makes use of document analysis of ‘grey material’ in order to reconstruct the 
processes of policy-making. The term ‘grey material’ includes government documents (white 
papers, green papers, commissioned research evidence, consultation papers, press releases 
and transcripts of speeches) and non-government documents (official responses to policy 
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from interest groups, publications from such interest groups, speeches by experts, Hansard 
transcripts, technical reports). The material may be published in print and electronic formats, 
but it is not controlled by commercial publishers as per the ‘Luxembourg definition’ of grey 
literature. Such material is highly valued by researchers given it is often original 
documentation and relatively recent. 
Grey material is critical to the project as it has not only allowed for the production of a 
‘timeline’ of immigration policy, based on the documents from before, during and after 
policy production and implementation, but it has also provided what could be a more nuanced 
look at the role of ideas in policy formation. In looking at the ‘debris’ related to the 
Conservative Party and the development of immigration policy, the intention was to bring to 
the fore those influences behind policy formation which may not normally be noted in 
histories of the Party. Examination of the documents has enabled greater understanding of 
the power struggles between, and among, individuals, interest groups and institutions with 
an interest in immigration policy. 
The process of analysing grey material focused on key terms, legislation and events during 
the period in question. Of a variety of information sources, the most extensively referred to 
sources are the publications of the Conservative Party (such as its general election 
manifestos) and the transcripts of speeches by politicians. The material was located both 
online (on organisations’ websites) and in hard copy (within organisations’ archives and 
within individuals’ private effects). Efforts were concentrated on significant ministries and 
agencies within government (UK Border Agency, Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, Treasury) as well as non-governmental organisations (employers’ bodies such as the 
CBI and IoD, trade unions within and outside the TUC such as Unison and the TGWU, 
respected think-tanks, such as the IPPR and Demos, Migration Watch, parliamentary 
committees, and also groups of experts, such as the Westminster Forum. 
However, as this author notes, research which uses grey material is not without its problems. 
Such material is often very difficult to obtain through conventional means due to the fact that 
it is not published commercially nor generally promoted to researchers. Ignorance of the 
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existence of such material, and inaccessibility, were therefore major concerns. Furthermore, 
as grey material may have few users, and does not generate profit, there may be little 
incentive for organisations to properly maintain and catalogue such material. This may make 
research more difficult, as basic details may be hard to obtain, and there may be 
inconsistencies regarding the storing of documents. As this author found, documents may not 
be available in full, may have been scanned improperly or there may be ‘broken’ online links. 
Less concretely perhaps, any research which uses documentary sources must acknowledge 
they are not neutral sources.30 Finnegan is more specific – ‘when analysing policy statements 
it may be difficult to differentiate between how far the policy presents normative propaganda 
or an actual guiding principle for practice’.31 There is never a full and definitive account: it 
is always a matter of judgement or interpretation.  
 
Archive material/ document analysis  
This thesis also uses document analysis to examine archive material in order to better 
understand the opinions, debates and conflicts of the time. The centrality of archive material 
to the research project stemmed from a wish to use original sources to form an evidence-
based history of immigration policy development as well as providing material for ‘thick-
descriptive’ work, which is lacking in this field. Archive material refers mainly to documents 
that are produced in the conduct of affairs and broadly centred around a theme (for example, 
migrants’ experiences of settling within the UK) or organisation (such as the Conservative 
Party).  
Archives were used to examine how events and policies are constructed within the 
interconnected political machinery of party, press and interest groups. Analysis of such 
material provided a means to track the developing importance of the immigration issue over 
time, as responsibility for immigration policy was transferred from different departments, put 
out for consultation and chewed over by focus groups. For example, the direction of policy 
was, at times, fought over by Conservative Party officials and party activists putting forward 
conference motions regarding how tough the Party should be on the issue.  
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The archive material studied included minutes of meetings, notes, papers, photographs, 
letters, policy proposals and strategies. Government sources were found at the National 
Archives in Kew, London. It should be noted, however, that sources were only available up 
to the mid-1980s, as they are restricted after this date due to the 30 years’ disclosure rule. Of 
particular use were the Cabinet Paper archives, especially the sections on Empire, 
Commonwealth and De-colonisation, and the Home Office collection, with sections on 
Aliens and Immigration, Denization and Naturalisation, Community Relations. The author 
also examined documents from those departments most relevant to immigration, citizenship 
and asylum, namely the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Treasury. Non-
government sources were mainly found within the Conservative Party archives, located at 
the Bodleian Library, Oxford. The Thatcher Archives, much of which is online now via the 
Thatcher Foundation, with the entirety being stored at Churchill College, Cambridge, were 
used too. The analysis of archive material was very similar to that used on grey literature, 
with a focus employed on key words, legislation and related events in order to construct a 
narrative of the period in question. 
Primary archive material was complemented by thousands of media articles from 1945 to 
2015, which were found using relevant keywords on Nexis, the online database of news 
sources. The sources used were mainly UK national newspapers, with the remainder being 
local papers and occasionally international news sources (mainly from India or Pakistan). Of 
great use to this thesis too were the dozens of memoirs by former British politicians from 
across the political spectrum, from those who held the Conservative leadership to those who 
were ministers or backbenchers with an interest in immigration. Academic literature on the 
history of the Conservative Party was a source of context too. 
The heavy reliance of this thesis on archive material raised a number of questions. As with 
research on grey literature, there were concerns over selectivity. Why are some documents 
kept and others destroyed? Some say ‘selective preservation is a particularly important 
consideration in archival research’.32 There could be a certain path dependency at work: if 
only material which constructs an issue in a certain way is retained, and this material points 
to other sources which corroborate this approach, to what extent is such resulting research 
62 
 
systematic and evidence-driven? Some scholars claim that archives have been constructed 
specifically for a reason: Harvey Brown and Davis-Brown say archives are ‘manufacturers 
of memory’.33 Other concerns relate to situations in which material contradicts other material. 
What should be disregarded? Whose ‘truth’ is it anyway? Is the researcher doomed to 
cognitive dissonance or doublethink? How many sources are enough to make something 
reliable? More practically, research using archive work is often set back by delays: it took 
time to receive accreditation, gain membership, and travel to the physical archives, at which, 
occasionally, documents had been misplaced or were poorly organised. Extra time was put 
aside to deal with such instances. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the theoretical and methodological frameworks that underpin the 
research in question. This thesis is a political-historical study which seeks to explain the 
development of Conservative Party immigration policy in a critical and thoughtful way. The 
research is founded on a theoretical framework that is derived from existing models from 
within both political science and migration studies. This framework has allowed for the 
research question to be further developed in order to generate three propositions which this 
thesis will consider. Finally, this section has discussed the mixed method approach which 
has allowed for the collection of data using semi-structured, elite interviews and document 
analysis of both archival sources and grey material, as well as memoirs and media sources. 
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1945 to 1964 
 
It would probably be impossible to find […] time for legislation on this subject.1 
– Alan Lennox-Boyd 
 
This chapter examines the development of the Conservative Party’s immigration policy from 
1945 to 1964, during the period of post-war reconstruction in the UK and the decolonisation 
of the British Empire. It will first consider the more important changes in the Tories’ 
approach to immigration. It will then explain the Party’s policy-making using the theoretical 
framework expanded on previously. Over six general elections and under four different 
leaders, the Party became gradually concerned by the immigration issue, sought to do 
something about it, commissioned committees and reports, resolved to let the matter stand, 
and then, finally, brought in legislation to limit the numbers. In 1955, the Home Secretary 
told Cabinet that it would be ‘necessary to pass some legislation sooner or later’.2 It was not 
until 1962 that migration controls were brought in. By the end of this parliament, the 
Conservative government had brought in – for the first time – controls on citizens from the 
Commonwealth. Over a period of 19 years, British immigration laws were transformed from 
some of the most liberal in the world to some of the most restrictive.  
During the immediate post-war period, Conservative Party policy on immigration was non-
existent. There was no need for policy: the number of migrants entering the UK was close to 
insignificant. Efforts made by the Labour government to encourage Commonwealth citizens 
to fill labour shortages in Britain went unopposed by the Tories. The passing of the 1948 
British Nationality Act, then viewed as something of a technicality, and now seen as opening 
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up settlement in the UK to some 600 million people, received no objections from the 
Conservative Party. The Tory leadership did not expect that the Act would facilitate 
immigration from the Commonwealth. When the arrival of the Empire Windrush ship in 1948 
with its 492 (mostly) Jamaican immigrants aboard proved not to be an exception but the 
precursor to a new wave of immigration, the Conservatives began to debate the matter. 
Discussions were initiated, but they were often incoherent, with the deliberations embodying 
‘contradictory preferences and confused thinking’.3 The emphasis was on limiting the 
immigration of black and Asian migrants from former colonies, and not their white fellow 
Commonwealth citizens, a distinction which some Conservative ministers found 
disquieting.4  
Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, the Conservative Party considered how – if at all – to 
best control immigration to the UK. Intervention was repeatedly delayed on the grounds that 
immigration was inextricably linked with economic, social and even moral arguments. Post-
war, Britain was in dire need of labour for economic recovery – reconstruction was the 
national priority.5 The UK needed workers for the newly set-up National Health Service, the 
NHS, as well as its public transport system and Post Office. However, there were concerns 
about the muddying of the English character if black and Asian citizens were allowed to settle 
in the UK, as well as fears about migrants importing crime and violence into the country.6 
Some Conservative figures worried about the impact on public services, from housing, in 
particular, to healthcare and transport.7 Less concretely, though no less important, was the 
substantial emotional attachment that many within the Conservative Party felt towards the 
former Empire. For many Tory politicians, the UK had a moral duty to care for, and maintain 
links with, the citizens of the Commonwealth. 
 
The most dramatic change to the Conservative Party’s approach to immigration during the 
next few decades was its gradual support for legislation to control the number of migrants 
entering the UK. Less formal measures, such as administrative rules which attempted to 
discourage travel to – and settlement in – the UK, fell out of favour when the context changed. 
The immigration figures increased from a very low base, and some half a million black and 
Asian people entered the UK during the 1950s.8 As the UK recovered, the economic 
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argument that migrants were needed to fill labour shortages became less relevant. Some Tory 
MPs received word from constituents of local difficulties that were purportedly caused by 
immigrants. Controlling the level of migration soon became a pressing issue.  
 
However, to claim that the Conservatives merely responded to a changing context would be 
to ignore a subtle shift within the composition of the Party. The self-avowed liberals and 
moderates – the Edens and the Lennox-Boyds – made way for politicians who were less 
resistant to bringing in restrictions on Commonwealth citizens. They did not believe that the 
UK needed to maintain a role as protector of the former Empire, and nor did they have moral 
qualms about undermining the promises of former British governments to allow immigration 
from the Commonwealth. Many of them believed that the UK’s future would be best served 
forging stronger ties with Europe. In 1960, the UK founded the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA); in 1961, it applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Maintaining freedom of movement for the citizens of the former colonies was not a priority 
for the 1960s Conservative Party. 
 
The Conservatives did not consider the immigration issue to be so important as to demand 
immediate action until the final parliament of this period. Instead, the leadership allowed the 
issue to drift, until the time seemed right to return to it. Churchill was making plans to 
legislate as early as the mid-1950s, yet his ministers resolved to put the issue aside until after 
the forthcoming general election, so they could better concentrate on the campaign. After the 
1958 riots against ethnic minorities in Nottingham and Notting Hill, the Tories once again 
began considering controls on immigration. Months later, ministers decided that immigration 
was no longer a public concern and policy-making was suspended. When the Conservatives 
did finally conclude that administrative controls were no longer effective and legislation 
would be necessary, they were fortunate that the context had changed. By 1961, the 
electorate’s somewhat sentimental support for the Commonwealth had declined.9 Opposition 
to restrictive measures was much less extensive than it had been just ten or so years 
previously. In a diary entry from January 1962, Macmillan mused that ‘[o]ne of the strange 
results of an outbreak of smallpox, traced to Pakistani immigrants, has been to make the 
ordinary people more in favour than ever of the Immigration Bill…’.10 
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4.1 The development of Conservative immigration policy 
1945 to 1951 
Within months of the end of the Second World War in Europe, the first general election in a 
decade was held – and the Conservative Party was badly defeated. On 5 July 1945, the Tories 
lost nearly 200 seats on a swing of 12 per cent. The result was ‘all the more shocking because 
it was so unexpected’.11 The Conservatives had not been in opposition for nearly 15 years. 
During the post-war period, the Tories were bitterly disappointed by their electoral defeat 
and uncertain as to how to conduct themselves. The Party pursued a path which had more in 
common with the ‘politics of power’ reminiscent of a party in office. 
Unfortunately for the Conservatives, their move to the opposition benches was a rough 
transition. This was not only because ‘defeat gives a lot of people much annoyance and much 
time on their hands’.12 As opposition leader, the war-time Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
established a ‘Leader’s Consultative Committee’ (LCC) – in effect, a shadow cabinet – but 
the group could not match the discipline and structure which the civil service had provided 
to the Conservative Party when it had been in government.  
The weaknesses of the LCC greatly impacted on its ability to prioritise and develop 
Conservative policy. The group had no real demarcation of responsibilities; discussion was 
reactive, with conversation on policy matters as much about its presentation and timing of its 
release than about its content.13 There was no secretary to keep minutes and the membership 
of the Shadow Cabinet was – by Churchill’s order – to remain secret.14 Nor were shadow 
ministers able to rely on the Conservative Parliamentary Secretariat (which later merged into 
the Conservative Research Department): it had been neglected during the war, reduced to a 
‘ghost ship’ of two men and two secretaries.15 
Immigration was of next to no concern to the Conservative Party during this parliament. In 
the immediate post-war years, the flow of migrants into the UK was relatively low and there 
were few signs that immigration would, within a decade or so, become an issue of national 
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importance. As a result, there was not much in the way of Conservative policy on 
immigration, official or otherwise. Tory politicians gave little serious thought to the issue. 
The Conservatives did not object when the Labour government introduced legislation that 
would have profound implications in this area. The 1948 British Nationality Act bound 
together ‘subjecthood’ and citizenship. This was no attempt to facilitate mass migration. It 
was, in fact, a response to Canada’s amendment of the basis on which it defined imperial 
nationality. The UK government responded with ‘the restitution of a common status for 
British subjects following Canada’s wrecking initiative’, by bringing on the statute books 
legislation ‘designed to retain the privileges that had accrued to British subjecthood’.16 The 
Irish, who had been free to enter the UK since the 1800 Act of Union had incorporated Ireland 
into the UK – a right which had continued despite Ireland’s gaining independence in 1922 
and its exit from the Commonwealth in 1947 – would be ‘neither British subjects nor aliens 
but Irish citizens with all the rights of British subjecthood’.17 
Despite the fact that that British Nationality Act opened up settlement in the UK to more than 
600 million people, the Tories did not, in their role as the official opposition, criticise the 
legislation. In fact, there was next to no discussion on the issue, in part, because of a 
parliamentary consensus on the purpose of the legislation, which was, then, a technicality.18 
Neither politicians nor civil servants expected the Act to facilitate migration into the UK.19 
The ‘possibility […] does not seem to have been considered at length’.20 This was not entirely 
misguided: nobody expected the UK to experience major migration from the non-white 
colonial regions.21 Indeed, the explanation lies in the context; for most policy-makers, 
recalling pre-war conditions, migration operated in the opposite way, with people travelling 
‘from a Britain blighted by economic stagnation and high unemployment to the Imperial 
colonies’ and not the other way round. 22  
While the Conservative Party did not profess any interest in the migration issue at the time, 
it was developing its research and opinion polling wing. In 1948, Conservative Central Office 
established its Public Opinion Research Department (PORD). Leading the department was 
Dudley Clark, who hoped to make use of polling to guide the Party’s strategy as well as to 
gain a greater understanding of ‘the voting behaviour of the electorate’.23 From January 1949 
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onwards, the department produced a monthly public opinion report, which was distributed to 
key figures within the Party as well as MPs, agents and candidates.24 When, despite efforts 
to better understand – and respond to – the public mood, the Conservatives were not returned 
to office in the election of 1950, the Research Department tasked itself with ‘find[ing] and 
exploit[ing] a crucial vote-catching issue’, immigration did not make the shortlist.25 In fact, 
during the brief interlude between the elections of 1950 and 1951, the Conservatives made 
no significant changes to their policy offering.26 
 
1951 to 1955 
The 1951 general election, which Labour had called in a bid to build upon its slender majority 
of the previous year, rewarded the Conservatives with 321 seats, a gain of 22. The Tories 
were back in office, despite receiving, at 48 per cent, just a fraction less of the vote share 
than Labour, which won fewer seats. After the disastrous results of 1945 and 1950, this was 
something of a turnaround for the Conservatives. It was a testament to the Party’s ‘ability to 
subordinate all other considerations to the pursuit of office’.27 The Conservative Party had 
only been perceived as a viable government in the previous year or two, following a series 
of strategic changes.  
In the run-up to the election, senior figures had made efforts to revise the Party’s electoral 
offerings and shore up parliamentary morale.28 Members of what was then effectively the 
Shadow Cabinet had grown frustrated by Winston Churchill’s approach to the leadership of 
the Party. The documents of the LCC ‘do not give the impression of a body either capable 
of, or responsible for, providing strategic direction’.29 Harold Macmillan, together with Lord 
Woolton, had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Churchill in 1948 to create a more 
functional and smaller committee for coordinating policy. It was only after the election of 
1950, in which the Tories had very nearly won office that Churchill, sensing a return to 
government, had relented and allowed for the establishment of a more functional group.30 
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While levels of immigration were beginning to rise following the passing of the British 
Nationality Act in 1948, the matter was of no immediate concern to the Conservative Party. 
While some 64 per cent of Conservative parliamentary candidates had made addresses which 
touched on ‘The Commonwealth and Empire’, immigration from such places was not an 
election issue.31 In fact, the issue of migration was first touched on by Churchill’s 
government in 1952, when he inquired about the Post Office’s employment of ‘coloured’ 
workers.32  
 
While the Conservative Party in government made no attempt to develop a policy on 
immigration, this is not to say that politicians were not opposed to increasing immigration 
levels. Policy-makers and civil servants of the time were ‘not enthusiastic about non-white 
migration, and many of them […] wished to see it restricted’.33 Despite this, the 
Conservatives did not make plans to legislate. They saw no need to mobilise on the issue 
when the number of non-white migrants entering the UK remained quite low. 
 
Although the leadership of the Party maintained a near silence, a handful of Conservative 
backbenchers and parliamentary candidates emphasised the issue. A memo from Home 
Secretary David Maxwell Fyfe to Cabinet in March 1954 revealed that ‘the continued 
immigration of coloured Colonials has received some public attention’ and that ‘[c]omplaints 
are becoming more frequent’.34 While public opinion was slowly moving in favour of 
restrictions on migration, the lack of legislation on immigration in the mid-1950s reflected, 
in part, a ‘lack of clear public support for controls, and opposition among liberal opinion’.35 
Churchill himself ended one Cabinet discussion in February 1954 with the argument that it 
‘might well be true that the problem has not yet assumed sufficient proportions to enable the 
government to take adequate counter-measures’.36  
During 1954, Conservative ministers (prompted by the then Labour MP for Swindon) 
considered setting up a committee or inquiry to investigate the facts of the matter and propose 
solutions to the immigration issue. Maxwell Fyfe expressed concern that, if no committee 
was set up, it ‘would not, of course, satisfy those Members [of Parliament] who feel that 
some action ought to be taken’ (my italics).37 However, in the end, the Home Secretary 
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concluded that there was no need to establish a committee, on the grounds that ‘the question 
is not yet sufficiently acute’.38  
Just six months later, there was a ‘renewed interest in migration control’.39 At a Cabinet 
meeting in late November 1954, the new Home Secretary Gwilym Lloyd George informed 
his colleagues that the situation was now quite different. No longer should Cabinet be 
considering, as it had earlier that year, merely bringing in powers to deport British subjects 
who had committed a criminal act or were dependent on public funds – instead ‘power should 
be taken to control the entry of British subjects into this country’.40 The cause for alarm, he 
believed, was down to a great increase in immigration, with the UK likely to receive some 
10,000 people from the West Indies alone in 1954, compared to just 2,200 the previous year.41 
This, he believed, was enough to justify the setting up of a committee without delay. Layton-
Henry believes it is ‘extraordinary’ that immigration controls were considered to prevent the 
entry of a few thousand people who were British subjects at a time when Irish immigration 
to the UK was numbering some 60,000 a year.42 
With the UK receiving unprecedented (even if, by modern stands, very low) levels of black 
and Asian immigration from Commonwealth countries, the Conservative Party came under 
pressure to deliver a plan to control the numbers. Ministers were under pressure from their 
own supporters too, with Conservative backbenchers making approaches to junior ministers 
to express their concern that immigration was causing difficulties for their constituents.43 By 
November 1954, the rate of immigration from the West Indies was referred to in a Cabinet 
meeting as a ‘matter of some urgency’.44 Churchill had come to the conclusion that 
unrestricted Commonwealth immigration could not continue, and he instructed his 
colleagues to make plans for the drafting of legislation.45  
There was now emerging a visible divide between much of the Conservative Party (with the 
exception of its leader) and the general public. During one Cabinet meeting in December 
1954, ministers acknowledged that there was a ‘surprisingly wide body of opinion in favour 
of immediate action’ on immigration (my italics).46 In early 1955, Churchill is said to have 
remarked to Ian Gilmour that immigration was ‘the most important subject facing this 
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country, but I can not get any of my ministers to take any notice’.47 Gilmour recalls that ‘most 
Ministers remained complacent, while their supporters were growing restive’.48 
The decision to set up a committee to look at the immigration issue was not a foregone 
conclusion. Some figures within Cabinet believed that the committee exercise was ‘simply 
postponing the issue and that we had already […] quite enough material to enable us to take 
a decision now.’49 It was suggested that the whole exercise might ‘serve as an invitation to 
potential immigrants to rush to this country’ and even worse, perhaps, it would ‘provide far 
too long an interval for public debate and exacerbation’.50 Speaking from quite a different 
wing of the Party, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, argued that setting 
up a committee would allow time to postpone the development of policy until it could 
reasonably be legislated for, and, curiously, allow time for ‘public opinion to develop further 
and be crystallised’.51 There would be no committee until the next parliament. 
In early January 1955, the Cabinet acknowledged the existence of widespread public support 
for limiting the immigration of West Indians to the UK, and however uncomfortable some 
members may have found the proposal, the need to do something about it. 52 The timing was 
problematic. Senior Tories worried about getting any eventual bill put into legislation, on the 
grounds that the opposition parties would not support it, and nor would some of the 
government’s own supporters. 53 Others maintained that bringing in such a bill now would 
‘seriously dislocate the Parliamentary programme’. 54 
Despite well-founded concerns that it would not be possible to bring in legislation to control 
immigration at this time, the Prime Minister argued that it would be worth doing so anyway.55 
This was a signalling exercise; it was important for the Conservative Party to portray itself 
as tough on immigrants and immigration. Even if the bill did not pass, ‘[a]t least we shd. have 
shown our view’ [sic], as Churchill was reported to have said in a Cabinet meeting. 56  
While the Conservative Cabinet were discussing how to introduce immigration controls – or 
at least, the possibility of them – the backbenchers were not idle. Some parts of the 
Conservative Party had ‘become agitated’.57 This was of great help to Conservative ministers. 
When Tory backbencher Cyril Osborne let it be known that he was considering putting 
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forward a private member’s bill to control Commonwealth immigration, it was seen by 
ministers as an opportunity for the Conservative Cabinet, rather than a criticism of it. They 
would be able to get a better understanding of their colleagues’ views: ‘the attitude of 
Members on that occasion might provide a useful indication of the prospects of securing 
Parliamentary approval for a measure of this kind’. 58 In the event, Osborne withdrew the bill. 
By May 1955, a draft bill was ready for consideration, and the Cabinet was informed that 
‘the flow of Colonial immigrants continues to increase’.59 However, on the advice of the 
Home Secretary, the Conservatives decided against making any statement on the matter 
before the general election just a few weeks later.60 They would make no promise to impose 
even the ‘smallest curbs’ on Commonwealth immigrants; there should certainly be ‘no 
definite commitment’ to legislate to control immigration.61 The new Prime Minister, 
Anthony Eden, did suggest that ministers talk about the problem of immigration during the 
coming electoral campaign – but as individuals.62 When asked about ‘coloured workers from 
colonial territories’, members of the government and Conservatives candidates should give 
the vague answer that ‘this might be a suitable subject for some form of public enquiry’.63 
Little wonder then that the Cabinet of the early-mid 1950s were reported to be suffering from 
a ‘lack of grip and decision’.64 
A memo from a cautious Alan Lennox-Boyd to Cabinet was prescient: he stated that it was 
‘virtually certain that this Government or its successor will be driven by events and by the 
pressure of public opinion to enact legislation controlling the immigration into this country 
of British subjects from overseas’.65 In summary, then, and despite a significant faction of 
Cabinet that was unenthusiastic about immigration controls, the growing weight of public 
hostility to immigration put pressure on the government to reluctantly consider such 
measures.66  
 
75 
 
1955 to 1959 
The 1955 election was ‘unprecedentedly quiet’, with the ‘outcome […] as unsensational as 
the campaign’: the Conservatives won office again – as expected – on a swing of 1.7 per 
cent.67 They received 49.7 per cent of the vote and gained 23 seats, which gave them a total 
of 344. Eden was ‘the first Prime Minister in nearly a century to increase his party’s majority 
at a general election’.68 Despite the fact that there had been a significant movement of people 
into the UK during the last parliament, the election campaign said nothing about immigration. 
After all, in 1955, Great Britain was 99.8 per cent white; the number of ‘coloured’ immigrants 
was still relatively small.  
Immigration may not have featured in the Party’s election campaign, but, by the mid-1950s, 
Conservative politicians were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of the issue – 
or, more specifically, what was seen as the ‘problem’ of black and Asian migration from the 
New Commonwealth (specifically the West Indies).69 The Tories had long recognised that 
legislating to control immigration would likely be contentious. Cabinet members suggested 
ways in which this could be mitigated, and the Party intended to take advantage of its position 
in government as a means of shielding itself from controversy. The Home Secretary informed 
his colleagues that ‘[c]ontroversy would be reduced if it were possible to base the legislation 
on the recommendations of an impartial Committee’.70 Ministers had already decided to 
legislate, before the committee was even set up. They knew exactly what they intended to 
do, which would make it, in the words of Lennox-Boyd, ‘awkward if they [the committee] 
find against action’.71 
Cabinet discussions during this period show that the matter of whether or not to take some 
kind of action to reduce levels of immigration was no longer in question. The Conservatives 
had, by now, resolved to do something. The main dilemma was whether to legislate and 
impose restrictions on all Commonwealth citizens or, alternatively, to impose restrictions on 
certain groups. The 1948 legislation which had endowed the concept of Citizen of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) on all Commonwealth citizens continued to cause 
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difficulties, with senior Conservatives wary of taking action which might be seen to go 
against the promises of previous governments.  
While the committee was conducting its work, and in the continued absence of formal 
controls, the Conservatives oversaw a series of administrative procedures which were 
intended to reduce the levels of immigration by discouraging settlement from the Caribbean 
and Asia. The measures were ‘neutral in principle but discriminatory in practice’: they 
allowed the UK government to sift migrants between those it wanted and those it did not 
want.72 British offices overseas were required to delay the issuing of passports to black and 
Asian applicants, to increase the financial deposits that applicants were obliged to make and 
even to disseminate negative information about the UK to discourage potential migrants.73 
While these soft controls had been around since the early 1950s, the practice continued during 
this period and the possibility of extending such administrative measures was seriously 
considered.74  
Less than two months before the general election of 26 May 1955, the leadership of the Party 
had passed from Churchill to Anthony Eden on 7 April. Eden had ‘relatively poor knowledge 
of domestic affairs’ and ‘virtually no experience of a non-departmental, coordinating role’.75 
But the failure to produce comprehensive policy on immigration cannot be attributed to 
Eden’s lack of interest or experience. This ‘do nothing’ approach encompassed more than 
the leadership of the Party: factions within the Conservatives were a source of growing 
difficulties. True, there was a growing faction keen on controlling this new movement of 
people, but there were at least two other strands that were very much opposed.  
While the Conservatives under Eden had seriously considered restricting immigration in 
1955, the issue had been quietly shelved following serious opposition within the Party, 
including the threat of resignation from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 76 Lennox-
Boyd was well-liked within the Conservative Party and a personal friend of the Prime 
Minister.77 Eden could do little more than ‘keep the situation under review’.78 There was no 
deliberate attempt to keep the ‘open door’ ajar: in fact, Eden was in favour of limiting entry 
to Commonwealth immigrants for a period of up to five years.79 However, the reluctance of 
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the Cabinet, reflecting divisions within the Party over how best to differentiate (if at all) 
between migrants from the Old Commonwealth and the New Commonwealth, meant that 
there was ‘deadlock over this question’, and unsurprisingly, migration control was not 
introduced.80 Eden ‘effectively killed the draft bill’ by calling for further consideration to be 
given to the issue.81  
Within this context of a fractured party, it made sense for a leadership keenly aware of such 
divisions and wary of provoking bad feeling to push for soft, or administrative controls on 
immigration, rather than risk further damage to the Party over immigration. Initially, at least, 
these controls seemed to be working: Cabinet acknowledged in late 1956 that the 
‘acceleration in the rate of immigration […] seemed to have been checked’.82 By 1957, 
Cabinet was told that ‘the flow of immigrants had declined significantly’: in the first five 
months of the year there had been 5,500 migrants from the West Indies, compared with 
12,700 for the same period in the previous year.83 
Halfway through the parliament, there was a change in leadership, after Eden resigned due 
to ill health, though this was widely seen as a pretext given his disastrous loss of authority 
after the Suez incident of 1956. By this point, the Conservatives were ‘badly bruised’ and 
desperately in need of strong leadership.84 Unfortunately for the Party, factional differences 
meant that the least disliked candidate – rather than, perhaps, the better candidate – would be 
chosen for the role of leader. Frontrunner Butler would not have the support of the Suez 
Group and the Tory right. Harold Macmillan on the other hand, ‘raised no corresponding 
antipathy among the Tory left’ – and he duly became leader on 10 January 1957.85  
While the Conservative Party was slowly taking steps to bring in controls on immigration, 
primary immigration to the UK from the West Indies continued.86 In Cabinet discussions, 
ministers argued against legislation on the grounds that the electorate were not ready for such 
a move and that ‘public opinion generally does not appear yet to be seriously concerned by 
the problem’.87 Controlling immigration did become more frequently discussed – albeit 
behind closed doors, and ministers did consider restricting immigration substantially. After 
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all, Conservative politicians were also ‘sensitive to the political risks associated with a lax 
migration policy’.88 
The Conservatives were growing aware of the strength of public feeling on the issue. Gallup 
began measuring public opinion on policy issues from 1958 onwards, and, from the start, 
polls consistently showed majority support for tighter controls on migration.89 Through 1957 
and the first half of 1958, the Conservatives were consistently behind Labour in the opinion 
polls.90 And yet, despite this – and the potential for electoral reward – the Conservative 
leadership were not interested in exploiting the issue. To do so would, for many 
Conservatives politicians, be ‘divisive and morally objectionable’.91 
Outside Westminster, a minority of the electorate was becoming impatient and would not 
wait around while the Conservative Party came up with a line to take. The 1958 riots in 
Nottingham and Notting Hill seem to have forced Conservative elites to look more closely at 
the concerns of the voting public. As Hansen says, the riots were ‘a tremendous shock to […] 
all political parties’.92 After condemnation, the second response was to analyse the riots as 
‘the response of local people who felt resentful against black immigration’.93 With supporters 
of restrictions on immigration using the riots as ‘evidence of popular hostility’ to 
immigration, commentators argued that the British public would not tolerate a more sizable 
immigrant presence.94 
Immigration control was forced to the top of the Tories’ political agenda; it was no longer a 
matter specific to certain regions. 95 The riots were a visible representation of tensions within 
communities with ethnic minority populations, however small. Prime Minister Macmillan 
told his colleagues that it was time to consider legislation again’.96 (And yet, the Colonial 
Secretary continued to support administrative controls. Within weeks of the riots, Lennox-
Boyd was meeting with West Indian ministers who agreed to delay the issuing of passports 
by increasing the period between application and grant of the passport from five days to some 
six months.97) The Tory leadership was now under pressure to respond in a more visible 
manner; frontbenchers shifted their attitude towards migration.98 Backbenchers too were 
speaking out, passing on the concerns of their constituents to ministers.99 Electoral geography 
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ensured that those MPs with high immigrant populations were backbenchers with ‘little 
access to the instruments of government and party policy’.100 Enoch Powell referred with 
disdain to the ‘knights of the shires’ who were ‘little affected’.101 
When, in the months following the riots of 1958, the migration issue did recede from public 
attention, the Conservative leadership did not let go of the issue. Behind closed doors, the 
matter underwent ‘sustained consideration’.102 And yet still, there was ‘no clear policy’.103 
The Tory Party could no longer contain the issue. Conservative politician Iain Macleod, who 
had first stood for parliament in 1945, told the Commons 16 years later that he had seen 
immigration ‘grow from something about which no figures and no problem existed into a 
problem that flared into the headlines’.104 The Conservative Party’s general consensus 
against introducing serious controls continued to splinter. 
 
1959 to 1964 
The Conservatives were returned to office in October 1959 in what has been described as a 
‘stunning’ victory.105 It was the third successive victory for the Party; they were now well 
used to operating within the ‘politics of power’ mode. Butler and Ross note that here, as 
elsewhere, the Conservatives benefited from being the incumbents during the election period, 
noting that ‘Ministers readily appear as men of achievement, opposition MPs only as 
critics’.106 The share of the vote, at 49.4 per cent was very similar to that in 1955, and yet the 
Party gained 20 seats. Understandably, given the extent of their success, Prime Minister 
Macmillan ‘felt little need to give the Party a face-lift in its immediate aftermath’.107  
Immigration was ‘scarcely an issue’ for the Conservatives; it did not feature in their national 
campaign.108 However, in some regions, it was a significant concern, with Conservative 
parliamentary candidates in Birmingham raising the issue during the campaign. The lack of 
a leadership-led focus on immigration was because, by 1959, the administrative controls 
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‘appeared to be doing their job’ and public concern over migration had diminished in the 12 
months or so following the riots.109 
This period of relative quiet did not last. Towards the end of the year, the level of immigration 
increased (see Table 2), and, most worryingly for the Conservatives, it was ‘black and Asian 
migration rates [which] accelerated’.110 A year later, in November 1960, Home Secretary 
Rab Butler warned his Cabinet colleagues that, while there had been ‘no serious incidents’ 
yet, it was probably only a matter of time: ‘social tensions continued to exist and were a 
potential source of serious disturbance’.111 Although India and Pakistan had been ‘co-
operating’ with the UK by employing soft controls, this could not be relied upon for much 
longer. 112 Both governments, Butler said, were under pressure to lessen their controls.113  
 
Table 2: Estimated net migration to the UK from the New Commonwealth, 1953-61114 
 West Indies India Pakistan Others Total 
1953 2,000    2,000 
1954 11,000    11,000 
1955 27,500 5,800 1,850 7,500 42,650 
1956 29,800 5,600 2,050 9,350 46,800 
1957 23,000 6,600 5,200 7,600 42,400 
1958 15,000 6,200 4,700 3,950 29,850 
1959 16,400 2,950 850 1,400 21,600 
1960 49,650 5,900 2,500 -350 57,700 
1961 66,300 23,750 25,100 21,250 136,400 
 
The Conservative leadership became less convinced by the continued use of administrative 
controls.115 Butler argued that administrative controls were no longer working and that it 
‘might become necessary’ to legislate to stem the flow of immigration.116 With Cabinet of 
the opinion that the ‘present situation was disquieting’, Macmillan’s government began 
seriously thinking about restricting migration using legislative means.117 Unusually, perhaps, 
the backbenchers were not ahead of their leadership; the 1922 Committee did not begin 
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taking the issue of immigration seriously until December of 1960.118 Emboldened by 
statistics which made it clear that levels of migration had shot up, the Conservative Party 
faction in favour of restriction had won the debate. While the proposed measures were, as 
Ford puts it, ‘relatively mild’, this was certainly a change.119 
By 1961, the Conservatives judged that the need for legislation had become ‘inescapable’.120 
Macmillan recorded in a diary entry that there was general agreement in Cabinet that the 
Tories would have to legislate that autumn and was surprised to find that his Colonial 
Secretary agreed.121 Immigration to the UK had reached an unprecedented 136,000 a year.122 
Immigration from the West Indies and the Indian sub-continent was 21,000 in 1959 and had 
nearly tripled to 58,000 in 1960.123 The Party was under pressure from its own supporters, as 
well as the broader electorate, to bring in a means of control. 124 In October 1961, the Home 
Secretary firmly, if reluctantly, recommended that legislation be brought forth. The Cabinet 
agreed and it was decided that a bill would be introduced in the forthcoming parliamentary 
session.125  
Butler presented the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in November 1961 with, in his own 
words, ‘considerable reluctance’.126 The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (CIA), wound 
up the ‘period of imperial citizenship’, and ushered in a ‘new exclusionary phase’.127 Controls 
were applied to all Commonwealth citizens, other than those born in the UK or holding a UK 
passport issued by the UK government. Those who had not, or did not, would be subject to 
an employment voucher system. Would-be British migrants could apply for Category A, B 
or C vouchers, depending on whether they, respectively, had a job offer in the UK, had skills 
or experience which would be of use to the country, or were unskilled workers in search of 
employment. Only the number of vouchers in the latter category would be limited, with a 
quota that could vary according to political, social and economic considerations. Removal 
from the UK of Commonwealth citizens who had been convicted of an offence was now, for 
the first time, permitted in law.128  
The CIA of 1962 had, for the first time, restricted ‘the right of British subjects to enter the 
“mother country”’.129 The legislation, though depicted by ministers in parliamentary debates 
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as non-discriminatory, was specifically intended to restrict New Commonwealth – mainly 
black – immigration.130 Government minister W F Deedes later wrote that the ‘real purpose’ 
of the Bill was to ‘restrict the influx of coloured immigrants’.131 Irish immigrants – who had 
been long been regarded as a ‘special case’ – would be formally included within the scope 
of control, but these controls would, in practice, not be exercised.132 The Conservative 
government’s readiness to receive some 50,000 new Irish immigrants every year, combined 
with a willingness to defer to ‘arguments of practicality against border control where it 
suited’ would imply that ‘Irish migrants ranked higher on the imperial scale than British 
subjects of colour’.133 
The Conservatives soon realised that the controls imposed by the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act were not sufficient either to severely reduce levels of immigration or address 
public concerns. In 1964, the Home Secretary, Henry Brooke, reported to Cabinet that the 
Commonwealth Immigration Committee had examined the controls and found them to be 
‘inadequate to keep the number of immigrants at an acceptable level’.134 According to 
government statistics, prior to the decision to legislate, some 40,000 Commonwealth 
immigrants had been entering the UK each year; now, in the 12 months leading up to July 
1964, around 68,000 had been admitted to the country.135 Paul suggests that this increase was 
the result of a concession made by the Conservative government, which, in a bid to ‘lessen 
the apparent inhumanity’ had allowed for dependants of British subjects who were already 
in the UK to be given allowed unrestricted entry.136 With some immigrants concerned that 
this provision would be removed at a later stage, many dependants rushed to enter the UK in 
the year or so after the 1962 Act was passed.137 
The Home Secretary believed that the solution was to bring in further controls to substantially 
reduce the rate of immigration. Brooke informed Cabinet that the Party would need to shift 
its policy to do so, in order to ‘free ourselves from some of the pledges given during the 
passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill about the issue of employment vouchers’.138 
Any concerns fellow ministers might have had as to the implications for international 
relations were put aside. Brooke believed that there would be unlikely to be any objection 
from Commonwealth countries if there were to be a gradual reduction of the rate of issue of 
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vouchers. 139 Such an assumption was based on the understanding that these governments had 
caused little fuss when the 1962 legislation was going through. Brooke even ventured to 
credit the Act with improving Commonwealth relations, explaining that ‘the regulation of 
coloured immigration had helped to diminish racial friction’. 140 
While the Conservative Party was developing its immigration policy, so were its competitors, 
whose policies began to diverge from those of the Tories. In the run-up to the 1964 general 
election, the parties were finally taking on ‘distinctive positions’: the Conservatives 
supported further controls and Labour opposed them.141 In a draft speech intended to signal 
the Conservative leadership’s intention to further tighten up immigration control, Brooke 
indicated that he would condemn Labour and the Liberal Party for their opposition to the 
1962 Act and show ‘How right the Government was […] there are now over 300,000 more 
immigrants who, to judge from the waiting list for entry vouchers, would have come here by 
now […] if the control had not been imposed’.142 
And yet, despite such claims, the Conservatives did not try to distinguish themselves from 
their main opponent by seeking to make immigration a significant issue in the 1964 election 
campaign. Ford’s explanation is that neither the Tories nor Labour wanted to exploit an issue 
which might expose – and exacerbate – major internal divisions within their party. The 
Conservatives were, despite the 1962 legislation, still very much divided between 
‘Imperialists opposed to restriction and little-Englanders favouring tougher restrictions’.143 
 
4.2 Explaining Conservative immigration policy 
The dynamics of government versus opposition 
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My first proposition asserts that policy-making is influenced by the status of the political 
party in question: it does matter whether the party is in office or in opposition. Yet during 
this post-war period, initially, at least, this proposition is not relevant. The dynamics of ‘the 
politics of power’ versus ‘the politics of support’ is less useful when the topic of policy-
making – here, immigration – is not a prominent issue for politicians or the electorate. A wish 
to maintain international relations with the Commonwealth, which was of particular 
importance when the Conservatives were in government, served to delay the making of 
immigration policy. Towards the end of the period, however, as levels of migration to the 
UK continued to climb, there was a slow but steady push for restricting immigration in the 
form of legislation. The civil service – whose role in the Conservatives’ policy-making is 
minimal when the Party is in opposition – helped create an environment in which tightening 
up immigration controls was perceived to be the only legislative option. 
 
1945 to 1951 
The unexpected defeat of the Conservatives in the immediate post-war election of 1945 did 
make it difficult for the Party to develop and revise policy more generally. Without the 
support of the civil service, the Tories were left to rely on the Conservative Research 
Department, which at the time was lacking both staff and resources. This state of affairs, 
combined with a Leader’s Consultative Committee (in effect, a Shadow Cabinet) that was 
disorganised, even dysfunctional, meant that policy-making during this parliament was 
difficult. There was not much in the way of Conservative policy on immigration, official or 
otherwise; little serious thought was given to the issue by Tory politicians. When the Labour 
government passed the British Nationality Act, which opened up settlement in the UK to 
some 600 million people, the Tories did not, in their role as the official opposition, criticise 
the legislation. They did not expect the Act to facilitate migration into the UK.144 
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1951 to 1955 
Although the Conservatives did lose the subsequent general election in 1950, their success at 
the 1951 election returned them to office and the Party was able to quickly resume its ‘politics 
of power’ approach. Namely, Conservative policy was well-thought-out and practical, if not 
necessarily of great interest to the electorate. While the level of immigration did rise during 
this period, in the years following the passing of the British Nationality Act of 1948, it was 
of no immediate concern to a Conservative government. Migration levels were not yet 
perceived to be problematic, and there were other priorities which prevented the 
Conservatives from developing policy on immigration. For one thing, the Party from 1951 
onwards was more concerned with ‘reassuring the electorate’ that Labour’s scaremongering 
about the Tories was groundless – hence the emphasis was on ‘consolidation’ as well as the 
implementation of popular pledges.145 It was important that the Party projected an image of 
competence and authority, or, in other words, that the Tories took on the mantle of the 
‘politics of power’. A potentially controversial policy on immigration would not have fitted 
in with the desired image. 
 
1955 to 1959 
In the mid-late 1950s, one significant obstacle to Conservative policy-making restricting 
immigration – and one that was more relevant with the Party back in office – was the need 
to maintain relations with other Commonwealth countries. Domestic concerns about rising 
levels of migration from the Commonwealth, and the impact on British society, were 
superseded by a different sphere of policy. In the 1950s, worries about Commonwealth 
migration were ‘secondary to a larger foreign policy aim – maintaining close relations with 
the Old Commonwealth’.146 
The Conservative focus on retaining links with the former colonies was not only pragmatic; 
it was deeply ideological. Both the leadership of the Party and the dominant factions within 
it were concerned with maintaining relations with the Commonwealth. Policy-makers could 
not fail to be influenced by such considerations when calls to restrict the movement of 
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Commonwealth citizens were made. The Conservatives’ 1955 election manifesto emphasised 
the commitment that many within the Party felt towards the Commonwealth: 
The British Commonwealth and Empire is the greatest force for peace and progress 
in the world today. […] We are its founder member, and for a large part we are still 
directly responsible.147 
 
Despite the reluctance of ministers to discuss the issue of immigration publicly, debates took 
place in private throughout the early 1950s. The debates reveal the ‘conviction held by many 
Conservative politicians […] that Britain’s political future lay at the centre of the 
Commonwealth, rather than in cooperation with Europe’.148 Unsurprisingly, then, both 
politicians and civil servants were reluctant to impose restrictions on Commonwealth 
countries which were perceived to be integral to the future of the UK.149 After all, if free 
movement between the Old Dominions and the colonies and the UK was a symbol of the 
links between these countries, taking steps to remove this movement would be deeply 
damaging to continued close relations. 
The Conservative leadership ruled it something of a success – at least, with regard to 
maintaining international relations – when Conservative MP Cyril Osborne decided not to 
proceed with his plan to bring in a private member’s bill on controlling immigration. The 
Cabinet argued that the forthcoming visit of Princess Margaret to the West Indies, combined 
with a recently-fought election in Jamaica (which was still under British rule) meant that it 
was currently ‘an inopportune moment to initiate action on this matter’.150  
Considerations for international relations continued to hinder the development of 
immigration policy under the newly-elected Conservative government of 1955. The Colonial 
Secretary Lennox-Boyd warned that legislation against Commonwealth immigration would 
not only be regarded as discriminatory, but that it would have ‘a particularly unfortunate 
effect on our relations with the West Indies, and might well prejudice the future association 
of the proposed West Indian Federation with the Commonwealth’.151 
When increased levels of migration and growing public hostility demanded some kind of 
response, ministers did begin to discuss restricting immigration. Yet, keen to maintain 
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reasonable relations with Commonwealth countries – out of both loyalty and economic 
concerns – the Conservatives were able to maintain and extend administrative controls on 
migrants. This, then, is an example of the Conservatives benefitting from their position in 
office by bringing about a ‘best of both worlds’ solution and almost certainly doing policy 
differently to how they might have done in opposition, which would, likely, have been to 
press for more explicit controls. 
 
1959 to 1964 
During the early 1960s, when the Party held office having won its third consecutive election 
victory, the Tories were now well used to operating within the ‘politics of power’ mode. 
Given that Conservative strategy seemed to be ‘working’, that is, levels of immigration were 
not increasing significantly, there seemed no need to make changes to policy. However, as 
migration levels continued to climb, senior Party figures began to lose faith in soft controls 
and there was a slow but steady push for restricting migration in the form of legislation.  
This shift was encouraged by an entity whose level of influence on Conservative policy-
making would have been far less if the Party had been in opposition. The civil service was 
close to irrelevant when the Party was in opposition. In government, however, Tory ministers 
were, and are, encouraged to reconsider policies on the advice of their civil servants.152 
Several ministries (including the Ministry of Labour) repeatedly pushed for controls on 
immigration.153 The civil service helped create an environment in which tightening up 
immigration controls was perceived to be the only legislative option. 
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Electoral considerations, leadership and factions 
My second proposition contends that there are three influencing factors with regard to party 
policy-making: the ‘fear of electoral defeat’, or, electoral calculations relating to elections in 
the recent past or coming up in the short term; the leader of the party’s interest in, and stance 
on, the issue as well as their managerial style; and lastly, the factions that may, to some 
extent, direct the Party. I find that these factors are critical to policy-making during certain 
periods. When divisions within the Party are most apparent, the role of opposing factions can 
well explain the changes (or lack thereof) to policy-making. The leadership’s take on 
immigration – and their affinity with particular wings of the Party – is also important. 
Electoral considerations are less of a concern: Tory politicians did not at this time believe 
that there would be votes in immigration, nor would it be seemly to mobilise in such a way. 
 
1945 to 1951 
 Factions 
In the immediate post-war period, the Conservatives did not have an explicit immigration 
policy, but nor did they object to the 1948 British Nationality Act, which allowed for the 
expansion of UK settlement rights to more than half a billion people. Dominant ‘moderate’ 
factions within the Party cannot fully explain the lack of policy on this issue or indeed the 
lack of objections to the liberalisation of the UK’s immigration laws. Although there was 
‘considerable doubt as to what the Conservative attitude was or should be’, there were, at this 
time, no significant divisions within the Party on immigration.154 If anything, a Party-wide 
respect for the Empire would have dissuaded any individuals from undermining legislation 
that was merely restoring the rights of citizens of the Empire. As late as 1949, the 
Conservative Party published The Imperial Charter, a document which declared that ‘if the 
British Empire were to break up Britain would become a third-class power unable to feed or 
defend herself’.155 
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Leadership 
If factions cannot fully explain Conservative near-silence on the issue, can the answer lie in 
the leadership of the Party? While Winston Churchill had expressed xenophobic sentiment, 
and would later, in 1954, warn of a ‘magpie society’ (that is, with black and white citizens), 
immigration does not seem to have been a concern to him in the immediate post-war 
period.156 Furthermore, Churchill was uninterested in his new and unexpected position as 
leader of the opposition and had ‘no intention of applying himself to the daily grind of 
Opposition’.157 He was more interested in foreign affairs and ‘cared little’ for domestic 
matters.158 Immigration was a low priority to him. We can only conclude that the British 
Nationality Act was viewed as no more than correcting a technicality, and was, then, at least, 
‘only peripherally related to immigration’, and so there was no need for the Conservatives to 
develop policy on the issue.159 
 
 Electoral motivations 
Nor can electoral considerations provide an explanation for the lack of immigration policy. 
True, the Party had lost a general election, and it might be expected that the Tories would 
take lessons from this; in order to avoid further defeat, they might perhaps change their 
policy. Yet, on a topic such as immigration, which was then something of a non-issue, little 
would have been gained. From the early 1950s onwards, a handful of Conservative 
backbenchers and parliamentary candidates seized upon the issue of immigration. However, 
the leadership of the Party remained quiet, even as public opinion grew more solidly in favour 
of controlling immigration. It was not yet clear to the Tory leadership how significant – and 
how long-running – the issue would be, with even Churchill himself admitting that the impact 
of immigration did not yet warrant counter-measures.160 
  
90 
 
1951 to 1955 
 Factions 
As levels of migration to the UK from the New Commonwealth increased during the early-
mid 1950s, from 2,000 in 1953 to more than five times that in 1954, the issue threatened to 
damage the Party and entrench emerging factions.161 In November 1954, the rate of 
immigration from the West Indies was referred to in Cabinet as a ‘matter of some urgency’.162 
In that same year, Churchill’s decision to reshuffle his Cabinet had a significant, if 
unintentional, effect: the dominant faction within the new Cabinet were opposed to managing 
migration levels through formal controls.163 With the key members of the Party uninterested 
in taking the legislative route to control migration, it is unsurprising that the implementation 
of migration controls was delayed.164  
 
Leadership 
During the 1951 parliament, Churchill became more concerned by immigration to the UK, 
though he made no real effort to push for controls, preferring to concern himself with 
international issues. The leadership factor, then, is only relevant in the sense that Churchill’s 
lack of interest in the issue ensured that immigration was not a priority for policy 
development. It was only towards the end of his time in office that he expressed worries about 
controlling migration, and his subsequent struggle to get his ministers to take the issue 
seriously.165 Gilmour argues that if Churchill had continued as leader of the Party beyond 
April 1955, ‘legislation would almost certainly have been introduced far earlier than it 
was’.166  
 
 
91 
 
 Electoral motivations 
The fear of electoral defeat was not a great concern during this time; there were no efforts 
made to exploit the issue. This was no error. With the Conservatives keeping quiet on 
immigration so as not to deepen existing divisions, it was sensible to leave the matter out of 
Party manifestos of 1950 and 1951 and subsequent public documentation. In private, Home 
Secretary Maxwell Fyfe did argue that ‘public opinion is quite uninformed on this subject, 
and that this is part of the reason for the reluctance to discuss the matter in public’.167  When, 
towards the end of this period, the Conservative leadership did decide to consider the 
possibility of legislation, ministers did not want to make electoral gain out of the issue. One 
memorandum to Cabinet from the Home Secretary suggested that the Prime Minister meet 
to discuss the matter with the Leader of the Opposition on the grounds that ‘this is not a 
matter of Party politics but is one of national concern which will have to be tackled soon by 
whichever Party is in power’.168 
 
1955 to 1959 
Factions 
During the mid-late 1950s, factions within the Conservatives were a source of growing 
difficulties to the Party leadership, particularly when distinct and separate wings of the Party 
– with different motivations – formed an informal coalition in opposition to controls on 
migration. A substantial wing of the Party represented Conservatives with an ideological 
commitment to maintaining strong links with the Commonwealth. They opposed the option 
of introducing controls on all Commonwealth immigrants, including the ‘Old 
Commonwealth’ of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.169 Policy-making at the time was 
‘conditioned by an ideological commitment […] especially amongst Conservatives, to a 
previous century’s colonies’.170 A further faction was made up of those of more liberal 
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opinion, who were opposed to discrimination on racial grounds. It was these Conservatives 
who did not support controls that they believed to be discriminatory.171 
The newly emerging immigration issue created something of a dilemma for the Party: 
immigration from the Commonwealth ‘generated passions and interests’ that made continued 
internal party unity difficult.172 The importance of securing party unity – and preventing 
existing factions becoming more entrenched – was a further reason for the Tories to hold off 
on developing a restrictive and undoubtedly controversial immigration policy. Hansen argues 
that this period, in which the so-called ‘open door’ remained wide open, is down to a struggle 
for power between different factions within the mainstream parties. Thus, the moderate and 
liberal policy of this time was the result of ‘the intersection of a bipartisan ideological 
commitment, on the one hand, and the distribution of power within the Conservative Party, 
on the other’.173 Efforts to bring in migration controls were obstructed not because of political 
weakness, but because of political division. The Eden government had, early on, begun 
looking into restricting immigration, but opposition from within the Party and a threat of 
resignation from the Colonial Secretary meant that this was quietly put to one side.  
In the later years, the riots of 1958, which had brought pressure on the Conservative 
leadership to bring in more restrictive policy without delay, forced the emergence of a 
restrictionist faction which enjoyed support among both backbenchers and ministers. Certain 
prominent individuals within the Cabinet from the liberal faction of the Party, however, 
continued to oppose controls. The displays of street violence had encouraged ‘public pressure 
against migration [but] they decreased the government’s ability to respond’, because the 
‘liberal wing would not accept a panicked response’.174 
  
 Leadership 
The appointment of Eden as leader of the Party in April 1955 ensured that there would be 
little done on immigration. By the mid-1950s, Conservative ministers were now seriously 
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discussing the imposition of immigration controls, in part because of a growing clamour for 
such measures. However, Eden wished to retain his reputation for being a ‘moderate’ and 
where possible, to avoid controversy – and the matter of imposing restrictions on immigrants 
was nothing if not controversial at this time.175 His previous role as Foreign Secretary – and 
the contacts he had made from this time – made it unlikely that he would implement measures 
which might damage relations with other Commonwealth countries. As one biographer put 
it ‘[i]f in foreign policy matters he had been keen to please Nehru [the first Prime Minister 
of India], he would scarcely have wished to offend him by introducing discriminatory laws 
relating to Commonwealth immigration’.176 Furthermore, Eden’s lack of experience and 
general discomfort with domestic policy militated against a comprehensive approach to 
managing levels of migration.177  
Within two years, Macmillan had become leader and pushed the immigration issue back into 
the open. One might have thought that Macmillan would drive the Conservative Party’s 
immigration policy in a more restrictive direction. He was, after all, ‘seen by the right as 
decisive’, and had ‘few, if any enemies’ within the parliamentary party who might have 
obstructed his decisions.178 Macmillan used his right to appoint ministers as near proxies for 
himself: his priority was ‘to find someone he thought would take policy in the direction he 
himself desired.’179 His appointments did not always work out as he had wanted. In a diary 
entry, he described his new Colonial Secretary, Reginald Maudling, as ‘plus noir que les 
nègres’, ‘more difficult and intransigent than his predecessor [Macleod]’.180 Macmillan 
played a greater role than previous Tory leaders in driving immigration policy change, 
despite it being an issue which he did not consider to be of the highest priority.181 Notably, 
just a few days after he became Prime Minister, Macmillan sent his colleagues in Cabinet a 
paper which argued that ‘the new government’s approach to the colonies must be entirely 
pragmatic: those that wanted independence and where continued British possession made no 
economic sense should be let go’.182 He would later call for an end to an ideological, if not 
emotional, commitment to the colonies. 
 
94 
 
 Electoral motivations 
Far less significant as a means of explaining the delay in developing an immigration policy 
was the fear of electoral defeat. The landslide victory of 1955, in which as the incumbent, 
the Party had, unusually, increased its majority, meant that there was less of a need to worry 
about such things. The ‘comparative lack of public interest made inaction on immigration 
easier’ for the Party.183 Many within the Cabinet agreed with Colonies Secretary Lennox-
Boyd that the election had showed that immigration was not regarded as a serious concern.184 
Few seemed to have concurred with Lord Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, who 
argued that it ‘[d]oesn’t matter that [the] public don’t ask for control now. It may be our duty 
to act ahead, before it is too late.’185 
The Committee of Ministers that had been set up to consider the immigration issue reported 
back to Cabinet in June 1956 that ‘public opinion is much less exercised about the question 
than it was a year or two ago’.186 The immigration of citizens from the colonies had 
previously been a new phenomenon’; it was now ‘regarded with diminished interest’.187 Such 
a conclusion mitigated against bringing in controls against immigration. The government 
‘chose not to legislate along the lines suggested by the Committee primarily because public 
concern had decreased with the passage of time’ (my italics).188 Indeed, polling in the run-
up to the election of 1959 found that ‘concern for […] economic well-being came first; 
foreign affairs came a poor second; colonial and other issues were nowhere’.189 
Furthermore, even if they had believed immigration to be a significant concern, the 
Conservatives did not think there would be much to gain from a complicated and sensitive 
issue. It was better, it was believed, to work quietly behind the scenes, strengthening the soft 
measures to discourage black and Asian migration. However, that is not to say that the 
Conservatives were oblivious to public concerns. They may not have legislated to reduce 
immigration in this period (the conclusions from one Cabinet meeting in July 1957 state that 
‘public opinion was not yet prepared for […] statutory regulation’).190 However, 
Conservative ministers were certainly discussing immigration.191 Correspondence with 
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backbenchers who were themselves in contact with worried constituents, as well as unrest 
within Party ranks, meant that ministers could not ignore the issue. 
 
1959 to 1964 
 Factions 
In response to criticism that the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was being rushed through 
parliament, Iain Macleod, the Leader of the House, replied that ‘we have taken years to decide 
it’.192 This first piece of post-war legislation setting out controls on immigration was passed 
in 1962. But what explains the decision to legislate? Neither changes to factions within the 
Conservative Party, nor disputes between factions, are of much use. Macmillan did undertake 
a major Cabinet reshuffle in 1961 (the infamous ‘Night of the Long Knives’), in which he 
dismissed a third of his colleagues, but this had little impact in terms of changing the factional 
make-up of the Cabinet.193 One of the factions within the Party that was most concerned by 
the legislation was made up of a loose collection of ‘our more right-wing backbenchers who 
were most worried […] [that] the whole principle of the Empire and the Commonwealth was 
being undermined by these attempts to impede with free movement’.194 As an undergraduate, 
Ken Clarke went to listen to the debates and recalled that the bill ‘caused great furore within 
the Conservative Party’ before being passed ‘with great difficulty’.195 
The definitive move towards restricting immigration through legislation was a reluctant 
response to an issue that, for the Conservatives, could no longer be contained. Few of the 
key figures within the Party were enthusiastic about what would become the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. They had tried diplomatic means and 
administrative measures, but the level of migration had increased to a new high of nearly 
58,000 in 1960 (see Table 2). They had returned to the issue following periods in which the 
public seemed particular hostile to immigration and immigrants, and they had dropped it in 
favour of high-priority matters when public concern had decreased.  
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 Leadership 
The Conservative Party of the 1960s did not have a defined stance on immigration: the 
leadership was ‘in a muddle’.196 Macmillan had given his ‘Wind of Change’ speech in 1960, 
in which he acknowledged – and celebrated – the rise of African nationalism.197 The speech 
pointed out an incoherence within the Conservative Party’s approach to Africa: the conflict 
between the ‘traditional relationship with the white communities in the south and the new 
support for independent black states in the north’.198 The speech was so disliked by some 
within the Party that it led to the formation of the right-wing anti-immigration group, the 
Monday Club, which created difficulties for the leadership from this point onwards until the 
early 1970s.199 
The leadership were not unaware of the strength of public feeling; their backbenchers made 
great efforts to communicate the level of concern within their constituencies. As Hansen 
notes, from Gallup’s first measure of public opinion in 1958, polls consistently demonstrated 
majority support for stricter migration control, and these demands intensified in the run-up 
to the introduction of the first such controls in 1962.200 Despite this, there is evidence that the 
leadership were somewhat dismissive of polling, with senior politicians arguing that opinion 
polls were ‘no substitute for judgements about the electorate based largely on hunch, 
experience, the press, and personal contacts’.201 Fortunately for the Conservative leadership, 
their ‘hunch’ was close to that of the ordinary voter. 
The leadership was not compelled into bringing about legislation by their backbenchers. In 
fact, according to Hansen, there is no evidence to support the claim that frontbenchers were 
compelled to bring in controls by backbench restrictionism.202 Rather, backbenchers’ focus 
on immigration made it an issue that had to be discussed. The Cabinet, the leadership, and 
senior Tories were led more by their own ideas about what was right and proper. 
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Electoral motivations 
The Tories’ fear of electoral defeat is of some relevance in explaining the move towards 
restrictionist policy. The Party had been shocked by poor poll ratings and by-election results, 
but the move towards restrictions had already begun.203 Senior Conservative figures were 
making moves to legislate, driven in part by ‘the hostility on the issue picked up by 
canvassers and candidates at the 1959 election’, and ‘by fears that this hostility […] would 
damage race relations’, as well as the increase in black and Asian migration to the UK at a 
time when employment was falling.204 If, however, the Conservatives had been more 
concerned by electoral motivations, they would likely have talked up the issue more in the 
years leading up to, and following the introduction of legislation. What was to become the 
1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act had not even been hinted at in the manifesto of 1959. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the Conservative Party’s immigration policy-making from 1945 
to 1964. During this time, the Party’s policy was transformed – from the nearly non-existent 
(before World War Two Britain had been a country of emigration) to a more developed entity. 
The issue of immigration became a matter of national interest as public hostility to black and 
Asian immigration in some areas became apparent. Over time, the bulk of the Conservative 
Party took on a much more restrictionist approach to migration, race and citizenship. Policy-
making was heavily influenced by the Tories’ concerns about the negative impact of 
immigration on communities, as well as a desire not to interfere with, or damage relations 
with, the Commonwealth. The result was a Conservative Party which ‘sought to restrict non-
white immigration while avoiding public debates’.205  
Using the lens of the government versus opposition framework has allowed for a deeper 
understanding of immigration policy-making within the Conservative Party. The framework 
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is not consistently relevant, particularly with regard to the immediate post-war period, but it 
has allowed for two points to be made.  
First, when the policy issue has low salience, policy-making is less impacted by the differing 
dynamics of the ‘politics of power’ versus the ‘politics of support’. The converse is also true. 
During this period, as immigration became a growing public concern, there was more of a 
differential between policy that was produced when the Conservatives were in government 
and when they were in opposition. In other words, policy and policy-making is dependent on 
the status of the party – but only when the policy issue is a priority for the party. 
Second, the Party’s interest in maintaining international relations was consistently stronger 
when the Party was in office than when it was not. When the Tories were more mindful of 
how other countries might react, they were less likely to bring in sweeping changes to 
immigration policy. For much of this period, worries about Commonwealth migration to the 
UK were less important than preserving close relations with Commonwealth countries. By 
the final parliament, the Conservatives were less sensitive to the need to preserve 
international relations: it was not irrelevant but it was less of a priority. This explains, in part, 
the Tory Party’s move from administrative measures to legislation to control immigration. 
This chapter has also considered three separate drivers of party policy-making: the ‘fear of 
electoral defeat’, or, electoral calculations relating to elections in the recent past or future; 
the party leader’s interest in, and stance on, the issue as well as their managerial style; and 
lastly, the factions that, to some extent, direct the party. Of the three factors, their impact on 
immigration policy is varied, and fluctuates throughout the period. 
The existence of – and interaction between – factions within the Conservative Party is most 
helpful as a means of explaining the changes (or lack of) in policy in this period, particularly 
when the divisions are most apparent. For much of this period, migration controls remain 
theoretical and the ‘open door’ stays wide open – this was the outcome of a struggle for 
power between different factions. When Eden’s government began considering restricting 
immigration, opposition from within the Party and a threat of resignation from the Colonial 
Secretary ensured that no action would be taken. It was difficult for the leader to win over 
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his colleagues when the various factions of the party had different reasons for opposing 
control. It seemed preferable to keep the Tory Party together than to risk further divisions 
developing an undoubtedly controversial immigration policy. 
Less important, though still relevant in explaining policy change, is the leadership of the 
Party. The Conservative leader’s take on immigration, and their affinity with particular wings 
of the Party, does matter. Churchill paid little attention to domestic affairs, and only acquired 
something of an interest in immigration towards the end of his leadership in 1954. However, 
at that time, he could not get his ministers to take it seriously; the dominant faction in charge 
of the Party would not allow restrictions on immigration. While the Party under Eden did 
consider controls on the movement of people into the UK, Eden’s leadership ensured not 
much would be done. He was keen to retain his reputation for being a ‘moderate’ and where 
possible, wished to avoid controversy. Macmillan may not have considered immigration 
policy to be of the highest priority but he played a greater role than previous Tory leaders in 
driving changes to policy. In calling for a more modern and tolerant way of dealing with the 
UK’s former colonies, he put paid to the idea that the citizens of these countries should 
receive special treatment (including unrestricted entry to Britain).  
Electoral calculations are close to insignificant as a means of explaining developments in 
immigration policy. Despite the Conservative Party suffering an unexpected defeat at the 
start of the period, followed by a second – albeit brief – term in opposition, the making of 
immigration policy was not affected by the motivation to win votes. The topic was considered 
close to a non-issue for much of this period and Tory politicians did not believe they could 
gain electoral support on the back of it. The Labour Party’s shared interest in keeping 
immigration off the political agenda may have helped the Tories. Had Labour decided to 
politicise the issue to criticise the Tories, then the latter would likely have had to take a 
different position. Further, many figures within the Party did not believe it was right to exploit 
an issue as sensitive and volatile as immigration. If the Conservatives had been less 
concerned about the unseemliness of mobilising in such a way, they would have made more 
of immigration policy both before and following the introduction of legislation.  
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1964 to 1979 
 
[W]e didn’t have a policy and we had to make one.1 
– Douglas Hurd 
 
This chapter will seek to explain the making of Conservative immigration policy from 1964 
to 1979. It will first examine the key developments in the Tories’ approach to managing 
immigration. It will then explain the Party’s policy-making using the theoretical framework 
expanded on previously. Over five general elections and under three different leaders, the 
Conservatives struggled with the issue as it exposed – and worsened – fault lines within the 
Party, before eventually settling on a severe tightening of immigration control. A 
contemporary report on the election of 1965 dismissed the arguments used by the minority 
in favour of further immigration controls as ‘based more on fear than on facts’.2 Whether this 
is an unfair comment or not is irrelevant: these arguments would, in time, become widely 
accepted. By the end of this period, the Conservative Party had moved from a quiet 
recognition that it would be best to keep the immigration issue out of the headlines (on the 
grounds that nothing would be served by destabilising community relations) to an 
understanding that the issue had to be dealt with and there was no sense in not making use of 
the matter.  
In the mid-1960s, the Conservative Party had no substantial policy on immigration or 
immigrants. In government just a few years previously, it had passed the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act of 1962 – legislation which, senior Party figures hoped, would put to a rest 
demands for controls on immigration. At the time, some within the parliamentary party had 
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expressed concerns that the bill was too restrictionist: it had provoked ‘strong emotional 
opposition and internal strife’ within the Party.3 Within a few years, however, a handful of 
Tory MPs who believed the 1962 Act to be far too modest were calling for further action. By 
the early 1970s, there were more Conservative parliamentarians with the same mindset, and 
they were supported by the constituency associations, which put forward dozens of 
resolutions on immigration and ethnicity to Party conference each year.4 Towards the end of 
this period, the Conservative leadership was less hesitant about putting forward a tougher 
immigration policy. Concerns about exploiting the issue and exacerbating community 
tensions continued, but these concerns were no longer so widespread within the Conservative 
Party, and were limited to Tories of the liberal, patrician ‘old guard’. 
During this period, there was a notable shift within the Conservative Party in attitudes 
towards immigration controls, which occurred at the level of the leadership and the 
parliamentary party as well as ordinary members and supporters. The emergence of a 
‘Powellite’ take on immigration disarmed senior Conservative figures in the late 1960s, but 
their outrage did not prevent the restrictionist viewpoint becoming commonplace among 
backbenchers and constituency associations. Meanwhile, those Tories with a patrician-like 
loyalty to Empire and then Commonwealth were being replaced by a different kind of 
politician: one who was not burdened by such emotional and moral attachments, but who 
was instead looking to Europe – with interest or with scepticism. 
It would be misleading to argue, however, that there were two clearly delineated factions 
within the Conservative Party that were in opposition to each other. Nor was there a smooth 
transition for the Party as particular approaches to immigration policy became more or less 
acceptable. While younger and new parliamentary candidates in the 1960s were aware of the 
pressures of immigration within their constituencies, few expected the issue to become one 
of national concern and fewer still had developed a comprehensive take on it.5 A Gallup poll 
from November 1964 found just ten per cent of the public believed there to be a ‘colour 
problem’ (often used as a short-hand for immigration) in their area.6 The Conservative 
leadership certainly did not believe immigration to be an issue on which it would be worth 
taking a distinctive position that differentiated it from the main opposition party. Within a 
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few years, however, the Party found itself divided as to how best to manage the issue of 
immigration. In one case, senior Tory figures expressed opposition to the Labour 
government’s Commonwealth Immigrants Bill on the grounds that it was (for some) too 
restrictive and (for others) too liberal. The Conservative leadership recognised the divisions, 
and, while it supported Labour’s bill, decided not to impose a whip on the issue, and to allow 
Shadow Cabinet members to abstain.7 
Even the related issue of race discrimination did not allow the Party to come together. Instead, 
the Party was split three ways, with some MPs wholeheartedly in favour of the government’s 
measures, others sceptical of the need for the legislation and uncertain of the timing, and a 
sizeable body downright opposed: there were proponents of each of these points of view 
within the Shadow Cabinet. While the Shadow Cabinet did put forward an amendment 
opposing what became the 1968 Race Relations Act, it did eventually decide to vote in favour 
at the third reading, on the grounds that to do otherwise might damage the Party’s reputation. 
By this point, senior Conservatives were well aware that a perceived opposition to ‘coloured’ 
people might have negative electoral implications.  
In later years, in order to better manage these opposing factions within the Conservative 
Party, the leadership attempted to put together a compromise of sorts. While seeking to 
dissociate themselves from the more extreme views of some members of the parliamentary 
party, senior Party figures did try to respond to the more restrictionist views that were gaining 
ground, while simultaneously trying to keep the more liberal or ‘old-fashioned’ Tories 
content by, for example, supporting racial discrimination legislation. Keeping competing 
wings of the Party content was no simple task, and occasionally, these factions found 
common ground and were able to frustrate the leadership. This was the case in 1972, when 
the Conservative government introduced legislation on new immigration rules; the bill was 
initially defeated when MPs opposed to Conservative policy (some, on the grounds that it 
discriminated against Old Commonwealth citizens), brought onside those parliamentarians 
who were sceptical of the EEC and the free movement of European workers. 
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5.1 The development of Conservative immigration policy 
1964 to 1966 
In 1964, after 13 years of uninterrupted power, the Conservatives lost office. Their defeat, 
which many Tories had expected, was partly down to a shift in support to the Liberals.8 
Conservative leader Alec Douglas-Home later wrote that, if it had not been for the Party’s 
divisions over his leadership, the election might have been won.9 Two members of 
Macmillan’s final cabinet, themselves influential figures within the Party, did not support his 
leadership.10 According to Douglas-Home, the refusal of Ian Macleod and Enoch Powell to 
serve under him likely lost the Tories votes.11 
The Tories’ 1964 manifesto had, for the first time, made an explicit reference to controlling 
immigration to ‘our crowded country’.12 There was also a comment on the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, ‘which we passed […] against bitter Labour Party 
opposition’.13 Despite the emphasis on immigration in the manifesto, the issue was not 
significant during the campaign, having come to the fore very occasionally.14 In one notable 
example at a Yorkshire Conservatives rally, Douglas-Home claimed that 300,000 immigrants 
would have entered the UK if it had not been for his government’s passing the 1962 
legislation.15 This intervention did not, however, signal wider exploitation of the immigration 
issue.16 Douglas-Home, who found opposition to be a ‘frustrating business’, resolved to hold 
back from criticising the government for the sake of it, believing that ‘indiscriminate 
bludgeoning is boring to the great majority of thoughtful electors’.17 His MPs were 
unsatisfied by this and Home was subject to a constant pressure to employ a more dynamic 
approach for the remainder of his leadership.18 
The matter of immigration had little influence on the Conservatives’ performance during the 
general election. Writing in 1964, Michael Steed concludes there was ‘no evidence of any 
general effects of immigration’.19 The Party made no mention of immigration other than in 
passing and there was little to distinguish its immigration policy from that of its main 
competitor. Using opinion polling data, Rob Ford has argued that during this time, the 
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majority of voters did not perceive a great deal of difference between the parties’ stance on 
immigration.20 
It is worth noting, however, that the Conservative campaign in one constituency did push the 
immigration issue up the agenda. In Smethwick, a town in the West Midlands which had 
received many immigrants from the Commonwealth in the years following World War Two, 
the Conservative candidate campaigned on an overtly anti-immigration platform with the 
slogan 'if you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour'. He referred to 
Smethwick’s future being decided by ‘voters in their turbans and saris’.21 Hansen has argued 
that the outcome of the 1964 election – in which the Conservative candidate, Peter Griffiths, 
took the seat – provided an ‘argument in favour of immigration restrictions’.22 The huge 
support for a xenophobic campaign unsettled many Tories, although Douglas-Home (and 
others) did avoid direct condemnation of the Conservative campaign in Smethwick.23 
The Smethwick campaign brought to the fore tensions between the relatively liberal 
leadership and their more socially conservative supporters on the ground. Senior 
Conservative parliamentarians were so nervous that several refused invitations to speak in 
the constituency.24 And yet, this may well have helped the candidate secure his seat, as ‘the 
Conservative hierarchy’s displeasure only served to gain Mr Griffiths more support in the 
local organisation’.25 However, despite this seemingly noticeable gap between the 
Conservative leadership and their supporters, the Party’s position on immigration was, in 
fact, very close to that of the median voter.26 A Gallup poll in 1964 found that 30 per cent of 
voters thought the Conservatives had the better policy on immigration, as against 20 per cent 
for Labour.27 After all, the Tories ‘instinctively viewed themselves as the party that would 
not lose from immigration’, given their previous legislative efforts and stance on the issue.28 
Despite the Conservative leadership putting in little effort to make use of the immigration 
issue – believing it to be a local not a national concern and not a particularly seemly one at 
that – the Party was, in some sense, benefiting from the situation.29 
It might be reasonable to assume that, having lost an election, the Conservatives would, in 
opposition, seek to emphasise different policies, if not re-work them entirely. In an effort to 
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show that the Party could ‘keep up with the times’, there was a thorough re-evaluation of 
Conservative policy.30 However, immigration policy received little attention from the Party 
as it was not, at this time, perceived to be a national issue.31 And yet, while the Conservative 
leadership chose to focus their efforts on other issues, there were signs that immigration to 
the UK would shortly become a matter of great interest to voters. 
Within the Party, some of the first to realise that, if immigration was not yet, truly, a national 
concern, it soon would be, were its parliamentary candidates, particularly those standing in 
areas that were receiving higher levels of immigrants. One candidate, David Waddington, 
who would later become immigration minister and then Home Secretary, found that 
immigration was a ‘live issue’ in his constituency of Nelson and Colne, in Lancashire, 
because it was receiving many Pakistani immigrants.32 It was then that Waddington saw ‘the 
strain that large[-scale] immigration could put on a community’.33 
The one exception to the quiet consensus was an interjection from Douglas-Home in early 
1965, who, as Leader of the Opposition, put forward four restrictionist proposals at a meeting 
of the Party’s Central Council in Westminster. He called for a reduction in the level of 
immigration, the repatriation of all illegal immigrants and more data on the dependants of 
immigrants.34 Hansen argues that Douglas-Home’s intervention lent momentum and 
credence to those within the Conservative Party pushing for a tougher approach to 
immigration.35 This was problematic for the Conservative leadership, which was wary of the 
possibility of immigration splitting the Party along existing factions. The introduction of a 
Race Relations Bill in April 1965 did not help matters, as the parliamentary party was divided 
between those who professed support for the measures and those, such as Enoch Powell and 
Cyril Osborne, who expressed total opposition to the measures on the grounds that legislation 
was damaging and an unnecessary intervention.36 As a result, the leadership proceeded 
cautiously: frontbenchers managed to secure a compromise motion that condemned racial 
discrimination, but which still opposed the bill because of its criminalising of 
discrimination.37 Importantly, perhaps, the Conservatives experienced a change in personnel 
– with the replacement of Edward Boyle, seen as a ‘liberal enthusiast for race relations’, with 
Peter Thorneycroft as spokesman for Home Affairs.38  
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Perhaps more important with regard to how the Conservative Party handled immigration was 
the attitude of the leadership. Douglas-Home was not particularly concerned by the issue. 
Nor was Heath, who took on the leadership of the Party in late July 1965; he did little to 
change the direction or tone of policy and he made few changes to the Shadow Cabinet. 
Under him, at least initially, there was no ‘cull of the old guard’.39 In fact, the Party at this 
time saw little reason to make use of immigration as a party-political issue. Senior 
Conservative figures were pleased to work with – not against – their Labour counterparts. 
When in 1965, Shadow Home Secretary Peter Thorneycroft initiated a debate on 
immigration, ‘the government struck a conciliatory tone that appeared to be reciprocated by 
the Opposition’, while the policy of retaining controls on immigration while encouraging the 
integration of immigrants was said to have ‘appealed to members on both sides’.40 
By mid-1965, the possibility of using the immigration issue for electoral gain had become a 
topic of discussion within the Party at the highest levels. A Policy Group on Immigration 
released an interim report putting forward ‘detailed proposals for integratory measures, 
including hostels for unmarried immigrants and additional staff for schools and a substantial 
increase in the grant to the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (a body 
encouraging the integration of immigrants)’.41 The media seized upon one suggestion within 
the report that ‘the numbers entering do not exceed those returning’, which was branded the 
‘one in, one out’ proposal.42 This proposal came to dominate discussion on the topic.  
However, this ‘tinker[ing] with the possibility of using immigration in party competition’ did 
not last long.43 Shadow Cabinet discussions revealed fears that too restrictionist a line might 
‘offend the middle vote’ in the electorate.44 In private correspondence between Heath and 
Selwyn Lloyd, the latter expressed his fear that Labour might well adopt the Conservatives’ 
more restrictive stance – which would, presumably, have undone any potential advantage, 
and left the Tories with little space to go. Regardless, the proposal to use immigration as an 
electoral issue was no longer deemed appropriate. The proposals within the report were 
‘quietly dropped’ and the Party conference of 1965 was a ‘moderate affair concentrating on 
the favourable aspects of integration’.45  
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The explanation for the Conservatives’ retreat on the issue is that, as Lloyd had warned, 
Labour had caught sight of the Tory plan and had moved their own policy in a more 
restrictionist direction. In August 1965, the government published a White Paper titled 
‘Immigration from the Commonwealth’, which was portrayed as a balanced set of proposals 
that would bring in further immigration controls while simultaneously providing greater 
funding for areas that had experienced high levels of immigration. In media coverage, the 
integration measures were overshadowed by the restrictionist policy, which modified the 
existing system of permits and brought in new powers for the authorities.  
Labour’s plan had worked: by taking on more hard-line policies, the Tories had been left 
with little room in which to distinguish themselves on immigration. Admittedly, there had 
been damage done to relations with some of the Labour Party’s own supporters (those in the 
media had responded with ‘disappointment and hostility’) – but it had done its bit to demolish 
the Tory lead on the issue.46 The White Paper was a ‘clear success with the voters and the 
Opposition’; 87 per cent of the public were said to endorse it.47 Labour politician Richard 
Crossman acknowledged that the Labour government had carefully and deliberately planned 
for this, noting that ‘Politically, fear of immigration is the most powerful undertow today’.48 
He argued: ‘We felt we had to out-trump the Tories by doing what they would have done and 
so transforming their policy into a bipartisan policy’.49 
With the Conservatives forced to revert to treating immigration as a cross-party matter, the 
Conservative Policy Group removed the controversial ‘one in, one out’ proposal and resolved 
to minimise any discussion of new restrictionist measures.50 By this point, there was little 
difference between the two parties on the issue of immigration – Labour had neutralised the 
Tories’ lead to such an extent that the Tories’ ‘Policy Document: Breakthrough for Britain 
in Sept 1965’ ‘could have been written by either party’, at least with regard to immigration.51 
Consequently, the Conservative offering to the public at the 1966 election was little different 
from that of the Labour Party. 
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1966 to 1970 
In 1966, the Conservatives suffered their second successive electoral defeat. On this 
occasion, they lost not by four seats but by over a hundred. Douglas-Home’s strategy of 
‘principled opposition’ and ‘high-minded tactics’ had left Tory voters frustrated and Heath’s 
taking on the leadership had done little to change this.52 Immigration did not play a prominent 
role in the election campaigns of either of the two main parties, and the matter went ‘virtually 
unmentioned’.53 The Conservative manifesto did set out six points to ‘deal with the Problem 
of Immigration’, but immigration was not one of the Party’s five electoral themes.54 The issue 
was considered to be of no importance, in part because it was believed that it could no longer 
sway votes.55 A contemporary observer argued that immigration had had a limited impact on 
the electorate and was, instead, a preoccupation of the elites, given that ‘immigration seems 
to have affected pre-election commentators much more than voters’.56  
It would be wrong, however, to say that immigration was of no concern for the Conservatives 
during this parliamentary period. On the contrary, within a year or so of the 1966 election, 
several unexpected incidents, which were coupled with the continued entry to the UK of new 
migrants, ensured that the issue was forced to the top of the agenda. The Tories were 
compelled to quickly devise a response. In 1967, the Director of the Conservative Research 
Department warned the Shadow Cabinet that there would likely soon be ‘renewed concern 
about coloured problems’. 57 If that were to occur, he suggested, ‘we will probably at that 
time want to draw attention to the continuing rate of immigration and call for further 
restriction’.58 Chief Whip William Whitelaw foresaw that increasing issues with immigration 
would mean ‘dangers ahead’ for the Conservative Party.59 
The second-wave of immigration occurred from the mid-late 1960s until the 1970s. Many of 
these immigrants – unlike some of their predecessors – began to establish roots and settle 
down in their newly adopted country, lending their presence a new kind of permanence. Some 
were Asians who, having faced persistent hostility and persecution in Kenya (which had 
previously been under British rule in the colonial era), were then forced to leave and many 
turned to the UK. They were not subject to the 1962 CIA Act as their passports were issued 
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by the UK High Commission, and not, importantly, a colonial government.60 By early 1967, 
some 2,000 Kenyan Asians were arriving in the UK every month.61 The Times reported that 
in one 24-hour period, some 500 Kenyan Asians had entered the UK.62 The former 
Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies, Duncan Sandys, urged action and stated 
that he would introduce a private member’s bill to dramatically decrease the level of 
immigration to the UK if the government did not do something; his motion along the same 
lines was signed by some 90 Conservative MPs.63 There was, by this time, according to 
Whitelaw, ‘a considerable body of opinion’ which believed that the 1962 controls were less 
than adequate.64 
By mid-February, it was reported by the press that the Labour government was considering 
toughening up immigration legislation, in light of the continuing influx of Kenyan Asians to 
the UK.65 Wilson’s Labour government were quick to put together a restrictive bill that would 
curb the rights of Asians to enter the UK by bringing in a new prerequisite for entry.66 Under 
what became the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, those who were exempt from 
immigration controls would now need to possess what was referred to as a ‘qualifying 
connection’ to the UK, that is, they, or their children or grandchildren would need to have 
been born, naturalised or adopted in the UK.67 Few Kenyan Asians could show such a 
connection. In short, the legislation distinguished between those who ‘belonged’ to the UK, 
and those who did not. 
The Conservatives, as Her Majesty’s Opposition, could only watch from the side-lines: 
opposition in the Commons was ‘always frustrating’.68 Yet, it was acknowledged by some 
that the Party must do something. According to Edward Heath, immigration was a ‘new 
challenge to the whole philosophy of One Nation […] we could not afford to shirk it’.69 In 
response to what one broadsheet called ‘mounting pressure inside the Tory Party and in the 
country’, Heath did go so far as to release a statement on immigration.70 In what was 
perceived as an attempt to satiate those of his backbenchers who were demanding greater 
controls while avoiding potentially difficult legislation, Heath suggested that the government 
should bring in a system of phased entry for immigrants. This would mean that Kenyan 
Asians would not have their right to entry restricted, but that their entry would be controlled 
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‘to a level that suits not the immigrants but Britain’.71 In effect, they would continue to be 
citizens, but citizens who did not belong to the UK, a distinction which would allow the 
government to prevent the entry of ‘coloured’ immigrants without explicitly legislating for 
this. 72 
The Conservatives’ proposal was not taken up by the government; Heath’s party was left in 
a divided and bitter state as to how to manage the issue of immigration. The Shadow Cabinet 
was broadly in favour of a higher annual quota ‘than the 1,500 immigrants proposed by Mr 
Callaghan for all the overseas holders of British passports who come in the special 
category’.73 Following what the press called an ‘unhappy meeting’ and in a move that was 
not unanimous, the Shadow Cabinet agreed to support the government bill, but not to impose 
a whip on their Conservative backbenchers, many of whom, it was reported, were considering 
voting against.74 Senior Tories were well aware that immigration was a divisive issue for the 
Party, and tried to limit its impact. In fact, it was decided that even members of the Shadow 
Cabinet would be free to abstain on the issue.75 Shadow Chancellor Iain Macleod was one of 
a dozen Conservative MPs who went against the Party line by voting against the second 
reading of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill.76 Macleod’s stance marked him out as a 
liberal, but there were more factions within the parliamentary party; Heath acknowledged 
that there were ‘those in the party, even on the front bench, who wanted to harness racialist 
support’.77 
Within the Conservative Shadow Cabinet, some members did their bit to make the legislation 
more liberal, with concerns being raised about the impact on immigrants of decisions by 
immigration officers. Frontbenchers were tasked to explain that the Party could more easily 
support the Bill if it included a mechanism for appeal.78 Such concerns were likely to have 
been at the forefront of the mind of future leader Margaret Thatcher when she wrote that the 
Conservatives of the 1960s were, on issues such as immigration, ‘beginning to lose touch 
with the instinct and aspirations of ordinary conservative-minded people’.79 
Unfortunately for the Conservatives, they could not exert much pressure as an opposition – 
and a divided one at that. The government paid next to no attention to what a contemporary 
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press report referred to as ‘the whiffling ambiguities of the Shadow Cabinet’.80 The 
legislation, despite its very substance marking a break with the obligations of a (former) 
British government, was passed.81 The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, as it became 
known, did not only have profound consequences for would-be immigrants: it also ensured 
that the Conservative leadership would struggle to keep the immigration issue out of political 
debate. The passing of the bill contributed to the erosion of the bipartisan consensus which 
had previously kept discussion of immigration out of sight.  
With the Labour government having rushed through severely restrictive legislation in early 
1968, the Conservatives in opposition had little room for policy development.82 It was the 
government’s proposal to introduce race relations measures (in response to criticism of the 
legislation) which did offer an opportunity for the Tories to make a stand. However, there 
were ‘deep divisions of view’ within the Conservative Party regarding race relations.83 The 
Party was divided on the bill three ways, with the bulk of the Party ‘unconvinced either of its 
necessity or its timeliness’.84 There were also, according to Thatcher, ‘many on the right’ 
who were strongly opposed to the concept of legislating for race relations, on the grounds 
that it might lessen incentives for immigrants to integrate into British society. 85  Shadow 
Home Secretary Lord Hailsham, while expressing his distaste for discrimination, which, if 
encouraged, would ‘certainly incur great odium abroad’, believed that legislation would 
worsen race relations.86 However, there were also Conservatives who were critical of the 
Bill, but for quite different reasons: Education Secretary Edward Boyle, who was a member 
of the Council of the Institute of Race Relations from 1964 to 1972, explained his criticism 
on the grounds that the Bill ‘needs strengthening [rather] than because I want to see it 
emasculated’.87  
Hailsham first recommended that the Party abstain on the second reading of the Bill, though 
he feared that ‘opponents of the Bill in our ranks’ would regard this as a cowardly course of 
action.88 After discussion, the Shadow Cabinet agreed, instead, to put forward a reasoned 
amendment, though Hailsham warned that this would ‘emphasise rather than diminish the 
dissension in our ranks’.89 Following the meeting at which the amendment was drafted, 
Whitelaw recalls ‘hoping against hope that as a compromise it would keep some semblance 
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of party unity’.90 The draft amendment rejected the bill on the grounds that, while racial 
discrimination should be condemned, the bill would not lead to racial harmony.91  
The measure was viewed as a yielding to right-wing pressure, with the Shadow Cabinet 
noting that ‘our backbenchers were very hostile to the Bill’. 92 Key members of the liberal 
faction, among them, Keith Joseph, Edward Boyle and Robert Carr did not agree to support 
the amendment until they had seen its exact wording; Boyle and Joseph, along with over 40 
backbenchers, opposed the Conservative line.93 Heath had made it clear that there would be 
no whip on the matter and that ‘if any member of the Shadow Cabinet felt the Race Relations 
Bill to be a matter of conscience and did not vote for the Conservative amendment, he would 
quite understand’.94 The Tories did not do well from this episode; it was perceived that, in an 
effort to maintain party unity, they had come up with ‘an official attitude which seem[ed] 
vague to the point of evasion’.95 (The Shadow Cabinet would later decide not to oppose the 
bill on its third reading, after the Home Secretary agreed to Conservative concessions and 
the Shadow Cabinet reached the view that if they did not, the Party’s reputation might well 
be harmed.96 Willie Whitelaw as Chief Whip later confided in colleagues that ‘there was a 
feeling that the Party had been going too far Right on too many issues’.97)  
The difficulties over race relations legislation may well have been the issue that pulled the 
Shadow Cabinet member Enoch Powell into the debate.98 Powell was said to have made no 
contribution during the Shadow Cabinet discussion on how to respond to the race relations 
bill.99 This made his later speech all the more surprising to his colleagues. Powell chose to 
make his intervention shortly after the well-publicised passing of the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act 1968, which was designed explicitly to toughen up UK immigration controls, 
and at a time when public hostility towards immigrants was mounting. In April 1968, in a 
speech to Party activists at the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre, he forecast 
‘rivers of blood’ if immigration was not severely reduced.100 He directed his attention to the 
existing immigration regime and demanded an end to all immigrant settlement from the 
Commonwealth. The speech was highly inflammatory. Powell could, however, claim that he 
was ‘simply articulating and explaining official policy’: he had structured the text around 
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three Conservative policies on immigration, which then included tough immigration control 
and voluntary repatriation.101 
According to colleagues, Edward Heath was said to be enraged, and his anger was echoed by 
other members of the Shadow Cabinet, of whom none were said to be sympathetic to 
Powell.102 Margaret Thatcher, however, later wrote that she ‘strongly sympathised with the 
gravamen of his argument about the scale of New Commonwealth immigration into Britain 
[…] [she] too thought this threatened not just public order but also the way of life of some 
communities’.103 ‘Harsh rhetoric’, Heath later wrote, was not only ‘distasteful in itself, [but] 
was bound to increase tensions’.104 Powell, who was then the Conservative Shadow Secretary 
of Defence, was dismissed from his post. Thatcher had advised Heath not to do so, believing 
it best to let the matter die down.105 Despite Heath’s swift action, Powell’s popularity with 
the public – and the frequent expression of his views – meant that his views on immigration 
became associated with that of the Conservative Party.106 This occurred despite the 
considerable lengths that many within the Shadow Cabinet went to ensure that this was not 
the case: despite Heath and his colleagues trying to disassociate themselves from Powell, the 
latter ‘repeatedly identified himself as a Conservative, and urged his supporters to vote for 
the Conservative party.’107  
By dismissing Enoch Powell from the Shadow Cabinet, Heath signalled an unwillingness to 
exploit the immigration issue. Heath’s decision was met with ‘extensive and often bitter 
hostility’, to the extent that Conservative Central Office was ‘flooded with letters in praise 
of Powell and in condemnation of Heath; many were obscene and some contained 
excrement’.108 Such views were not limited to a vocal minority – some 69 per cent of voters 
were found to disagree with Heath’s decision, although Heath continued to believe that the 
sacking had ‘saved our position with the majority of our people’.109 Thatcher believed 
Powell’s departure to be a ‘tragedy’, as it ‘prevented our gaining the political credit for our 
policy of controlling immigration more strictly’.110 She was wrong – the Conservatives were 
ultimately rewarded, even if Heath did believe that far right support for the Tories was 
‘because such people were blindly following Powell, instead of listening to us’.111  
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The electorate’s response to Powell’s dismissal, as well as ‘the maverick politician’s 
continuing popularity, and his campaign against immigration encouraged Heath, who, while 
moderate, felt no particular post-imperial obligation to Commonwealth citizens, to harden 
his position’.112 Powell was at this point the most popular, and one of the best known, figures 
within the Conservative Party. Heath acknowledged that the public support for Powell’s 
views would require greater restrictionism in Conservative policy.113 This was not a whole-
hearted conversion at the top of the Tory Party: ‘Reluctantly, therefore, and without 
appearing to embrace his views, Heath was bound to trim his sails over the next two years to 
catch the Powellite wind’.114 
In an effort to counter accusations that the Conservative Party was losing momentum on the 
issue of immigration, Heath made a speech in Walsall, West Midlands, on 25 January 1969 
in which he promised to further tighten up controls.115 (In the same month, Keith Joseph – 
not known for having a hard-line view on the issue –  had given an interview in which he 
referred to Powell as having ‘spoken for England’ by pointing out ‘a problem where popular 
demand was violently against what the politicians were doing’.116) Heath’s speech, given the 
extent of its proposals, was seen by some immigration organisations as something of an 
implicit adoption of the Powellian view.117 He referred to a ‘public fear that politicians were 
unable to control immigration’ and proposed four further restrictionist measures, which 
included removing the right of Commonwealth citizens to permanent settlement in the UK 
and proposing that Commonwealth citizens only receive work permits for specific jobs in 
locations where there was a shortage.118  
Heath’s approach was somewhat disingenuous. Up to the end of this period, he continued 
trying to distance himself from Powell’s rhetoric while, simultaneously, ‘identifying himself 
[and his party] more closely with his basic position’.119 Thus, in the run-up to the general 
election, the Tories’ take on immigration policy was much more restrictionist than it had ever 
been before.120 And yet the Conservative leadership continued to attempt some kind of 
impossible compromise in order to avoid being seen to be yielding to either the right-wing 
of the Party or looking out of touch on the issue. 
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1970 to 1974 
The 1970 general election was decisively (and unexpectedly) won by the Conservative Party, 
and – according to Hansen, writing in the late 1990s, was ‘the only one, before or since, in 
which immigration and race may have played a significant role’.121 The Party’s manifesto 
proposed what was then a new and ‘extremely firm’ line on controlling immigration, and 
here, for the first time, was a public commitment to removing the special status of 
Commonwealth immigrants, who would no longer be regarded differently from those 
immigrants from any other country.122 The Party’s success was partly down to public 
(mis)perceptions: even two years after Enoch Powell’s speech, the Conservatives benefited 
from his association with them, to the extent that perceptions about Tory immigration policy 
differed quite significantly from policy in reality. 
Research based on polling has found that the electorate of 1970 believed the Conservative 
position on immigration to be much more restrictive than it was. Some 36 per cent 
‘erroneously believ[ed] the party proposed to completely halt immigration settlement’, while 
22 per cent thought that the Conservatives would introduce a repatriation programme for 
settled immigrants – neither of which was true. 123 Such a misunderstanding would have had 
little effect had it not been for the fact that immigration was an issue of concern for many.124 
With the matter possessing a high degree of salience, the public were more likely to reward 
whichever party would offer the more restrictive choice. Fortunately for the Conservatives – 
and despite extensive criticism of Heath and his policies, Powell did, late on in the 1970 
election campaign, come out in support of the Party.125 Voters regarded the Conservative 
Party over Labour as more likely to implement the immigration restrictions they wanted by 
a margin of nearly 15 to one.126  
The first undertaking of the Conservative government was to choose the mechanism on which 
it would base its new system of immigration control.127 However, a totally new system of 
control was ruled out. Ministers believed that replacing the 1948 legislation with something 
akin to a new British citizenship scheme would be ‘excessively complicated and costly’.128 
Furthermore, a government memo from the time reveals that such a move would likely ‘incur 
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the hostility of Commonwealth governments’.129 International relations, that is maintaining 
cordial relations with countries for diplomatic and economic reasons, and which had been of 
little concern in opposition, became increasingly important and acted as a deterrent to 
redefining citizenship wholeheartedly. Little wonder then that immigration was, at this point 
in time, according to Heath, ‘the most intractable problem of all’.130 
The Conservative leadership settled on ‘patriality’ – the notion of a familial connection to 
the UK – as a means for ‘distinguishing between Britons and those denied entry rights 
without recourse to a new definition of British citizenship’.131 Those from the New 
Commonwealth were less likely to have a grandparent or parent who had been born in the 
UK – and would not, therefore be exempt from control. Hansen has argued that this was 
deliberate: the ‘patriality provisions were clearly designed to secure access for Australians, 
Canadians, and New Zealanders while denying it to the rest of the Commonwealth’.132 
Minutes from a Cabinet meeting in January 1971 reveal that ministers predicted that the 
measure would be seen as discriminatory, but that it was defensible in that it recognised the 
UK’s ‘unique relationships’ with the Old Commonwealth countries.133 
Despite this compromise of sorts, in which previous policy would not be undone because of 
concerns about the effort of dismantling the current system or upsetting British diplomatic 
relations, it was not straightforward for the Conservative Party to put the legislation through 
parliament. In fact, during the Commons Committee stage of the Bill, an amendment was 
carried which, in effect, removed the provision whereby Commonwealth citizens with UK-
born grandparents would not be subject to immigration control. The clause was ‘opposed by 
a coalition of the left (which saw it as racist) and the right (which feared an open door for 
persons of “mixed blood”)’.134 The Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, informed his 
colleagues that while the omission might well ‘provoke considerable resentment in Australia 
and New Zealand’, making moves to restore the ‘grandparental concessions’ were ‘hardly 
feasible’ given the possibility of ‘serious political opposition’ which might further undo other 
concessions in the Bill.135 
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Eventually the Immigration Act of 1971 was passed, and Heath and his colleagues were 
hopeful that the measures ‘might settle the immigration issue once and for all’.136 This was 
not the case: unforeseen events and postcolonial obligations conspired against the 
Conservatives’ pledge to restrict large-scale immigration. In 1972, the President of Uganda, 
Idi Amin, announced suddenly that some 70,000 Ugandan Asians would be forced to leave 
the country within three months. While the first response of the Tories was consistent with 
the election manifesto not to permit further major immigration to the UK – it was made clear 
that ‘the quota system […] could not be altered’ – this stance did not last long.137 Just over a 
week after Amin’s proclamation, the British government declared that it would accept ‘full 
responsibility’ for the Asian ‘Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ (CUKC), of 
whom approximately 50,000 held British passports.138 One senior Conservative figure later 
referred to this as ‘one of the most courageous decisions’; ‘we were under a moral obligation 
to these people’.139 Such sentiments did not prevent ministers focusing their efforts on 
encouraging other countries to take them, with the UK eventually taking some 25,000. 140  
It is worth noting that the legal position of the Ugandan Asians was ‘identical’ to that of the 
Kenyan Asians just a few years earlier: both groups of people were ‘originally controlled by 
the 1962 Commonwealth Act, were released from their restrictions through the independence 
process and were placed under a new set of controls through [Home Secretary] Callaghan’s 
1968 Act’.141 However, Heath’s Conservatives acted very differently from the Labour 
government of 1968. While Wilson’s government recognized the Asians as citizens legally, 
yet differentiated between them and those with a close ethnic connection to the UK, Heath 
accepted the consequences of their citizenship – that they could not be denied entry to the 
UK – while making clear that the experience could not be repeated.’142 It took Cabinet only 
five minutes to agree – unanimously – that Britain would accept the Ugandan Asians.143 This 
was despite the ‘deep disquiet’ within the wider Party and ‘intense pressure […] placed on 
us by the right wing to renege upon our […] obligations’.144  
As Hansen notes, the Conservative Party had deliberately brought in legislation in 1970-1 in 
order to ‘avoid a repetition of the Kenyan episode’.145  The 1971 Immigration Act had 
lowered the status of Commonwealth citizens to those of aliens. The Tories had already tried 
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to prevent the entry of Asians – and yet Heath’s Conservatives took ultimate responsibility 
for the Ugandan Asians. The decision seems even more unlikely in light of the fact that public 
anxiety about immigration was high; Powell remained popular and there was ‘intense 
hostility to immigration among many rank-and-file Conservatives’.146 There were 
consequences, of course, with the leadership bearing the brunt of intense criticism from the 
Tory right, with divisions becoming most clear at the party conference in October 1972, at 
which Powell moved a motion against accepting the Asians.147 The right-wing anti-
immigration Monday Club went so far as to organise a ‘Halt Immigration Now’ campaign 
within the Conservative Party.148  
While the policy group process may have kept the Party from tearing itself apart, little was 
taken from the groups and turned into policy. On immigration at least, Heath’s Conservatives 
did pursue a more restrictionist direction with the introduction of new immigration rules in 
late 1972. While the rules contained no further restrictions, they did again put citizens of the 
Commonwealth on the ‘same legal footing as aliens’ and as a result those now deemed to be 
non-patrial Commonwealth citizens (that is, without a parent or grandparent born in the UK) 
could only visit the UK for a period of up to six months and required permission to work in 
the UK legally.149 
In a shock defeat on 22 November 1972, the government lost the vote to bring in the new 
rules: seven Conservative backbenchers voted against the leadership, and 53 abstained. 
Hansen argues that the rules would likely have been approved by parliament if it had not 
been for an unfortunate association. The government had linked the immigration rules with 
new rules for European nationals, which allowed for the free movement of European 
workers; as a result, the scene had been set for a cross-party coalition against the 
government.150 Simply put, MPs who were opposed to Conservative immigration policy were 
able to mobilise those backbenchers who were not opposed, but who had their own 
reservations about the EEC.151 Minutes from a Cabinet meeting the following day admit that 
there was an ‘anti-European sentiment’ among backbenchers, who expressed ‘continued 
resentment’ at the government’s dealings with the EEC, perpetuated by media reports that 
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Conservative immigration policies would discriminate in favour of citizens from EEC 
countries at the expense of those from Old Commonwealth countries. 152  
This was correct, though, as Heath noted, ‘[t]he rules also applied to non-patrial coloured 
people, but there were those in the party who were quite happy to see them excluded’.153 
Those on the right wing of the Party, he declared, found the new rules ‘galling’ and warned 
that ‘we were betraying the Commonwealth’.154 However, Chief Whip Francis Pym feared 
that the real crux of their opposition stemmed from fears that there would be a repeat of the 
recent influx of Ugandan UK passport-holders (UKPH).155 Heath took the defeat personally, 
later writing that the ‘rebels […] were determined to vote against us’ and the ‘extremists […] 
had their revenge on me’.156 The rules were revised, and, although the changes made were 
minimal, they were passed in January 1973.157 
It might be expected that the Conservative Party’s restrictionist policies would have helped 
to narrow the gap between the leadership and the electorate: in fact, this gap widened during 
this period. While British governments have almost always been less restrictionist than their 
voters, it was particularly noticeable during this period. Hansen argues that the ‘contrast was 
[…] most striking under Heath’.158 For those members of the public ‘anxious about 
immigration’, this era was one of disillusionment.159 While Heath’s Conservatives did bring 
in restrictive policy on immigration, he – and his Party – did not get the recognition for this 
that they perhaps deserved. This was partly because, with the Conservatives now in 
government, Powell continued to focus on immigration but ‘now trained his sights on his 
own party’.160 As a result, the Party was no longer inadvertently benefiting from being 
associated with Powell, nor was it perceived to have a particularly tough stance on 
immigration. 
Instead, the Tories became associated with one particular episode from this period, with 
Heath noted as the leader who had let the Ugandan Asians into the UK, right at the time that 
Powell was making his meteoric rise to national prominence’.161 The result of this unusually 
liberal decision was a resurgence in support for the far right, with the National Front gaining 
8.2 and 16.2 per cent of the vote in by-elections in 1972 and 1973 respectively, up from a 
130 
 
typical result in the low single figures.162 This was a time when ‘anti-immigration sentiment 
reached near-hysterical levels’ as ‘voters disaffected by the Conservatives’ perceived failure 
to control immigration […] turned in frustration to the far right.’163  
The public were confused; Powell’s most recent interventions had confounded them. In 1971 
Powell had dismissed the Immigration Act for not going far enough – despite the fact that it 
was ‘a highly restrictive piece of legislation designed particularly to assuage the fears of 
Powell and his supporters’.164 Later, he had criticised the Tories for being soft on immigration 
through criticism of the decision on Ugandan Asians and repeated allegations that the Home 
Office was lying about the level of immigration. Oddly enough, Powell’s pronouncements 
came at a time when the Conservatives were actually becoming tougher on the immigration 
issue. In late 1972, Cabinet registered the ‘current anxiety’ and ‘deep alarm’ among 
Conservative supporters who feared the prospect of further UKPH entering the UK and noted 
that ‘public opinion would not tolerate its repetition’. 165 Prime Minister Heath even 
suggested that ‘it might be necessary to go even further’, to tighten up controls on 
immigration by suspending the existing special voucher scheme.166 
By calling out the Conservatives for supposedly being too liberal on immigration – to the 
extent of encouraging supporters to vote Labour in 1974 – Powell was able to use his high-
profile position to thoroughly upset the Conservatives’ reputation on immigration. If Powell 
himself was condemning his own party for being too timid on immigration, surely the Tories 
could no longer regard immigration as their territory. As a result, dividing lines between the 
mainstream parties on immigration had become unclear in the run-up to the 1974 elections; 
a minority of voters reacted by turning to the far right National Front, who had taken 16.3 
per cent of the vote in a by-election in West Bromwich the previous year.167 The Conservative 
Party was forced to catch up, to distinguish itself from its main competitor – and become 
more restrictionist. 
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1974 to 1979  
In a shock defeat, the Conservative Party lost the general election of February 1974.168 The 
Tories took 297 seats, while Harold Wilson’s Labour Party took 301. Later that year, Wilson 
called a further election to shore up his support. The Conservative defeat at the October 1974 
election was widely predicted.169 The gradual move towards a more restrictionist 
immigration policy during this period of opposition was partly a response to the Conservative 
Party’s decision to keep quiet on the issue of immigration in the run-up to the general 
election. The campaign had been unremarkable; the manifesto had merely promised to review 
immigration policy, and possibly, introduce legislation.170 The Party had even taken the 
decision to block certain parliamentary candidates ‘whose views on race and immigration 
were likely to bring the Party into disrepute’ from standing for election.171 
Critical to explaining changes to Conservative immigration policy, and the presentation of 
that policy, was the Party’s change in leadership in 1975. Edward Heath had clung on to 
power despite losing two general elections in a row. His successor, Margaret Thatcher, was 
said to have been elected because she was not Heath, rather than on her own merits. Any 
confusion over the Conservatives’ stance on immigration was brought to a close within weeks 
of Thatcher’s becoming leader. She would, over the coming months and years, make it clear 
that she understood immigration to be a significant issue to many voters – and an issue that, 
sensitive as it might be, would be valuable to the Party in terms of electoral gain.  
Thatcher was said to have been ‘sympathetic to Powell’s positions on immigration in the late 
1960s’. 172 Her close colleagues believed her to have little interest in the immigration debate, 
and although she acknowledged that she would have to take part, she ‘wanted the issue to go 
away’.173 While her contemporaries did not regard her as having any substantial interest in 
the immigration issue per se, she was said to keep a close ear to the ground: what worried 
voters, worried her. Thatcher picked up on rising fears about immigration during the mid-
1970s and she was better able than most leaders to empathise with these concerns. In 1976, 
there was a further African Asians crisis, this time in Malawi, which provoked fears of an 
exodus. During a television interview, Thatcher referred to ordinary people’s fear of being 
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overrun by (black and Asian) immigrants; it was an appearance in which she ‘succeeded in 
offering voters worried about immigration a clear signal which party would best deal with 
their concerns […] without offering any specifics on how such a policy would be 
implemented.’174  
Beyond Thatcher, there was to be little resistance to her version of immigration policy-
making, in which strong claims were made, substantial proposals suggested, and the details 
were to be worked out later. There were few changes to the factions within the Conservative 
Party and Thatcher was, on the whole, allowed to do as she wished with policy. Heath’s Party 
of 1974 had something of a dominant faction in place, yet Thatcher did not hurry to change 
the faces at the top.175 There was to be no ‘immediate […] and wholesale replacement of 
“Heathmen” by those who came to be called “Thatcherites”’.176 In fact, she kept on many of 
the senior figures who had been members of Heath’s Shadow Cabinet – despite the fact that 
very few of them had supported her in the leadership contest.177 She was, in some senses, 
obliged to keep these people on. However, what she did do was put ‘[the] people she really 
wanted in charge of policy-making’.178 In this way she was able to keep some degree of 
continuity in terms of people – and yet change the overall direction of the Party in terms of 
policy.  
Over time, Thatcher was able to encourage the emergence of her own people – and they 
became more visible. Thus, ‘the team that sought the electorate’s endorsement in 1979 was 
by no means the same one that had appealed to it […] five years earlier’.179 By the end of 
this period in opposition, there was a clear Thatcherite faction. Admittedly, it may not have 
been quite as coherent or cohesive as some believe it to have been, but ‘when and where it 
counted, the dominant faction that formed around Thatcher after 1975 generally got what it 
wanted’.180 
While policy-making during this period was very much in the hands of Thatcher and her 
inner circle, there were efforts made to show that other people and new processes were 
involved. Soon after Thatcher took the leadership, her Shadow Cabinet decided to bring in a 
new policy-making process, which involved a number of different policy groups.181 
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Ostensibly, these groups would ‘generate enough material for a possible mid-term policy 
statement’, but it did not work out in this way and the groups were wound up in late 1976.182 
Little was taken from the exercise, to the extent that as Bale suggests ‘it provided work for 
otherwise idle hands to do while many of the smaller groups […] never really fed into or 
impinged on the policy-making process further up the chain of command’.183 Instead, the 
heavy lifting of policy-making was done by the frontbenchers, working in small teams.184  
When policy-making did not proceed in the way Thatcher wanted, she did not hesitate to get 
directly involved herself. There were ‘several instances […] of her intervening, even 
interfering, in order to ensure things moved at the pace and towards the ends that she had in 
mind’.185 In one particular incident, she pre-empted her colleague, the Shadow Home 
Secretary, Whitelaw, (who she referred to as ‘instinctively liberal-minded’) and forced him 
to develop policy that would be much more hard-line than he had intended.186 While Thatcher 
had given him direction – she had ‘made it clear’ that the Party would need to toughen up its 
stance on immigration – he did not expect much further intervention.187 Thatcher herself, 
however, thought differently and judged that the policy work on immigration under Whitelaw 
had ‘not progressed very far’, and ‘certainly not as far as many of supporters, vocal at Party 
conferences, wished’.188 So, by early 1978, as Whitelaw and his colleagues were ‘almost 
ready to announce our plans’, ‘press stories began to circulate, to Whitelaw’s frustration that 
it [the announcement] would represent a major shift of policy […] stories based, many 
believed, on a deliberate leak from sources close to the leadership’.189 Whitelaw hurried to 
quell speculation, but Thatcher gave a televised interview in which she argued that ‘either 
you go on taking in 40 or 50,000 a year, which is far too many, or you say we must hold out 
the prospect of a clear end to immigration and that is the view we have taken’.190 Whitelaw 
was said to be ‘furious’ as he would now have to ‘back up her tough talk with policies that 
could be sold as equally tough’.191 
The leadership’s decision to commission policy groups may well have contributed to a 
feeling that change was afoot. The policy group process may have meant fewer anxious Party 
members putting pressure on their local MPs to push for tighter border controls. Bale notes 
that the backbenchers’ ‘level of involvement in the policy process between 1975 and 1979 
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was probably no higher than it was between 1965 and 1970’, and, while ‘the number of 
people involved in constituency-based policy discussion groups organised by the 
Conservative Political Centre (CPC) was rising […] there is […] no real evidence of their 
feedback contributing to the policy-making process at the centre’.192 Their very membership 
of groups created specifically with the intention of revising policy may have made them feel 
more involved and more valued – and decreased the perception of a divide between the elites 
and ‘ordinary’ people. 
While Thatcher was firm on the issue of tightening up immigration legislation, there were 
those within the Party who believed that doing so might satisfy a few voters, but would likely 
prove damaging in the long run. Certain figures on the left of the Party feared that ‘too tough 
a line would only compound the difficulties the Party already had in picking up black and 
Asian votes – an argument that only two years earlier does appear to have helped to persuade 
the Shadow Cabinet to […] avoid voting against Labour’s race relations legislation paper’.193 
Fortunately for Thatcher, who thought that voters wanted what ordinary Conservative 
members wanted, ‘there was little or no difference on immigration between Conservative 
activists and the average voter’ during this period in opposition.194 Hence, when resolutions 
on immigration at the Conservative Party conference reached 140 in 1976 (up from 17 in 
1975) as Malawi made plans to expel its Asian population and when Airey Neave reported 
to colleagues the ‘very strong comments about the absence of a party policy on immigration’, 
the Party listened. 195  
Towards the end of the period, the issue of immigration became less significant – for both 
the Conservative Party and electorate – and so any difference between the two in terms of 
their approach to the matter became less pronounced. This decline was not because the 
electorate were satisfied with the level of immigration (the fact is, it was still a concern for 
many), but because other issues, such as the economy and industrial unrest, became more 
critical and knocked the immigration issue down (but not off) the agenda. A further 
contributing factor to the lessening salience of the issue was the diminishing influence of one 
of its most vocal opponents: the resignation of Powell from the Conservative Party in 1974 
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had ‘removed the most vociferous potential critic on immigration from the political 
mainstream’.196 
Regardless, the Conservatives continued to make efforts to try to decrease the apparent gap 
between the leadership and the electorate. Immigration policy was transformed by the end of 
this period, as a simple comparison of manifestos from both ends of the era shows.197 While 
the October 1974 document was somewhat reserved on the issue, even cautious, the 1979 
manifesto ‘committed an incoming Tory administration to a new British Nationality Act that 
would define citizenship and right of residence’.198  
 
5.2 Explaining Conservative immigration policy 
The dynamics of government versus opposition 
My first proposition suggests that the substance of policy-making is dependent on whether 
the political party has won – or lost – office. Did the Party’s movement from government to 
– unexpectedly – opposition and then, as predicted, opposition once more have any impact 
on immigration policy? Certainly, there were developments made to policy more generally, 
as there were, in fact, more broadly, ‘[f]undamental shifts in Conservative policy during this 
period’, but immigration was not picked out especially.199 Again, during periods in which 
immigration was deemed not to be a particular topic of concern to Conservative politicians 
or their electorate (as in the early 1960s), the proposition is of less relevance. In the latter two 
parliaments of this period, the proposition is of use. When the Conservatives regained office 
in 1970, they could not deliver on the pledges they had made in opposition. In government, 
there were too many obstacles to confront (from issues of diplomacy, questions of legality 
and sheer feasibility), which delayed or blocked progress. On losing office in 1974, they were 
unrestrained by practical considerations or international concerns associated with being in 
government, and they reverted to more restrictionist rhetoric in an attempt to regain their lost 
reputation for being tough on immigration. 
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1964 to 1966 
During the first parliament of this period, the Conservatives’ shift from the government to 
the opposition benches had no impact on the development of their immigration policy. While 
in opposition, the leadership took the opportunity to thoroughly review the policy offerings 
which the electorate had rejected. Immigration, however, received little attention, as it was 
not perceived to be an issue of great concern. There were few changes made to the Party’s 
stance on the issue during this parliament. 
 
1966 to 1970 
From 1966 onwards, there was no real break with continuity in the subsequent parliament; 
the Conservatives remained in opposition. With the Conservatives out of office for the next 
four years or so, one might have expected that there would be a new emphasis on developing 
attention-grabbing policies in an effort to bring voters on side and in time for the next 
election. Immigration, however, was to play a muted role: given that the issue was not 
particularly salient (at least, initially during this period), there was little reason for the 
Conservatives to work on extensive proposals on the topic. The leadership remained 
unconvinced that immigration could be an issue on which voters would be swayed, and there 
was a reluctance to exploit the issue; to do so, according to senior Tory figures, would have 
been unseemly.200 
However, the proposition is more applicable to the period from the late 1960s onwards, when 
levels of immigration increased and a hostile outlook on immigration among the general 
public was more evident. The luxury of opposition, which, in this situation refers to a lower 
level of scrutiny of policies and proposals, allowed for the Conservative Party to change 
strategy and to put forward restrictionist measures that had never seriously been considered, 
let alone tried, such as phased entry for certain immigrants.  
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1970 to 1974 
During the following parliament, in which the Conservatives regained office in 1970, the 
proposition becomes still more relevant. The Party began enthusiastically putting their hard-
hitting measures into legislation, yet they were not wholly successful. The Tories could not 
deliver on the pledges that they had made in opposition, let alone live up to their reputation 
for being tough on immigration. In government, there were too many obstacles to confront 
(from issues of diplomacy, questions of legality and sheer feasibility), which delayed or 
blocked progress. Fears about damaging relations with both the Old and the New 
Commonwealth, and which had been of little concern in opposition, became increasingly 
important and acted as a deterrent to redefining citizenship wholeheartedly. The unexpected 
events in Uganda – and concerns regarding the legality of restricting the Ugandan Asians – 
conspired to force the Conservatives to break their pledge of ensuring that there would be no 
more ‘large scale permanent immigration’. 
At times, parliamentary opposition to the Conservatives’ proposals served to complicate the 
process of legislation. In 1971, an amendment was carried which, in effect, removed the 
provision whereby Commonwealth citizens with UK-born grandparents would not be subject 
to immigration control. In a clear example of the Conservative Party’s responding to the 
different dynamic of policy-making in government, attempts were made to bring in the clause 
surreptitiously. In May 1971, the Cabinet agreed that the Home Secretary should discuss with 
ministers the possibility of ‘achieving by administrative measures the aims which the 
rejection of the grandparental concession had frustrated’.201 Publicly, however, the 
Conservative leadership were forced to reassess the rules so that ‘the right of abode was 
limited to persons with parents born in the UK […] [although it should be noted that] its 
application to those with grandparents was reinstated two years later when the immigration 
rules of 1973 were published’.202 
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1974 to 1979 
In 1974, the Conservative Party lost office, and during this parliament, the Party developed 
tougher immigration policies that were popular with the public, if not entirely practical for a 
Party with ambitions of returning to office. Fortunately for the Tories, the Labour 
government’s loosening up of certain immigration rules gave the Conservatives more space 
to shift and change policy in a more restrictionist direction.203  
It is tempting to argue that the Party – now released from the pressures of office which 
generally demand more modest proposals – was able to think more boldly in opposition, but 
there were other factors at work. Most likely, it was a combination of the dynamics of being 
out of government and unrestrained by certain practical considerations or international 
concerns, as well as the Party’s growing awareness of the importance of the issue to the 
public, if not a willingness to make use of the issue for electoral gain (at least, not explicitly, 
as it was seen as distasteful). The situation was compounded by internal party changes as the 
Conservatives struggled to come to terms with their unexpected election defeat, 
unceremoniously removed leader Edward Heath and replaced him with a politician from a 
very different faction of the Party.  
Furthermore, and as the proposition suggests, the Party’s retreat back to more restrictionist 
rhetoric was about trying to regain its lost reputation for being tough on immigration. The 
Conservatives had not received much in the way of electoral reward for passing restrictive 
legislation just a few years earlier. The public were still not satisfied. 
In short, the proposition is not so relevant for the first half of this period, when immigration 
was (for elites, at least) low on the list of priority issues. During the second half of this period, 
from the late 1960s to 1979, when immigration had become a salient issue, the proposition 
does come into play as the Conservatives struggled in government to keep up with the 
restrictive line they had promised in opposition. Thrown out of office unexpectedly in 1974, 
the Tories’ immigration policy took on a more restrictionist line as they sought to regain their 
trusted reputation on the issue. 
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Electoral considerations, leadership and factions 
My second proposition states that there are three influencing factors with regard to party 
policy-making: the ‘fear of electoral defeat’ or electoral calculations relating to elections in 
the recent past or near future; the party leader’s interest in, and stance on, the issue as well 
as their managerial style; and lastly, the factions that run, or aspire to run, the Party. I find 
that these factors can provide useful explanations for immigration policy-making change 
from 1964 to 1979. Electoral motivation is the most critical variable: it is a strong driver of 
immigration policy for much of this period. Leadership also has a formidable role to play, 
with the leader’s personal convictions and their motivations important to explanations of 
policy development. Factions are of less importance than the other variables, except for the 
period from 1966 to 1970, when the interactions between different wings of the Conservative 
Party do drive policy change. 
 
1964 to 1966 
Electoral motivations 
During the mid-1960s, the Conservative Party’s likely benefiting from the immigration issue 
did not go unnoticed, and there were occasional attempts to make use of the topic, with 
Douglas-Home’s call for voluntary repatriation an early example. However, the Shadow 
Cabinet worried that similar ploys might well upset the middle-ground vote, and there were 
few serious attempts to exploit immigration for electoral gain. Furthermore, the Labour 
government’s restrictionist stance managed to neutralise the Tory lead: there was little 
difference between the two parties’ immigration policy offerings. 
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Leadership 
The relative silence on the issue of immigration was partly down to the leadership’s reasoning 
that there was little point in making use of immigration as a means of winning votes, as it 
was not yet a nationally important issue, nor would it have been considered a polite thing to 
do. To compound this, only a few Conservative MPs, rather than any cohesive or powerful 
faction within the Party, saw any reason to disagree with this stance. 
 
Factions 
The Smethwick result presented the Conservatives with something of a dilemma. How could 
the Party ‘reconcile its internal divisions on race while simultaneously presenting a united 
front to a predominantly illiberal electorate’?204 The 1962 Immigrants Act had left the Party’s 
divisions more apparent than before.205 
 
1966 to 1970 
Electoral motivations 
Given the scale of the defeat for the Conservatives, with a loss of 52 seats at the 1966 election, 
it is curious that the shock of electoral defeat – for the second time in a row – did not force 
the Party to reconsider the entirety of its policy offerings. A senior Conservative figure 
recalled that there was no need to make use of immigration because ‘we believed we would 
win the election’ without it.206 Even if the Tories had wanted to exploit immigration for 
electoral gain, there was not much room for them to do this. The Labour Party had, in passing 
restrictive legislation, politicised the issue to the extent that any lead that the Conservatives 
might have had was quickly neutralised. Rather than seeking to winkle out votes from 
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immigration, the Party’s efforts to begin tightening up policy were made ‘not so much to 
capitalise on anti-immigration sentiment as to prevent it getting out of hand’.207 Policy 
development was a process of muddling on and responding to events.  
By the late-1960s onwards, immigration had become a contentious and partisan issue, and 
so, responding to the continuing popularity of Powell and his stance, the Conservatives were, 
in effect, compelled to harden their line and move closer to the electorate. This was no 
ideological conversion at the elite level; instead there was an acknowledgement amongst the 
leadership that it was necessary to react to public support for more restrictionist policies at 
this time. It was recognised that the public mood was shifting. Senior Conservative figures 
were becoming aware of a growing hostility to immigrants and immigration; a Times report 
from early 1968 stated that ‘most politicians uncomfortably admit that anti-immigrant feeling 
is rising among their constituents’.208  
There was, however, at least initially, a cautious approach, with something of a ‘tacit 
agreement’ between the two main political parties to keep quiet on the issue so as not to 
further entrench public opinion and provoke violence.209 While Labour’s efforts to establish 
itself as a party of tough controls succeeded in turning immigration into a partisan issue, 
unexpectedly, it was an issue that rewarded the Tories. Work by Ford has found evidence 
that from 1968 onwards, ‘hostility to immigration’ strongly correlated with Conservative 
voting. He argues too that the results are asymmetric, in that attitudes to immigration are 
‘more important in encouraging votes for the Conservatives than in discouraging votes for 
Labour’.210 
 
Leadership 
The leadership of the Party cannot be said to have had a strong influence on the making of 
Conservative immigration policy: Heath had no deep interest in immigration – in fact he 
‘didn’t like the issue’.211 One colleague of his recalled having to persuade Heath to come out 
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with a definitive line on immigration, which he eventually did, in a speech at York in 1968 
though ‘he made it reluctantly, he had to be dragged to the water, he wasn’t at all keen to 
drink it’.212 He and his Shadow Cabinet had been left on the back foot. They were 
disconcerted by Powell’s intervention, and they were forced to develop policy swiftly and 
under great pressure. As his colleague put it, ‘we didn’t have a policy and we had to make 
one and he [Heath] had to announce it and he had to spell it out in great detail’.213 As a result, 
Heath was ‘manoeuvred into having a policy […] that the Research Department produced’ 
and he ‘resented it’.214  
 
Factions 
The passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968 demolished the bipartisan 
consensus that had allowed the issue to be kept relatively muted. The Tory leadership were 
then left on the back foot: disconcerted by Powell’s intervention, they were forced to develop 
policy swiftly and under great pressure. At this point, while the Powellites did not represent 
an organised segment of the Party, the differing factions within the Party were having a keen 
influence on the development of policy. The parliamentary party were split three ways on 
both immigration and race relations, and with divisions even within the Shadow Cabinet, 
policy was the result of a careful compromise to contain Tory parliamentarians who were not 
above voting against the Party line.  
The influence of factions was becoming more evident, with sizeable numbers of Tory 
parliamentarians supporting and with others rejecting the entry of Kenyan Asians to the UK. 
Each ‘side’ encompassed a broad range of views, with the more liberal Conservatives 
supporting the government line for quite different reasons than those of a patriarchal 
disposition and with an attachment to the Commonwealth. Heath was said by a contemporary 
to have disliked the restrictionist ‘sour right’ of the Party and was uninterested in giving more 
than the ‘absolutely minimum concessions’ to them.215 Conservatives close to the leadership 
were more concerned with doing the ‘right thing’ by taking a cautious approach to the issue 
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so as not to damage community relations. One senior figure acknowledged that the Party 
‘could have taken a combative stance on the matter, but we deliberately refrained […] 
[because] it was the responsible thing to do’.216 Members of the Shadow Cabinet expressed 
concerns that, if the question of immigration was allowed to become more of a priority issue 
‘if we won, we’d have to handle it and it wouldn’t be good if everything was in a feverish 
state of expectation’.217 
 
1970 to 1974 
Electoral motivations 
Fear of electoral defeat did not play a significant role in the Party immigration policy-making 
during this period. In fact, the Conservative Party lost its reputation as a party that could, and 
would, control immigration. The gap in immigration preferences between the leadership and 
the electorate widened during the period from 1970 to 1974. This was partly because a new 
elite level preoccupation with immigration had emboldened the public: their views were 
justified. Relentless criticism of the Party by Powell did not help the Conservatives either. 
When the Tory government took the decision to allow the Ugandan Asians into the UK, polls 
showed that 54 per cent of the electorate disapproved of the handling of the situation, and 57 
per cent agreed with the statement that the Ugandan Asians should not settle in the UK.218 
There was a temporary rise in support for the far-right, with the National Front recording a 
gain of 11,000 new supporters between late 1972 and early 1973. While these figures are 
miniscule when looking at the electorate as a whole, polls at the time suggest that ‘affinity 
for the National Front among the general public ran deeper’, with 25 per cent of respondents 
voicing the opinion that the NF expressed the views of ‘ordinary working people’.219 In 
response, the Party was forced to catch up, to distinguish itself – and eventually, take a more 
hard-line stance in order to get closer to the position of the electorate. 
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Leadership 
It is, however, difficult to explain the Conservative government’s decision to admit the 
Ugandan Asians without examining the leadership of Heath. First, Heath had no great 
affection for the Commonwealth and hence saw no reason to maintain the privileges accorded 
Commonwealth immigrants.220 They were a historic relic which had lost their relevance, and 
he made it a priority for his government to equalize, as much as it could, the rights of aliens 
and Commonwealth immigrants.’221 Hence, the Immigration Act of 1971 put an end to the 
last few privileges that the Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) had 
retained, such as the work permit scheme that had operated since 1962. 222 
Second, Heath, a former Chief Whip, was concerned with maintaining party unity and he 
was well aware that immigration was a contentious enough issue to divide the Party. As a 
result, the leadership’s approach to immigration policy was a self-conscious and careful one. 
Heath knew that he could not push policy too far in the restrictive direction, nor could he 
make it more liberal. Instead, for he knew that it had to be dealt with, and under pressure 
from his colleagues to do something, he set up a series of policy groups, one of which 
considered immigration.223 This had the effect of calming certain wings of the Party, as well 
as making it more difficult for critics to work out what was going on policy-wise. 
Third, Heath’s hand was very much forced by Powell. The latter’s continuing popularity 
among the British public prompted the Conservatives to sit up and take note. More than this, 
the Party was forced to continually revise its position on the issue. In fact, the very success 
of Powell was likely to have compelled Heath to follow Powell’s lead to an extent.224 In part, 
Powell ‘probably helped to push […] [the Conservative Party] in a somewhat restrictionist 
direction on immigration’.225 This was a continual and mutually-reinforcing process: ‘by 
galvanizing public and party support for a restrictionist position, Powell forced the party’s 
front bench reluctantly to adopt a firmer anti-immigration stance; in turn, Powell responded 
by declaring himself in favour of a still more restrictionist position; the Conservatives again 
followed and so on’.226 
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1974 to 1979 
Electoral motivations 
By the last parliament of this period, the Conservative Party had begun to fully sense the 
extent of public concerns. The fear of electoral defeat was certainly a motivating factor, 
especially after two general election losses in a row. Fortunately for the Conservatives, it was 
electorally advantageous to push a tough line. Private and public polls from the mid-1970s 
on implied that there would be electoral gains if the Party took ‘an explicit hard line on 
race’.227 While public concern about immigration mounted in the mid-1970s, the 
Conservative Party made great efforts to deal with such concern by being more vocal and 
much tougher on immigration policy. There were deliberate attempts made to close the gap 
between the elites and the ordinary people, with one senior Conservative referring to the 
immigration issue as being the ‘acid test’ of whether politicians were in touch with the public 
they represent.228 
The sudden realisation that the Conservative Party’s huge lead on immigration had much 
diminished was a driving factor in policy development. Ford finds that over the previous 
three or four years, trust in the Conservatives to put forth – and deliver – tough policies on 
controlling immigration had lessened. By the time of the first general election of 1974, 
following nearly four years of the Heath government, just seven per cent of voters believed 
that the Tories were proposing a repatriation programme and 36 per cent that the Party would 
stop immigration to the UK. More alarmingly for the Conservatives, ‘[t]he proportion 
thinking the Conservatives favoured allowing new settlement of immigrants tripled from 8 
per cent to 24 per cent.’229 This breakdown in public perceptions came despite Heath’s efforts 
to deal with public concern by ‘contain[ing] the immigration issue […] [through] passing 
highly restrictive immigration legislation’, as he had in 1971’.230 These efforts were not 
enough. 
Many within the Party understood that perceptions that immigration would not be dealt with 
would be a vote loser. Dudley Smith wrote in a letter to Thatcher in January 1978 that there 
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were ‘still too many people even among our fairly dependable supporters who believe that 
we are not really serious over tackling the immigration problem and that at the end of the day 
we shall try and ignore the problem’.231 Thatcher’s reference to the ‘swamping’ of British 
culture in a television interview was seen by some as a ‘transparent effort to appropriate the 
National Front’s main electoral issue for the Conservative cause’.232 
Reforming immigration policy certainly did not seem to have harmed perceptions of the 
Party’s being in tune with the electorate. A Gallup poll from February 1978 found that ‘while 
just 13 per cent thought immigration would drop under a Labour government, 71 per cent 
thought that it would do so under the Tories’.233 However, it should be noted that this vote of 
confidence in Conservative immigration policy may not have had much to do with the Tories’ 
listening exercise. As Bale argues: ‘[j]ust because things shifted in the expected direction 
does not mean that those in control were simply reacting to pressure; their preferences, 
ideological and strategic, mattered too.’234 And while Thatcher was resolved to tighten up 
controls, there were those within the Party who believed that doing so might satisfy some 
voters, but would likely prove electorally damaging in the long run as it would push away 
liberal voters and further compound the difficulties in bringing ethnic minorities on side.  
 
Leadership 
Leadership became most significant during the final parliament of this period, after Margaret 
Thatcher had become leader in 1975, and with whom much of the immigration policy 
development during these years is associated. She made it clear that she understood 
immigration to be a significant concern for many voters – and an issue that, sensitive as it 
might be, would be valuable to the Party in terms of electoral gain. If, she argued, the 
Conservative Party were to keep quiet on immigration, that would be a motivating factor for 
voters to opt for extreme-right parties. While some supporters of the National Front (NF) 
may not have agreed with many of its objectives, ‘they [the voters] say that at least they [the 
NF] are talking about some of the problems’.235  
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Factions 
Factions, by this point, were of less concern: there was little serious resistance to Thatcher’s 
brand of immigration policy-making, despite the fact that she made few changes to the 
Shadow Cabinet that she had inherited. Concerns about the Conservative Party losing support 
if it did not take a tough line were, importantly, not the concerns of a few, but most likely a 
reflection of ‘majority opinion within the Party […] [and not] the agitation of a more radical 
minority’.236 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the immigration policy of the Conservative Party from 1964 to 
1979. During this era, a slow but steady increase in immigration to the UK from the 
Commonwealth, combined with solidifying public opposition to this movement of people, 
compelled the Conservative Party to develop a more coherent policy. Interventions by 
prominent figures within the Party, as well as pressure from backbenchers, resulted in the 
issue becoming one that could no longer be contained. In ending uncontrolled migration from 
the Commonwealth and colonies to the UK and joining the EEC, which permitted free 
movement of people among its members, the UK began to move away from the very concept 
of empire and, later, from the Commonwealth, and towards Europe. While concerns about 
raising the temperature on the issue and damaging community cohesion remained, the 
Conservatives became more accustomed to the possibility of using the immigration issue for 
electoral gain. 
Examining Conservative Party immigration policy within the context of the Party’s fortunes, 
that is, whether it is in government or in opposition, has allowed for a number of observations 
to be developed. As in the previous chapter, the salience of the immigration issue is critical 
in determining whether there is a difference between Tory policy developed in office and 
Tory policy developed in opposition. From the late 1960s onwards, when levels of 
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immigration to the UK increased and public hostility was more noticeable, the Tories made 
use of the luxury of opposition (including a lower level of scrutiny of policies and proposals), 
in order to develop and put forward various restrictionist measures that had never been 
seriously considered, let alone tried, such as phased entry for certain immigrants. 
In government, the Party’s policy was far less restrictionist; the Tories of the early 1970s 
struggled to keep to the line that they had promised. They could not deliver on the pledges 
they had made in opposition, let alone live up to their reputation for being tough on 
immigration. In government, there were too many obstacles to confront (from issues of 
diplomacy, questions of legality and sheer feasibility), which delayed or blocked progress. 
They were not wholly successful in implementing their pledges, and so, when thrown out of 
office unexpectedly in 1974, the Tories’ immigration policy took on a more restrictionist line 
as they sought to regain their trusted reputation on the issue. Back in opposition, they were 
unrestrained by electoral mandates, practical considerations or international concerns. 
This chapter has also examined the three influencing factors with regard to party policy-
making: the ‘fear of electoral defeat’, or, a collective concern about future electoral results; 
the party leader’s approach to the issue as well as their managerial style; and lastly, the 
factions that, to some extent, control the direction of the party. The influence of the three 
factors varies throughout the 15-year stretch. 
While electoral considerations had little to no impact on immigration policy early on in the 
period, they soon became the most significant factor. Despite the 1964 defeat, the 
Conservatives made no use of the immigration issue in the 1966 election because they 
believed they would win without it. Party positioning also made it difficult for the Tories to 
exploit the issue, even if they had wanted to. The Labour Party had, in making plans to pass 
restrictive legislation, politicised the issue to the extent that any lead that the Conservatives 
might have had was quickly neutralised. Rather than seeking to extract votes from the issue, 
the Party’s efforts to begin tightening up policy were made ‘not so much to capitalise on anti-
immigration sentiment as to prevent it getting out of hand’.237 
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Electoral motivations only became an influence on policy-making with the unexpected and 
meteoric rise of Enoch Powell. By the late-1960s, immigration had become a contentious and 
party-political issue, and so, responding to the continuing popularity of Powell, the 
Conservatives were, in effect, compelled to harden their line and move closer to the 
electorate. The leadership deemed it necessary to respond to the public mood and offer more 
restrictionist policies at this time. Towards the end of the period, the Conservatives were less 
reluctant to make use of their natural lead on immigration control, particularly within a 
context in which they had lost two general elections (February and October 1974) in a row. 
When public concern about immigration mounted in the mid-1970s, the Conservative Party 
made efforts to seize the momentum by being more vocal in support of a much tougher 
immigration policy. One senior Conservative referred to the immigration issue as being the 
‘acid test’ of whether politicians were in touch with the public they represented.238 The leader 
herself, Thatcher, argued that the Tories’ reticence on immigration control was a motivating 
factor in voters opting for extreme-right parties. 
The impact of factions on immigration policy-making – and the potential for them to do 
serious damage to the unity of the Conservative Party – is evident throughout the period. 
Powell’s rise to prominence and his strong anti-immigration rhetoric compelled Tory 
parliamentarians to declare their stance. From the late 1960s onwards, there emerged distinct 
dividing lines between those calling for immediate further immigration controls,  and their 
more moderate counterparts who were broadly in favour of controls, and those who rejected 
such calls. The existence of these factions made it difficult for the leadership to develop a 
policy that most of the parliamentary party would support. Unexpected events, such as the 
flight of Asians from Kenya and later Uganda were damaging for the Party as its divisions 
were brought to light. As a result, policy was a careful compromise to contain Tory 
parliamentarians who were not above voting against the Party line.  
Taken as a whole, the leadership of the Party had perhaps the least influence on policy-
making. Neither Douglas-Home nor Heath had much interest in immigration. The latter was 
practically forced by his colleagues to set down a definitive line on immigration – and was 
said to resent it. Neither of the two men could be seen to be driving the Tories’ immigration 
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policy – with the exception, perhaps, of Heath’s decision to allow in the Ugandan Asians in 
1971. Heath was mindful of the potential for immigration to damage the Party by exposing 
its splits; he tended to take a self-conscious and careful approach. Leadership only became a 
key factor in immigration policy-making when Thatcher took over as leader in 1975. She 
understood that immigration was, or could be, a significant concern for many voters – and an 
issue that, sensitive as it might be, would be useful to the Party in terms of electoral gain. 
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1979 to 1997 
 
A problem for which there was no solution.1 
– David Waddington 
 
This chapter will investigate the changes made to the Conservative Party’s immigration 
policy from 1979 to 1997. First, it will consider the key developments in the Tories’ approach 
to managing immigration. Next, it will explain the Party’s policy-making using the 
theoretical framework previously expanded on. Over four parliaments, and under two 
different leaders, the Conservatives held on to office for an uninterrupted period of nearly 
two decades. By the end of the period, the Conservative Party had switched its focus; no 
longer were the Tories so concerned by the family reunification route, instead, they turned 
their attention to asylum seekers, of whom many were believed to have made unfounded 
applications, now that they could no longer enter as economic migrants. Ministers found – to 
their frustration – that when one route was closed down, immigrants would find another, and 
the process would continue. 
In 1979, the Conservative Party’s immigration policy was comprehensive and far-reaching. 
During the next 18 years, the Conservatives held office at a time when levels of immigration 
were relatively stable (and even, at times, decreasing). There was a short period in which the 
number of asylum applications increased rapidly – but the figures then reduced just as 
quickly. Despite the fact that there were no dramatic changes to immigration levels (net 
migration was maintained at around 50,000 a year in the 1980s and 1990s), the Tories did 
not neglect the issue. The Party further tightened up entry to the UK and tidied up citizenship 
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legislation. In response to the rising numbers of individuals claiming asylum in the UK, the 
Conservatives fleshed out their asylum policy and revised the systems for ascertaining the 
legitimacy of ‘genuine’ refugees, as well as the benefits that they were entitled to. 
The Tories were most concerned with questions of how they could further tighten controls 
on migration. Substantial legislation had already been passed by previous governments in 
1962 and 1971, which made it more difficult to integrate further initiatives in a cohesive way. 
That is not to say that the Conservatives did not consider there to be a need to develop 
immigration policy. The 1981 disturbances, which occurred in deprived, inner cities with 
high numbers of ethnic minorities, were perceived by the Tories as confirmation that 
controlled immigration was critical to ensuring reasonable community relations. There were 
no simple solutions: the intention was to keep migration at a ‘sensible’ level and ensure that 
the pace of change was managed. Further, the handover to Hong Kong in 1997 (which 
brought its own legal difficulties), was a headache for Conservative ministers whose 
manifesto committed them to no further large-scale migration. 
A new generation of Tories with significantly less of an attachment to the concept of 
Commonwealth served to make it easier to bring in more restrictive legislation. No longer 
was maintaining positive relations with the Commonwealth countries a priority for those with 
responsibility for immigration policy. The notion that Britain had a duty towards the citizens 
of the Commonwealth became far less common among leading Tories. The paternalist, or 
‘one-nation’, politicians were replaced by those with far less of a commitment to the former 
colonies. Out went Willie Whitelaw, Lord Carrington and Ian Gilmour; in came David 
Waddington and Tim Renton. 
Policy proposals during this period went further in their scope than ever before. The Party’s 
1979 manifesto committed it to setting up a register of Commonwealth wives and children. 
It did not happen, but the concept would have been unthinkable a decade or two earlier. In 
1986, the Conservative government hardened its line on immigration by introducing a visa 
requirement for citizens from five countries that had been historically linked with the 
Commonwealth (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana and Nigeria). The Tory politicians of a 
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generation earlier would not have comprehended treating these people – with whom they 
believed they shared common links – in such a way. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the evolution of a Conservative Party less interested in the 
Commonwealth coincided with a period in which the parliamentary party was notably 
tougher on immigration and immigrants. By the early to mid-1990s, there were no protests 
from Conservative backbenchers about the government’s plans to fingerprint asylum seekers, 
to cut the benefits to which they were entitled, or to reduce the appeal rights of those refused 
visas. As the Tories’ immigration policy took on a more hard-line stance, the Party became 
more willing to make use of the electoral potential of the immigration issue. Although there 
continued to be a collective sense among senior figures within the Party that controlling 
immigration was an unpleasant business, immigration policy during this time was now 
considered an opportunity to portray the Conservative Party as tough, competent and in touch 
with the electorate. 
 
6.1 The development of Conservative immigration policy 
1979 to 1983 
On 3 May 1979, the Conservative Party won a landslide victory with 43.9 per cent of the 
vote. On an 8.1 per cent swing, and with 339 seats, the Conservatives believed they had 
received a strong mandate for change.2 Immigration did not play a significant role in the 
election campaign; it was not one of the Party’s five key policy pledges, most of which 
concentrated on economic concerns. The manifesto, however, included a comprehensive list 
of immigration-related proposals, which Messina has described as ‘the most restrictive 
posture either major political party had ever adopted on non-white immigration’:3 
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(i) We shall introduce a new British Nationality Act to define entitlement to British 
citizenship and to the right of abode in this country. It will not adversely affect the 
right of anyone now permanently settled here. 
(ii) We shall end the practice of allowing permanent settlement for those who come 
here for a temporary stay. 
(iii) We shall limit entry of parents, grandparents and children over 18 to a small 
number of urgent compassionate cases. 
(iv) We shall end the concession introduced by the Labour government in 1974 to 
husbands and male fiancés. 
(v) We shall severely restrict the issue of work permits. 
(vi) We shall introduce a Register of those Commonwealth wives and children 
entitled to entry for settlement under the 1971 Immigration Act. 
(vii) We shall then introduce a quota system, covering everyone outside the European 
Community, to control all entry for settlement. 
(viii) We shall take firm action against illegal immigrants and overstayers and help 
those immigrants who genuinely wish to leave this country-but there can be no 
question of compulsory repatriation.4 
 
The hard-line Conservative take on immigration was tested within weeks. Soon after the 
general election, Margaret Thatcher’s government received a private request from a UN high 
commissioner who proposed that the UK take in some 10,000 refugees. The ‘Vietnamese 
boat people’ had fled Vietnam for Hong Kong, a British colony, where they were being 
housed in camps. The suggestion received a mixed reception from the Conservative Cabinet. 
The Prime Minister was against offering refuge on the grounds that it would be unfair (she 
believed it was ‘quite wrong that immigrants should be given council housing whereas white 
citizens were not’) and there might be issues with integration (she was said to have had ‘far 
less objection’ to those who could ‘more easily be assimilated into British society’).5 The 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington and Home Secretary, Willie Whitelaw believed it would 
be inhumane not to receive the refugees. Whitelaw even went so far as to promise a decrease 
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in other types of immigration (mostly dependants) if the refugees could be accommodated. 
Thatcher relented, and the ‘boat people’ were allowed to settle in the UK, with, at her 
suggestion, a phased entry over three years and priority given to English-speakers with no 
medical issues.6 
In the event that anyone got the ‘wrong idea’, the Tory government took swift action to 
indicate that this was an exceptional case – and began drafting changes to the immigration 
and nationality rules.7 The immigration minister was sent to the Indian sub-continent, 
apparently to investigate how the British posts were dealing with immigration cases in 
advance of the introduction of new rules.8 The visit developed into something of a fact-
finding mission, with the evidence, as noted by the minister’s private secretary, indicating 
that tighter control of immigration to the UK had never been more necessary. 9  
In meetings with local dignitaries, and on behalf of the Conservative government, the 
immigration minister, Timothy Raison, explained the reasoning behind the changes to policy. 
He argued that the UK had a ‘very limited’ capacity to take in more immigrants.10 The British 
government was greatly concerned by unemployment in Britain, and feared that further 
immigration to the UK could worsen the matter. Raison also stated that the prospect of 
deteriorating community relations was a concern. When one Indian politician put forward a 
policy proposal to the Conservative government, the civil service were quick to counsel 
against. It had been suggested – and widely reported in the Indian press – that the British 
should introduce a visa requirement for all Indians travelling to the UK. This would allow 
for the British overseas posts to sort the ‘desirable’ from the ‘undesirable’ migrants in 
advance of their travelling to the UK, and so prevent Indians being turned away once they 
had reached British soil, as well as reducing queues at the airports. It would, however, have 
been difficult to defend a policy turning India into being the only Commonwealth country to 
have its own prior entry clearance system.11 As one civil servant put it, the proposal was 
rooted in socio-cultural issues, with Indian citizens being less opposed to the often lengthy 
process of entering the UK, and more uncomfortable with ‘standing in a queue with those 
who they considered to be socially inferior’.12 
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While Conservative ministers were engaged in reconsidering immigration policy, their 
backbenchers were becoming discontented. One group of MPs met with Home Secretary 
Willie Whitelaw and then called for a meeting with the Prime Minister to further outline their 
concerns that the Party was delaying the implementation of some of its manifesto pledges. In 
a letter to the leadership, the need for changes to immigration policy was conflated with the 
growth in the size of ethnic minorities: 
We believe that the party’s manifesto commitments are the very least that are 
necessary and that they should be implemented without delay. The urgency is 
underlined by recent statistics for births and immigration, which show that for every 
six new ethnic Britons there is one new coloured citizen – a factor which on 
unchanged policies will be reflected in the eventual population make-up of the 
country, and which will be far exceeded in some of our towns and cities.13 
Backbenchers warned that the Conservative Party would lose the votes of the white working 
class if it did not fulfil its manifesto pledges.14 One MP told the leadership that ordinary 
voters were questioning whether the UK should allow the entry of immigrants – the strong 
implication being that it should not – and that even a reduction in numbers was unlikely to 
lessen deep-seated concerns. While Ian Gow’s record of the meeting with Margaret Thatcher 
on 8 July 1980 referred to the MPs as ‘counter-revolutionaries’, the ordinary members of the 
Conservative Party did not seem out of step with the increasingly restrictive line. At an 
Executive Committee meeting of the National Union on 15 January 1981, third on the list of 
24 resolutions submitted by constituency and area parties was a request from the Hemsworth 
Executive Committee that the Government ‘stop all immigration’.15 
Against this backdrop, the Conservatives introduced new immigration rules in 1981. With 
primary migration to the UK having been effectively ended in 1971, the new rules focused 
on reducing the level of secondary migration, in which relatives joined migrants already in 
the UK.16 The ‘Primary Purpose Rule’, which had originated in the 1970s under a Labour 
government, passed into law.17 Under the Rule, fiancés and spouses of British citizens could 
not enter the country unless their partner could prove that the primary purpose of marriage 
was not settlement in the UK. The elderly or ill parents of British citizens could not enter the 
UK unless they could show that they had no relatives in their own country who could support 
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them, that their living conditions abroad were well below the average, and that they were 
mainly, if not totally, dependant on their children.18 It also became much more difficult, if 
not impossible, for migrants who had entered the UK on a temporary student or visitor visa 
to receive permission to settle in the country.  
Shortly after the new rules were brought in, the Conservatives introduced a bill, which, for 
the first time, separated immigration from nationality law. The British Nationality Act of 
1981, which came into effect two years later, was intended to rationalise existing legislation, 
which had become incoherent. In some cases, the rights of some categories of British subject 
meant that, for those holding the status, ‘their possession […] [was] virtually meaningless’.19 
The British Nationality Act created a simplified three-tier model of British citizenship. The 
first category of British citizenship was for those with close ties (such as parents or 
grandparents) to the UK; they would have right of entry and of settlement. The second 
category – Citizenship of British Dependant Territories – was intended for those who had 
been born or naturalised, or descended from those in the few remaining dependencies (such 
as Hong Kong, the Falklands, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and Gibraltar).20 The third 
category was British Overseas Citizenship, which was set aside for those who had been 
CUKC, and which was regarded as a ‘kind of dustbin category’.21 It was something of a 
transitional grouping that ‘disposed of remaining claims to the United Kingdom from groups 
who were not recently descended from British emigrants’: there were no ‘rights’ for the 
holder (such as settlement in the UK), and the status could not be passed on.22 
 
1983 to 1987 
The general election of June 1983 returned the Conservative Party to office with 42.4 per 
cent of the vote and – unusually for the incumbent – a gain of 58 seats, leaving the Tories 
with 397 in total. John Major says that there was never any doubt that the Conservatives 
would win: the success over regaining the Falklands had made Thatcher ‘unbeatable’.23 The 
Tory manifesto, while reiterating the Party’s previous record in controlling immigration, 
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contained little on future policy and there was no detail of what this would involve, only that 
‘we will continue to pursue policies which are strict but fair’.24 There do not appear to have 
been any plans for substantial changes to immigration policy during this period. One former 
immigration minister found that by the time he gained office in the early 1990s, the main 
issues had been ‘largely dealt with’ following the British Nationality Act (BNA) of 1981.25 
The Falklands War of 1982 prompted the Conservatives to re-work the three-tier citizenship 
that the BNA had introduced. The Falkland Islanders had been designated British Dependant 
Territories (BDTC) citizens unless they had ‘close ties’ with the UK, such as a parent or even 
grandparent who had been born there. As a sign of the UK’s commitment to the Falkland 
Islands, the 1983 British Nationality (Falkand Islands) Act 1983 conferred full British 
citizenship status, giving residents of the Falkland Islands the right to visit and settle in the 
UK.26 No further revision of immigration policy was expected; Conservative Cabinet 
members were not enthusiastic about making more changes to legislation in this field.27 
As with the residents of the Falkland Islands, the three million British subjects in Hong Kong 
had become citizens of the BDT following the 1981 Act, and they too risked losing this status 
‘in the face of an imminent takeover by an alien power’ – China, in this case.28 The 1985  
Hong Kong Act, however, was not intended solely to redefine the citizenship of Hong Kong 
residents. Instead, the legislation was to make arrangements for the ‘ending of British 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over Hong Kong’.29 However, as part of the Act, those Hong 
Kongers with British Dependant Territory citizenship would lose their status in 1999. They 
would, however, be able to take on a new form of nationality – the category of British 
National (Overseas) or BNO, although this would give them few privileges: they would be 
subject to immigration controls and they would have no right to settle in the UK.  
Further controls on immigration were introduced later that year, in response to ministers’ 
concerns that the worsening situation in Sri Lanka might lead to a rush of non-white 
immigrants to the UK. Although international observers represented the Tamils as fleeing 
violence and terror, Conservative ministers, ‘believe[d] that some of the Tamils who have 
entered […] [were] try[ing] to better their economic prospects by settling in Britain’.30 They 
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were to be treated as ordinary economic migrants rather than victims of conflict. As the 
number of Tamils entering the UK increased – though, admittedly, from a low base – the 
government informed the press that it was reconsidering its policy of not returning Tamils to 
Sri Lanka. 
In May 1985, the Conservative government announced, that, in future, those who arrived 
without advance entry clearance – effectively a visa – would be returned to Sri Lanka ‘unless 
they could persuade immigration officers that they would face severe hardships’.31 The 
decision was condemned by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who maintained that 
the situation in Sri Lanka was too volatile and too dangerous for Tamils to be returned. 
According to one newspaper, ‘a tendency was emerging to blur the boundary between the 
criteria used to assess immigrants and refugees’.32 In a precursor to later legislation that 
would penalise carriers for transporting migrants without the correct documentation in 1987, 
one airline had begun carrying out the British government’s policy. British Airways refused 
to carry passengers from Sri Lanka if they did not have advance entry clearance for the UK 
and had not purchased a return ticket.33 
In response to condemnation, the government argued that the measure had been imposed 
reluctantly and in response to the sudden increase in the number of Tamils entering the UK, 
which had been putting strain on the immigration system. It was maintained that the new 
requirement would, in fact, help those who did not qualify under the new rules as it would 
‘save the cost and disappointment of wasted journeys’.34 Opposition MPs claimed the 
government was panicking and disregarding human rights. One MP pointed out that the 
decision had been made during the parliamentary recess ‘so that it cannot be questioned by 
the Opposition’.35 The hurried approach to this matter resulted in problems, including errors 
of judgement and procedure. In June, Home Secretary Leon Brittan announced an inquiry 
into how ‘a young Tamil seeking asylum in Britain was sent back to Sri Lanka […] without 
refugee agencies being given the chance to make representations on his behalf’.36 
In October 1985, it was announced that the Tories were considering introducing visa 
requirements for visitors entering Britain from some Asian, African and Caribbean 
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Commonwealth countries. The visa requirement, which had previously only applied to 
Tamils, had ‘virtually stopped’ the flow of Tamils to the UK.37 The extension of the visa 
requirement could only be seen as a ‘hardening of the government’s stance on immigration’, 
in part because ‘visas [we]re often more difficult to acquire than clearance at port of entry 
and act as a deterrent’.38 Immigrants from five particular countries would now need to obtain 
entry clearance before they set foot in the UK, which would, it was hoped, shorten queues 
and placate the immigration officers’ union and prevent walkouts and subsequent media 
publicity. In the words of one of the designers of the extended visa scheme, it was ‘a response 
to terrible pressure on the Immigration desk’ at the major airports.39 Instead of dealing with 
what was a domestic, indeed local, situation (the immigration bottleneck at Heathrow), the 
government exported the problem abroad. 
Throughout this period, the Conservative government feared backbenchers (of all parties) 
blocking the smooth running of the immigration process – and making efforts to liberalise 
the system by making representations on behalf of their constituents.40 A growing level of 
correspondence from MPs meant that they came to be regarded by some ministers and civil 
servants as a ‘burden’ for carrying out their constituency duties and representing those 
constituents of theirs who were experiencing difficulties under immigration law.41  
From 1985 onwards, attempts were made to downgrade – and even delegitimise – the rights 
of MPs with regard to immigration cases. Arguing that ‘[s]omething fishy [was] going on’, 
in October 1985, the immigration minister, David Waddington, made a series of claims about 
23 MPs who had allegedly abused their positions and permitted the temporary entry of some 
4,500 (ineligible) visitors into the country, against the decisions of immigration officers.42 
Home Secretary Douglas Hurd released new draft guidelines regarding parliamentarians’ 
right to intervene. There was to be a time limit on MPs’ rights to challenge refusals (12 days) 
and a requirement for ‘new and compelling evidence’ in cases where MPs were seeking to 
defer a deportation.43 MPs promised to defy the guidelines on the grounds that they 
represented a breach of parliamentary privilege and a restriction on the rights of 
immigrants.44  
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In response to pressure from parliamentarians, the Home Secretary made a U-turn. MPs 
would continue to be able to make representations to Home Office ministers, rather than, as 
the original proposals had specified, be limited to liaising directly with chief immigration 
officers at ports of entry. While the Conservative government modified its policy, it refused 
to back down on the issue. Waddington ‘complained in the Commons that far too many 
immigration officers were having to sit in offices scribbling replies to MPs on immigration 
cases instead of processing applications for entry clearance’.45 Over a year later, in October 
1986, Hurd announced – to little fuss – that MPs would lose their right to ‘secure the 
temporary admission to Britain of passengers refused entry at air terminals and ports’.46   
 
1987 to 1992 
On 11 June 1987, the Conservatives once again secured a majority with a healthy 42.4 per 
cent of the vote – albeit a slightly reduced share, having lost 21 seats. The election was ‘won 
comfortably’.47 Their campaign had not focused on immigration and their manifesto merely 
summarised their achievements of previous years (‘immigration for settlement is now at its 
lowest level’; ‘we now require visas for visitors from the Indian sub-continent, Nigeria and 
Ghana’; ‘tackling the problem of those who fraudulently pose as refugees’).48 As for future 
policy, there was only one sentence: ‘We will tighten the existing law to ensure that the 
control over settlement becomes even more effective.’49  
The passing of the Immigration Carriers Liability Act 1987 was a sign that the Conservatives 
were prepared to contract out responsibility for securing Britain’s borders. By 1987, carriers 
were taking on the responsibilities of immigration agencies, despite UN concerns that the 
policy might discourage carriers from transporting genuine refugees.50 With companies 
which brought ‘non-genuine’ asylum seekers to the UK at risk of being fined up to £1000 a 
passenger, it was now the responsibility of these private corporations to determine whose 
claims were genuine.51 The Conservative leadership practised a more anticipative rather than 
reactive approach to immigration policy. The legislation imposing responsibilities on carriers 
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was supposedly about preventing abuse of the asylum system, yet there was little evidence 
that this was occurring on a broad scale: the impact was never quantified. Douglas Hurd 
denied that recent events involving the Tamils had provoked the bill; instead legislation had 
been triggered by the arrival of more than 800 people claiming asylum in the UK between 
December 1986 and February 1987 – nearly twice the number for all of the previous year 
and the majority of whom were Tamils. Hurd said ‘I believe we would be strongly, and 
rightly, criticized if we delayed our action until the trickle became a flood, as more and more 
people began to use the loophole.’52  
The subsequent Immigration Act of 1988 was a tidying exercise which allowed the 
Conservatives to show a tougher line: it gave the authorities more powers to deal with over-
stayers and illegal immigrants. It also limited the entry of dependants of those 
Commonwealth citizens who had settled in the UK before 1973.53 
Towards the end of the late 1980s, events in Hong Kong – and the legal situation regarding 
the then future handover to China – created difficulties for Conservatives intent on 
maintaining a strict restrictive immigration policy. The 1985 Hong Kong Act had created a 
non-transferable category of British nationalty for Hong Kongers – British National Overseas 
or BN(O), which had replaced the category of BDTC. One citizen maintained that he and 
other non-Chinese Hong Kongers were ‘the victims of Occidental and Oriental racial 
prejudices [with] Britain […] striving to stem the influx of brown-skinned immigrants [and] 
China […] reluctant to grant citizenship to anyone who is not ethnic Chinese’.54  
The Hong Kong issue exposed a tension between ministers keen to fulfil their responsibilities 
towards people who were entitled to British passports (and those fleeing to Hong Kong from 
Vietnam) and a British public adamant that the Hong Kong British should not be allowed 
into the UK, let alone have the right of abode. The then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd felt 
duty-bound: ‘I didn’t want this last chapter of British empire to come about in circumstances 
which would look dreadful’.55 In an interview in 1989, the Conservative MP John Carlisle 
relayed his message to ministers: ‘They should say, “We're sorry, this particular door is not 
just shut; it's slammed”’.56  
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The Conservative government did not wish to ‘offend’ Peking, which had said that the status 
of the non-Chinese was a ‘British problem’ yet the Tories could not be seen to be ‘giving 
in’.57 In June 1989 it was announced that Britain would not ‘give sanctuary’; the UK could 
not be a ‘last resort’ option for the three million of Hong Kong’s Chinese residents. 58 
Conservative MPs backed their leadership on the issue, with one arguing that it would be 
‘heartless for the Government to hold out to nearly four million people the hope that the 
solution to their problems lay in immigrating to the United Kingdom’.59 Perhaps in a 
concession to political and media pressure, it was reported that there would be slightly more 
flexibility, most likely with regard to former Crown servants, although there was little in the 
way of further details.60  
A few days later, Thatcher reconsidered the Hong Kong issue. There had been a change of 
tone in the parliamentary party, following Thatcher’s comments in the Commons that the 
government was seeking ways of allowing more Hong Kong citizens to enter the country 
within the existing rules. The Governor of Hong Kong relayed that, during a meeting with 
Thatcher, she had argued that allowing unfettered access of abode to all Hong Kong citizens 
would be a matter of great political difficulty.61 A poll for The Sun in early July found that 
65 per cent of the public rejected the prospect of three million Hong Kongers entering the 
UK.62 Britain was said to be ‘bound by its tough immigration laws’.63 Among ordinary 
Conservative MPs and supporters, opposition was reported to be ‘overwhelming’.64 One 
senior minister argued that a Conservative government would not be able to pass such a 
change on immigration rules. A junior minister was reported to have said ‘How would you 
like a Hong Kong family living next to you?’65  
Months later, in October of that year, the Prime Minister said – at the Commonwealth 
conference – that Britain would extend the right of abode to more Hong Kong people than it 
had previously been willing. Post-Tiananmen Square, ‘trust was shattered’ and the Tories 
were ‘jolted […] into a few hasty concessions’.66 The amended scheme would extend the 
right to new categories of Hong Kong people.67 But backbenchers were still not content with 
the Hong Kong issue. On 16 December 1989, it was reported that the ‘Tory rebellion’ might 
exacerbate fears of a Hong Kong exodus. At a meeting of the 1922 Committee, there was 
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criticism of Thatcher’s decision earlier in the week to offer full passports (with right of abode) 
to 50,000 professionals, public servants and businesspeople – along with their families – to 
a total of 175,000 people.68 The media reported that up to 60 Conservative MPs could vote 
against the measures.69 One rebel, Carlisle argued that admitting the Hong Kong Chinese 
might well damage the Conservative Party in electoral terms: 
The other thing is that we're not the political flavour of the month at the moment and 
one of the few things people do feel we're strong on is immigration. And if the 
Government weakens now, it is yet another pit prop taken away from under us. A 
great deal of resentment would build up, and I think it would be foolish to risk that, 
and frankly their first obligation must be to the people of this country, and not 
another.70 
Carlisle maintained that the Party’s stance on immigration had won him his parliamentary 
seat: ‘It was Mrs Thatcher who […] supported the policy of strong immigration control and 
that was the reason why I won my marginal seat by 200 votes; taking that line’.71 Carlisle 
also made a claim which chimed with senior Party figures who were fearful of a widening 
gap between the elites and the electorate: ‘I think there is one thing that actually unites the 
Conservative Party, and people outside […] and that is immigration. So there would be no 
compromise’.72  
The finalised scheme was announced by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd on 20 December 
1989. Passports with full entry rights would be granted to 50,000 Hong Kong ‘heads of 
families’ and their dependants, to reach a total of some 225,000 people. It was, apparently, 
‘the outcome of a delicate tightrope act by ministers’ forced to straddle a line between the 
elites’ notions of duty and responsibility and an immigrant-hostile public.73 Hurd had pushed 
for a higher number, and Waddington, fewer, and the Prime Minister was ‘torn by both sides’; 
she arrived at the final number by ‘split[ting] the difference’.74 The figure needed to be low 
enough to pass muster with Tory MPs who could, conceivably, have not allowed the bill to 
pass. (Britain’s ‘unwelcoming message’ was so well executed that the quota of 50,000 was 
not filled.)75 
The views of backbenchers were deemed to be of great importance to policy-makers; 
legislation on the matter was not yet forthcoming, supposedly because ministers ‘wish[ed] to 
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test backbench opinion further’.76 The former Cabinet minister, Norman Tebbit, and his 
fellow backbenchers, were still unsatisfied. After the proposals were announced, Tebbit 
questioned Conservative integrity, asking whether the Party’s commitment to end large-scale 
immigration still existed.77 He argued that immigration was an issue which had pushed 
traditional Labour voters to support Margaret Thatcher.78 The rebellion showed no signs of 
winding down while Parliament was in recess. On 6 January 1990, it was reported that 
ministers had ‘underestimated the hostility of Tory MPs’ over the Hong Kong legislation and 
that whips would face a ‘nightmare task to ensure smooth passage of the legislation’.79 An 
encounter with Francis Maude, then junior Foreign Office minister and Tebbit is illustrative 
of the divide in attitudes between them, even if Tebbit was not being entirely serious.  
‘How many would you allow in?’ demanded an exasperated Francis Maude as he 
remonstrated with a group of Tory MPs in the House of Commons tea room. ‘About 
twelve,’ said Norman Tebbit. The Foreign Office minister reacted with incredulity. 
‘What, 12,000?’. ‘No,’ Mr Tebbit said, ‘twelve.’80 
 
The Conservatives were fortunate to be in office when one particular case crossed their desks, 
for it allowed the Party to portray its policies as both sensible and tough on immigration and 
immigrants. This was the case of the Sri Lankan illegal immigrant who spent many months 
in a Manchester church to avoid deportation before he was removed by police and 
immigration officers in January 1989.81 According to Roy Hattersley, Viraj Mendis was 
something of a ‘test’ for the Government; he was ‘like a minor character in a morality play, 
written into the plot to test the wisdom, the compassion and, above all, the patience of those 
whose paths he crosses’.82 He argued that: 
It was absurd to spend so much time and money deporting a man who by no stretch 
of ministerial hyperbole could be described as a danger to society. […] They made 
an example of him to discourage the others.83 
 
Others saw the Mendis case as a chance for Conservative factions to prove themselves: 
[I]f the whole episode had been orchestrated by a government PR firm with a brief to 
give the immigration laws a more favourable image, it could not have been better 
handled. The point about Mendis was that he provided an excellent non-test case, 
illustrating the government's get-tough attitude on immigration at no political cost.84 
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By summer 1989, the Party was looking tired; the UK was moving towards a recession, 
unemployment rates were increasing and high interest and mortgage rates were driving away 
Conservative supporters. Conservative activists were sceptical that the Party could win the 
next election, and Conservative MPs too were similarly doubtful, particularly of the 
leadership of Thatcher, whose support base had never been particularly broad within the 
parliamentary party. In late 1990, Thatcher was replaced by John Major, who was reluctant 
to squeeze votes out of the immigration issue. However, the matter did not go away. First, an 
increase in the number of asylum applications initiated further policy work.85 Kenneth Baker 
became Home Secretary in 1990 and recalled that during this period the UK experienced a 
huge rise in asylum seeking, from a typical 5,000 applications a year in the mid-1980s 
increasing to 45,000 in 1991.86 In his view, ‘some of them were genuine asylum seekers, but 
many were economic migrants, quite frankly [...] and there was a great business in 
manufacturing false stories going’.87 
Conservative ministers concluded that something had to be done or it would get worse: ‘it 
had got around the world that you could move for all sorts of reasons other than asylum and 
claim asylum’.88 Policy changes were considered in an attempt to discourage false 
applications, with the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary working jointly on a 
proposal to remove people from Heathrow – before applications could be made – and return 
them to their country of origin. Baker concluded that it was an ‘impossible concept’, it was 
not possible to ‘delineate Heathrow to not be a part of Britain, and then turn them back’.89 
In their attempts to ‘put some sort of handbrake’ on immigration, Baker pushed for new 
legislation to expedite the process of assessing applications and appeals, so that the entire 
process could be completed within 12 weeks, rather then, as it then stood, at several years.90 
Plans were also made to remove entitlement to various social security benefits for asylum 
seekers, and it was proposed to fingerprint applicants to prevent impersonation. However, in 
the months leading up to the election in 1992, there were fears that the Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Bill would be dropped, owing to a shortage of time.91 The Labour Party 
offered to do a deal with the government, in which they would support the legislation in 
return for several concessions. The immigration minister Peter Lloyd believed that the 
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concessions would reduce the effectiveness of the controls and the deal was not seriously 
considered by the Conservatives.92  
The handover to Hong Kong continued to provoke consternation within the parliamentary 
party. Given the hostile environment from the Party’s own backbenchers, it is no surprise 
that, shortly before the general election, the Tories pulled out one of their trump cards. In the 
final week of the campaign, and with the reluctant support of John Major and Chris Patten, 
the Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, made a last-minute speech warning of the dangers of 
uncontrolled immigration, which he referred to as ‘one of the biggest problems facing the 
world in the 1990s’.93  
 
1992 to 1997 
The 1992 general election returned the Conservatives to office with 336 seats, a loss of 40, 
on a vote share of 41.9 per cent. The manifesto was more extensive on immigration policy 
than the previous two manifestos. Noting that ‘immigration for settlement is now at its lowest 
level since control of Commonwealth immigration first began in 1962’, the Party promised 
to ‘tighten the existing law to ensure that the control over settlement becomes even more 
effective’.94 Most notable, however, was the emphasis on asylum seekers as abusers of the 
system, with the manifesto noting the ‘increasing number of would-be immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and other parts of the world [who] seek to abuse our openness to genuine 
refugees’.95 The campaign itself, however, was less focused on immigration than one might 
expect; apparently, according to one contemporary, because of leader John Major, whose 
‘decency would not want to make a big issue out of it’.96 
By now, most forms of immigration had been ‘choked off’.97 The level of migration to the 
UK was around 50,000 a year, a ‘manageable and necessary figure which was more than 
matched by emigration’.98 Asylum figures were decreasing too, with the number of 
applicants for asylum falling to less than 25,000 in the early 1990s.99 And yet, the 1990s 
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period was notable for its continued emphasis on tightening up the rules relating to asylum 
seeking. It was suspected by some Tory ministers that economic migrants were still using the 
asylum route to get around restrictions on previous routes.100 One Home Office minister 
referred to the situation as ‘completely out of control’.101 
The Conservatives had pledged to reintroduce their Asylum Bill, which had run out of time 
in the previous parliament following extensive criticism. They had proposed to revise and 
expedite the system for examining the claims of asylum seekers, and introduce finger printing 
for asylum applicants to discourage fraudulent applications. It therefore fell to Ken Clarke, 
now Home Secretary, to get this through parliament – with some additions. The 1993 Asylum 
and Immigration Appeals Act brought in new, stream-lined procedures for applications, 
permitted the detention of asylum seekers while their claim was being decided and also 
decreased the monetary value of benefits to which asylum seekers were entitled. A new 
category of ‘claims without foundation’, intended for those who came from ‘safe countries’ 
was brought in, so that applicants in this category would be subject to a much reduced 
timeframe for appeal.102 Clarke did ‘concede’ to church leaders, the Bar Society, and Law 
Society by bringing in an automatic right of appeal for those who had been rejected asylum 
status, but he did also introduce a measure that removed the right of appeal from those who 
had been denied a visitor visa and for those immigrants whose grounds for appeal were 
regarded to be unfounded.103  
The Conservatives’ 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act was in much the same vein with new 
measures designed to reduce the number of asylum claims. Those asylum seekers who came 
from ‘safe’ third countries’ no longer had any right to appeal.104 More asylum seekers than 
ever before were subject to the fast track procedures, in which the timeframe for appeal was 
significantly limited.105 Along with further welfare restrictions imposed on asylum seekers, 
it became a criminal offence to employ someone who did not have permission to work in the 
UK.  
In the final years of this period, Conservative ministers were following opinion polls more 
closely. While senior figures did not believe the public to be much concerned by statistical 
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data (‘I don’t think the public thinks in terms of figures’ said one former Home Secretary) 
there was very much an understanding that the government would need to show 
understanding of the challenges raised by immigration – and clearly point to the impact that 
its policies had had (because ‘people need to feel it’s under control’).106  Meanwhile certain 
Conservative parliamentary candidates were espousing policies that were receiving currency 
within the Party. One former Home Secretary found it problematic that immigration policy 
could either be driven by ‘what is in the public interest, which you should do’ or by what ‘the 
people in the Party, the successful candidates want you to do, because they’ve said on that 
platform that we will do it’.107 
Other senior members within the Party were coming to terms with the idea that the populist 
rhetoric on immigration – while tempting to certain parliamentary candidates would, in the 
mid- to long-term, bring few votes. One former immigration minister, Peter Lloyd, saw it as 
short-sighted because ‘it was so obvious that there was going to come a time when the 
immigrant vote  would be as important to us as the red-neck vote’.108 Such a strategy would 
not help the Conservative Party, but could well damage it. It was a misdirected approach to 
certain elements of the electorate: 
politically, it was stupid, why make out the Conservative Party was hostile to 
immigrants when in fact the irony was that the people who were most hostile [to 
immigrants] were often Labour-voting working-class people […] it didn’t make any 
sense politically.109 
 
 
6.2 Explaining Conservative immigration policy 
The dynamics of government versus opposition 
My first proposition contends that the process and the content of policy-making is dependent 
on whether the Party is in office or in opposition. From 1979 to 1997, the Conservative Party 
enjoyed a continuous period in government, and so, while the proposition cannot, strictly 
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speaking, explain policy development within this period as there is no variation in the 
variable, I tentatively argue that this proposition is still of use. As the period of opposition 
became a distant memory for the Party, and the Conservatives became used to the restraining 
influence of being in government, the Party’s immigration policy grew more pragmatic. 
There were fewer grand undertakings, such as the 1979 manifesto pledge to introduce a 
register of dependants of every Commonwealth citizen. Towards the end of this era, policy 
was developed in a stealthier way so as to side-line certain expected obstacles, such as 
parliamentary opposition.  
 
1979 to 1983 
During the first parliament of the period, the proposition is particularly relevant, with the 
Conservative government of 1979 finding itself unable to fully implement many of the 
restrictionist proposals that it had pledged while in opposition. What prevented a newly-
elected Conservative government, fresh from a landslide victory, from implementing its 
policies? The Conservatives had to quickly adjust from the ‘politics of support’ to the 
‘politics of power’. The Party – and its policies – were forced to adapt or be adapted by the 
practicalities of governing (namely legal obligations, economic imperatives and international 
relations). There were previously unconsidered impediments to policy, and there were new 
influences on policy-making. 
First, legal matters served to delay and influence policy, with measures almost certainly 
weakened so as to reduce the possibility of lengthy legal challenges. In 1980, the Home 
Secretary and Foreign Secretary warned their colleagues that the ‘[European] Commission’s 
decisions pose a real threat to aspects of our policy.’110 Legal advisers argued that the new 
immigration rules were likely to be challenged at Strasbourg, and that the changes would be 
‘extremely difficult to defend’.111 Civil servants advised their staff that ministers had always 
been aware of the possibility of a successful challenge, but that this was to remain 
confidential. The line to be taken with enquirers was that ‘[t]he government is confident of 
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successfully defeating such a challenge’ – even when it certainly was not.112 Frustration at 
European ‘interference’ with UK immigration policies would soon become a key component 
of Tory Euroscepticism, and later, an important faultline leading up to the UK’s decision to 
vote to leave the EU.  
Despite the tough stance, the Party’s policy on immigration was revised so as to avoid legal 
difficulties. International legal obligations frequently superseded the policy preferences of 
the Party’s own supporters. During a Cabinet meeting in late 1979, Home Secretary Willie 
Whitelaw laid down a proposal to ‘end the practice of allowing permanent settlement to those 
who come here for a temporary stay’.113 A step in the restrictionist direction, certainly, but 
this was something of a compromise: the Home Secretary had considered ‘the risk of 
criticism from our own supporters’ for not going further and removing the right to settle for 
work permit holders and their dependants too.114 However, Whitelaw feared that such 
measures would be obstructed by greater forces and that ‘because of our international 
obligations, we cannot sensibly go further’.115  
Second, for the Conservatives in government, economic imperatives overruled tough 
initiatives which would have reduced the pool of migrant labour. The Tories were less 
dogmatic than they had been in opposition; they were prepared to yield to economic rationale 
at the expense of immigration policy objectives. The Permanent Secretary of the Home 
Office at the time recalled that ‘[t]he economy was a damned sight more important than 
bloody immigration’.116 The critical importance of business to the UK economy prevented 
ministers from pursuing more restrictive immigration policy.  Ministers and civil servants 
believed that prolonged debate over the immigration issue should be avoided so as not to 
damage what were termed ‘Indo/British relations and some specific British [economic] 
interests’.117 In one unlikely instance, a Conservative minister proposed to make immigration 
easier. Admittedly, it was for ‘those […] who matter to us’.118 In 1979, Timothy Raison, the 
junior foreign minister, suggested that visitors of influence be given shorter interviews so 
that, in the words of one official, they do not ‘stir up unfair publicity for immigration 
control’.119 The proposal came shortly after an incident in which an Indian minister spoke of 
his having experienced ‘inconvenience and delay’ at the UK border.120  
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In one similar case in which economic imperatives trumped the objective of reducing the 
flow of immigrants to the UK, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, asked Whitelaw in 
March 1981 to look again at the ‘urgent’ matter of concessions for some Indian immigrants 
to the UK. The request was not to remove concessions, as one might expect within broader 
Conservative immigration policy, but to introduce concessions. The letter came shortly 
before Margaret Thatcher’s visit to India in 1981, and following what were euphemistically 
referred to as ‘certain developments’. The success of the visit, it was said, depended on 
whether a £1 billion steel contract was awarded by the Indians to a British consortium or a 
German one; the two companies were, technically, ‘neck and neck’. Carrington concluded 
that ‘it would be greatly to our advantage to make a concession very soon [such as] a doubling 
of the existing annual quota’ for UK passport-holders from India. Carrington suggested that 
the Tories make plans so that ‘a concession on UKPH does not lead to a significant increase 
in the annual rate of immigration from India and to find a way of conveying publicly, if 
necessary, that it will not’.121 Later that year, in September 1981, Cabinet was informed that 
the contract had been awarded to the British-led consortium Davy McKee Ltd.122  
Third, the Conservative government’s level of interest in the decisions of other countries was 
such that policy was modified following comments or criticism from overseas governments. 
This inclination to modify policy could be seen as a strategic move to avoid prolonged 
discussion of the Conservatives’ preferred British immigration policy. The willingness to 
listen to other governments was no secret: one lobby briefing explicitly stated that ‘our 
attitude to the number of refugees we were willing to consider taking would be influenced by 
the attitude of other countries’ (my italics).123 
Certain small regions had an impact on policy-making that was disproportionately greater 
than their status on the world stage. When, during the early-1980s, the Conservative 
government proposed to split citizenship of the UK and colonies into two parts as part of the 
Nationality Bill, the proposal was condemned by the Dependant Territories, which made 
direct protests to the Foreign Office. They had ‘strong objections’ to the proposal because 
they regarded the new British Overseas Citizenship as second-class, and they disliked the 
fact that CUKC with direct relations with the British government through their links with 
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dependant territories ‘would be lumped together with those who belong nowhere’.124 It was 
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington who suggested that the British government ‘meet the 
concerns’ of these governments and establish a three-tier system.125 The alternative system 
was implemented – against the advice of civil servants. The Act reclassified the previous 
Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) into three categories with varying 
levels of rights.  
 
1983 to 1987 
During the mid-1980s, the Conservative Party’s immigration policy was both more moderate 
and more modest in scope. The more restrained agenda for immigration policy can be partly 
explained by the Conservatives’ recent experience in government, in which, having shifted 
into the ‘politics of power’ mode, there was a much greater understanding of what was and 
what was not realistic. That is not to say, however, that the path of policy-making was a 
simple one: there continued to be obstacles that served to complicate the making of 
immigration policy.  
Legal issues continued to impede the Tories’ plans, particularly as the government was now 
receiving frequent criticism from the UK courts as well as the wider international legal 
system. The entry rules, which had applied since 1980, had already been amended by 1983 
(after much international criticism) to allow women with British citizenship to bring foreign 
husbands into the UK – but only if they could prove that the marriage was not for the purpose 
of immigration. The policy did not survive the declaration from the ECHR in May 1985 that 
the Conservative government’s immigration rules were unlawful. The rules were found to 
have discriminated against women: ‘under the rules, foreign men with full residency rights 
in the UK can bring in their wives or fiancées, but foreign women cannot’.126  
The Conservative government response was clear: changes would have to be made to policy. 
There were two possible options for the Tories: they could makes the rules more liberal by 
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allowing foreign husbands and fiancés to enter the UK, or they could go in a different 
direction and exclude all foreign wives and fiancées. The first option would mean putting 
aside the Conservatives’ 1979 manifesto pledge to prevent foreign husbands and fiancés from 
entering the country. However, the second option would lead to a ‘political furore’ as many 
(white) women would be banned from joining their husbands in the UK.127 In response to the 
ECHR ruling, the Conservative government announced that it would tighten up matters 
further still. New rules would make it more difficult for men as well as women who had 
settled in the UK but were not British citizens to be joined by their spouses from abroad.  
If legal matters were not enough of a problem for the Tory government, they were also forced 
to contend with parliamentarians who were considerably obstructive with regard to 
government policy on immigration. A greater level of rebelliousness by Conservative 
backbenchers meant that the leadership were forced to play close attention to their disgruntled 
MPs. Policy was revised, and concessions were sometimes made, following parliamentary 
discussion. In Party papers, reference was made to ‘the Government’s flexible response’ in 
that it proved ‘willing and able to make significant amendment to the proposals in the White 
Paper in the light of constructive criticism’.128 Such concessions were framed so as not to 
worry Party members and supporters. Parliament was, repeatedly, blamed as an obstruction 
to carrying out policy commitments. In a draft letter from the personal assistant to the 
Chairman of the Conservative Party (who also held the position of Director of Research at 
CRD) to a disgruntled party supporter, it was confirmed that: 
It remains the intention of our party to bring to an end immigration on the scale in 
which it has been seen in post-war years. Because of Parliamentary Opposition it was 
only in March this year that we were able to bring into effect changes in the Rules 
governing immigration into the United Kingdom.129 (my italics) 
 
 
1987 to 1992 
In 1987, the Party secured its third successive victory, and again, as befits a party in the mode 
of ‘politics of power’, offered little in the way of immigration policy that was column-worthy. 
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The Conservative Party’s strongly worded – yet vague – policy commitment is characteristic 
of a Party which has become used to government; the Tories had a greater sense of what was 
realistic. The then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, later recalled that there were practical 
reasons for keeping the immigration issue low-key in the run up to the election: ‘We weren’t 
anxious to see it pushed into the front of the discussion, because if we won, we’d have to 
handle it and it wouldn’t be good if everything was in a feverish state of expectation’.130 As 
in previous parliaments, the Tory government sought to anticipate critical interventions from 
legal bodies as well as from parliamentarians. 
Immigration policy in this period was pursued in a less public way – that is, by stealth, and 
without necessarily resorting to the statute books – to bypass both of these potential obstacles. 
In the previous parliament, a leaked internal Home Office document had detailed how 
deliberate procedural delays were intended to prevent (legal) immigration. It was an echo of 
past government policy in which administrative or ‘soft’ controls attempted to keep 
immigration numbers from rising. The document, which was intended as a briefing for 
ministers, explained that the number of Entry Clearance Officers, or ECOs, on duty was ‘the 
primary regulator’ of levels of immigration. The document warned that public 
acknowledgment of what it referred to as ‘a policy of deliberate delay without legislation 
giving powers to impose quotas’ could be vulnerable to legal action both in the British courts 
and at the international level. Previously, the long waiting time, on average 22 months for 
those waiting to enter from Bangladesh, and 11 months for those from Pakistan, had been 
explained with regard to the lack of resources.131  
Making policy on the quiet was a response to the Conservatives’ growing exasperation to 
legal bodies causing issues for the government. Hurd, the then Home Secretary, argued that 
the judiciary’s interventions ‘made it easier for people to stay in this country’ by undermining 
existing policy and pushing policy development in a more liberal direction.132 There were 
numerous cases (mostly by the Court of Appeal) in which individuals’ rights to apply for 
asylum in the UK were upheld by the courts, or those who had been wrongly deported were 
ordered to be re-admitted. One court hearing against the deportation of three Tamils in 
September 1987 was described in the media as: 
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the latest bout in the contest between the Government and the courts, a contest which 
the Government has lost so often and so bruisingly it has concluded that if it can't win 
by the old rules, then the rules will have to be changed.133 
The Conservative government was said to be so frustrated by the courts’ interventions that it 
planned to curb judicial review, and consequently, the drafting of all new legislation was 
being developed with that consideration in mind.134 But why were the courts suddenly so 
receptive to such hearings? From the late 1970s onwards there had been a changing of the 
guard: in came younger, and more progressive judges – or, in the words of one former 
minister, ‘liberal unrealists’.135 When the Tamils won their deportation reprieve, the 
government did not, could not, under such pressure, give up; it was already seeking to undo 
the judgement when it came in.136  
If interventions by legal bodies were not enough of a constraint on policy-making, there were 
also the efforts of backbenchers to wreck Conservative immigration policy to control 
immigration. For Cabinet ministers, MPs continued to be troublesome throughout the mid-
late 1980s and beyond. The Home Secretary made attempt to limits parliamentarians’ rights 
to make representations on behalf of immigrants. In November 1987, when the second 
reading of the bill was going through, it was reported that Hurd would make ‘new 
arrangements’ for MPs so as to prevent their ‘detracting from proper exercise of ministers’ 
responsibility’.137  
Compared with the two previous Conservative governments, the government of 1987 
onwards played less heed to maintaining reasonable international relations. During the late 
1980s, international relations were threatened by the Conservative government’s stance on 
Vietnamese immigrants in Hong Kong, which was then a region under UK mandate. The 
UK’s decision to remove Vietnamese ‘boat people’ from Hong Kong was severely criticised 
by the US government. Margaret Thatcher, however, criticised those who had condemned 
the decision: ‘Those countries who object very strongly when it comes to repatriating illegal 
immigrants should say “right, we will take so many ourselves”’.138  
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1992 to 1997 
By the final parliament of this period, the Conservatives, during their fourth consecutive term 
in office, were quite conscious of what they had previously achieved and which objectives 
would be practical over the coming years. Immigration policy was in part a response to the 
sudden increase in the number of asylum seekers to the UK; it was more pragmatic and more 
reactive than previously. There was a sense in which the Party was growing tired: John Major, 
in response to critics who had condemned the 1992 election for lacking a big idea, said 
‘[q]uite what they expected after 12 years of Conservative government I am not sure’.139  
Unfortunately for the Party, the unexpected victory of 1992 led to a ‘dangerous over 
confidence’ for the Conservatives.140 They believed they would be in office for the 
foreseeable future, and complacency meant they were less focused on developing policy and 
more likely to indulge in petty internal squabbles. Major later said that it was ‘right’ for the 
country that the Conservatives won the 1992 election, but ‘had the party chosen to behave 
like a party of government in the five years after our election, it would have been good for 
the Conservative Party too’.141  
However, by and large, the Party was mindful of the gap between the popular if unfeasible 
and that which was less headline-grabbing but more likely to be implemented. Appeal rights 
for those who had failed to secure a visa or obtain asylum, for example, were whittled down. 
There was certainly a sense among Tory ministers that they should only set out to do what 
was possible. Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary for much of this period, maintained that 
‘you’ve got to minimise that gap. If there is a gap […] you pay a heavy penalty if you neglect 
what you’ve promised.’142  
Of course, there were obstacles to Conservative attempts to reduce levels of migration and 
toughen the system for asylum applicants, many of whom, ministers believed, were in fact 
economic migrants. The judiciary continued to play a role in frustrating the Conservatives’ 
immigration policy. In one notable case the Home Secretary Kenneth Baker was held to be 
in contempt of court for defying a court order which banned the deportation of an asylum 
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seeker.143 His immigration minister, Peter Lloyd recalled that it was a misunderstanding, but 
acknowledged that there were difficulties with the judiciary.144  
The weariness that John Major had alluded to in 1992 did not leave the Party: to some 
onlookers, the Conservatives seemed tired and complacent. The Tories’s ‘[d]efective internal 
management’ resulted in ‘steadily rising level[s] of bitterness over “Europe”’.145 
Simultaneously, Conservative politicians were found to be involved in scandals and errors of 
judgement.146 The steady drip of ‘sleaze, Europe and short-term dramas’ had an impact on 
Tory morale.147 Prime Minister Major was left ‘vainly trying to reconcile the divisions and 
to manage an unmanageable party’.148 Even worse, the Party was left close to unelectable.149 
No wonder then, that the Tories of 1997 were showing ‘the characteristic signs of a party on 
its way out’.150 
 
Electoral considerations, leadership and factions 
My second proposition suggests that the Conservative Party’s immigration policies are in a 
part a product of three factors: the Party’s electoral performance, or its fear of electoral defeat; 
the Party’s leadership and their position on immigration; as well as the factions that, to a 
greater or lesser extent, run, or aspire to run, the Party. While these factors are analysed here 
separately as standalone influences on policy-making, they are, in many ways, inextricably 
linked. During the period from 1979 to 1997, the leadership (of both Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major) played a significant role in the development of immigration policy with regard 
to its tone as well as its content. Factions were of importance throughout this time, but were 
perhaps more of a substantial influence in the middle and final parts of the era, during which 
a more ideological, right-wing faction gained prominence over the more traditional one-
nation wing of the Tory Party. While the opinion polls showed fluctuating support for the 
Conservatives, there is little evidence that fear of electoral defeat was a significant or 
consistent motivating factor behind changes to immigration policy, other than a general need 
to show a tough approach to the issue. 
190 
 
1979 to 1983 
Leadership 
During this parliament, the leadership was critical in ensuring that the disputes over 
immigration policy did not develop into something more damaging for the Party: it was 
Margaret Thatcher who made the decision to put policy to one side. The priority, as she saw 
it, was the unity of the Party. At one Cabinet meeting in 1982, she acknowledged the 
‘considerable anger’ against the Conservative MPs who had voted against government 
legislation on new immigration rules.151 She maintained, however, that it was ‘of the utmost 
importance that further damaging divisions within the Conservative Party on this issue should 
be avoided’.152  
As leader of the Party, Thatcher seems to have had a profound – and personal – influence on 
immigration policy, and in particular, its ad-hoc formation. She was notable for her 
interventionist approach and personal interest in policy. There are some indications, however, 
that Thatcher was prevented from using, or perhaps exploiting to its full extent, the 
immigration issue, mainly by her more moderate colleagues. Whitelaw not only ‘refused to 
let her’ do this in opposition; as Home Secretary, he also ‘ensured that it [migration] was 
kept entirely out of the 1983 campaign’.153 References to immigration in the manifesto of 
that campaign were relatively limited and fairly insipid (‘strict but fair’).154 Whitelaw was 
not the only one to hold her back: 
Beyond armchair psychology, Thatcher’s approach to immigration reflected the 
pursuit of an explicit political aim. Throughout her career as leader of the Opposition 
and Prime Minister, Thatcher was not, and could not be, as far to the ideological right 
as she claimed, and her strongest supporters expected her to be. Her Cabinet 
colleagues […] would not have it.155 
 
Beyond these instances, Thatcher’s leadership was not particularly restrained by her 
colleagues in government, at least on the matter of immigration. This might be seen as 
unexpected: she had, after all, ‘inherited’ most of her Shadow Cabinet from her predecessor, 
Edward Heath, and she had brought most of them into office with her – despite the ideological 
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differences. The paternalist or one-nation wing of the Conservative Party was heavily 
represented with Willie Whitelaw at the Home Office, Lord Carrington and Ian Gilmour at 
the Foreign Office and Lord Soames as Leader of the House.156 Thatcher had been 
‘characteristically cautious’ when forming her first Cabinet; she had to make use of senior 
Tories who did not share her outlook, in part because they were experienced and capable, 
and partly so as not to cause division.157 Many of her colleagues ‘expected her to fail’; 
Gilmour and others did not think Thatcher or her policies would be around for long.158 
Perhaps these low expectations explain the Conservative Cabinet’s willingness to allow her 
to drive immigration policy (nearly) singlehandedly. 
 
Factions 
Although the changes to immigration policy during this parliament may not have been 
momentous, disputes between different factions of the Conservative Party were so serious 
that, at times, it was feared that the Conservative government’s proposals would not pass. 
One incident deeply worried ministers, according to the Cabinet minutes of 28 October 
1982.159 The Home Secretary argued that the changes to immigration rules had to be put in 
place following the British Nationality Act 1981. However, there were complications; 
regardless of the outcome, one of two groups of supporters on either side of the issue would 
be seriously disappointed: 
The recently published White Paper containing the Government’s proposals had been 
fiercely attacked by a group of their own supporters […] It was, however, clear that 
any proposals which would satisfy this group would meet with equally strong 
opposition from a similar number of other Government supporters, and would be 
impossible to carry in the House of Lords (my italics).160 
 
This was not just one isolated incident and there was much more at stake than the potential 
failure to pass one piece of legislation. The loss of the vote might have meant that a ‘long 
and damaging dispute would almost certainly break out within the Conservative Party, and it 
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would become difficult to secure Parliamentary authority for any new Immigration Rules’.161 
When the government was defeated in the Commons during a division against the new 
Immigration Rules on 15 December 1982, and despite the ‘strenuous efforts’ of the Home 
Secretary (or so he himself said), the Chief Whip and other ministers, immigration policy 
was put to one side.162 In a Cabinet meeting the next day, it was noted that many  Government 
supporters had voted with the opposition. Ministers pressed for urgent consultation with the 
Conservative MPs who disagreed with the government in order to reach a solution that could 
be stomached by them as well as the supporters of the government.  
 
Electoral motivations 
The new immigration rules and the British Nationality Act of 1981 may, at first sight, be seen 
as significant developments to immigration policy that would play well with the electorate. 
They were designed by a Conservative government keen to implement greater restrictions on 
immigrants during a time in which public concern about the level of immigration and the 
impact of migrants on established communities was running high. Tightening up controls on 
entry, redefining citizenship more exclusively and ensuring certain British nationals would 
not have automatic right of residence in the UK were likely to be popular proposals. In a 
speech at the Conservative Party conference of 1979, the immigration minister referred to 
the UK as a ‘small, crowded island which cannot absorb unlimited numbers’.163 Senior 
figures within the Party might well have considered the immigration issue to be a possible 
vote-winner, particularly if one considers a context in which the early 1980s Conservative 
Party had no certainty of winning the next election.164 
Yet, in fact, these combined changes to policy were neither as substantial as they were 
portrayed, nor were they devised especially as a means to score votes on the back of the 
immigration issue. While senior figures within the Party might well have considered the 
immigration issue to be a possible vote-winner (and the Conservatives had been far behind 
Labour in the opinion polls in 1980 and 1981), there is little evidence that policy development 
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was pursued with this in mind.165 Although the Conservative Party had commissioned one of 
its MPs to write a green paper on changes to nationality laws while in opposition in 1977 (see 
‘Who Do We Think We Are?’), the legislation was not the brainchild of the Conservative 
Party.166 Rather, the British Nationality Act was the culmination of many years’ work; 
previous governments had planned to revise and rationalise the nationality laws. One senior 
civil servant later recalled that the legislation was about ‘meeting a need’.167 While the 
government’s new immigration rules were hyped as firm and fair, they, and the British 
Nationality Act of 1981, were ‘really only footnotes to a work that had, to all intents and 
purposes, already been completed’.168  
In fact, far from intending to make immigration policies that would win support from 
xenophobic voters, the Conservatives of this time were more concerned with ethnic minority 
perceptions of the Party. Ministers noted that the parliamentary candidates of 1979 who had 
campaigned on an explicitly anti-immigration platform had been ‘generally rejected’ by the 
electorate.169 Desk officers from within the Conservative Research Department (CRD) pored 
over a report, titled ‘Votes and Policies: Ethnic minorities and the General Election 1979’, 
which argued that: 
[I]t seems likely that with an even distribution of the ‘ethnic vote’ between the two 
major parties, the Conservative Party would have won the General Election in 1979 
with an even bigger majority than they did.170 
 
While ethnic minority voters had little obvious impact on immigration policy (any 
moderation is hard to show), there were attempts to show the Party as less hostile on the 
topic. Given the study’s conclusion that ethnic minority communities were ‘likely to have an 
increasing influence in British politics in the future as participants rather than as subjects for 
debate and controversy’, CRD desk officers made efforts to identify which parts of 
Conservative policy were so off-putting to black and Asian communities.171 High-profile 
figures (including Margaret Thatcher herself), who had been encouraged to give speeches to 
ethnic (mainly Anglo-Asian) community groups, sought to draw attention to the similarities 
between ‘Asian’ values and Conservative values.172  
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1983 to 1987 
Leadership 
The leadership was less involved with immigration during this period and the Home 
Secretary and the immigration minister were able to deal with immigration matters with little 
interference from Thatcher. This was despite the fact that, as had been noted from early on 
during briefings with Foreign Office officials, Thatcher had ‘a particular interest’ in the topic 
of immigration, even if, as her colleagues later recalled she saw the need to manage 
immigration as ‘just something that had to be taken on the chin’ and even ‘a rather nasty 
job’.173 Thatcher’s personal views on migration were widely regarded as indispensable to the 
Party’s line on immigration under her leadership. A colleague recalled that ‘Margaret didn’t 
like the whole immigration debate; she had to take part in it and she did […] But on the 
whole, she wanted the issue to go away. And so she went some way towards, as it were, 
accepting the Enoch analysis […] We would stiffen the rules but they would, basically, 
remain.’174 
She – in contrast to many of her Cabinet colleagues (although not her Home Secretaries or 
immigration ministers) – was keen on restricting further the rights of immigrants to come to 
the UK. As Hansen puts it, she, like many people, had something of a cognitive dissonance 
on the issue: ‘Thatcher had only good to say about actual immigrants, and nothing good to 
say about immigration’.175 And she was certainly not above using the UK’s fear of outsiders 
for electoral gain. Yet, beyond Thatcher, and within the broader Conservative Party, there 
continued to be discomfort about making too much of the immigration issue. Former 
immigration minister, David Waddington, found that ‘those above me didn’t really want to 
soil their hands with this business’, in part because the role required making ‘firm decisions 
which caused an immense amount of controversy […] secretaries of state and prime ministers 
didn’t want anything to do with it’.176  
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Electoral motivations 
During the parliament of 1983 to 1987, the prospect of electoral unpopularity provoked hard-
line legislation and the reversal of policy pusued less than 12 months earlier. The year 1985 
was a very difficult year for the Tories, who lost control of shire counties in the local 
elections, suffered a poor result at a by-election in May and lost their lead in national opinion 
polls. As Blake points out, while polls, by-elections and local elections cannot be considered 
to be reliable indications of how voters may choose to cast their ballots in a general election, 
‘any party in power is bound to feel uneasy when all three seem to be going in the wrong 
direction’.177 
The Conservative Party’s poll ratings had been threatened by the deteriorating situation in 
Sri Lanka and the subsequent potential rush of non-white immigrants to the UK. In something 
of a U-turn, the Tory government decided that it would now return Tamils who had entered 
the UK to Sri Lanka. In September 1986, it was announced that citizens from five countries 
that had been historically linked with the Commonwealth (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Ghana and Nigeria) would, in future, have to acquire visas before entering the UK. The visa 
requirement was a result of departmental wrangling between the Home Office and the 
Foreign Office.  
This effort to discourage individuals from these countries from entering the UK was clearly 
a hardening of the Party’s line on immigration, and one that would play well with the 
electorate, which was generally hostile to ‘coloured’ immigration. The new measures were 
much more than an administrative shuffling of responsibilities, or, in the words of the then 
immigration minister, David Waddington, about ‘taking the strain off the immigration system 
in this country and placing it on the shoulders of our posts abroad.’178 
 
1987 to 1992 
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Leadership 
During this period, the Conservatives’ immigration policy was dominated by its leader, 
Margaret Thatcher, whose pointed remarks about immigration were credited with bringing 
voters over to the Conservative Party. Towards the end of the 1980s, with immigration 
running at some 40,000 to 50,000 a year, she told the Commons ‘I think that is as many as 
we can possibly cope with.’179 During the same debate in which Thatcher made these 
remarks, Roy Hattersley, Labour’s spokesperson for home affairs condemned government 
policy: it was based not on defensible principles of fairness, he said, but on keeping out non-
white immigrants. Hattersley argued that such measures would have been disowned by 
ministers who believed in racial equality, but now, with Thatcher as Prime Minister, things 
were different: ‘The big difference is not in the attitude of the Home Secretary, but in the 
attitude of the Prime Minister, who colours and dominates and determines all these 
matters.’180 
Thatcher’s domineering style of governing has been well documented. During this period, 
she would, apparently, begin meetings with the words: ‘Well I don’t know why we are 
meeting. It is quite clear this matter must be settled and in fact I thought it was. So shall we 
just check some of the details?’181 Her colleagues knew, then, ‘exactly what her views 
were’.182 On immigration, as with other domestic issues, Thatcher did not encounter much 
opposition from her colleagues. There are next to no accounts of any disagreements on 
immigration between the leader and her Cabinet colleagues during this period.  
By the end of the period, policy was becoming more muted under John Major’s leadership, 
who favoured a more moderate approach. On being appointed Chancellor just a year earlier 
in October 1989, the press reported that he ‘opposes capital punishment and has a soft spot 
for immigrants (though not in waves or huddled in Hong Kong)’.183 While Major ‘might not 
have been a Thatcherite zealot […] he was located towards (if not actually on) the right of 
the Party’.184 During his campaign for the leadership, he claimed that he was no ‘son of 
Thatcher’, yet many of his supporters backed him on the grounds that he might well turn out 
to be.185 He was, at that point in time, formally preferred by the right-wing half of the 
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parliamentary party.186 But Major, while enjoying the endorsement of Thatcher, was to some 
extent, expected to show a break with his predecessor. He certainly found the topic of 
immigration more distasteful than she did; his colleagues believes that his ‘decency’ would 
not allow exploitation of such an issue.187 
 
Factions 
Thatcher’s emphasis on immigration was matched by the emergence of a faction which was 
taking on a growing prominence: influential Conservatives with tough views on immigration. 
The hard-line faction were securing ministerial positions too. In June 1987, Tim Renton 
became the minister for immigration; he would oversee some of the ‘most far-reaching 
changes to immigration law’.188 He downplayed the implications of the new Immigration Bill 
before Parliament; it was, he said, a ‘modest measure’ which would merely ‘repair 
loopholes’.189 Renton replaced David Waddington, who took on the powerful role of Chief 
Whip, and who had become known for his ‘hardline attitude to immigration casework’.190 
Those Conservatives who were viewed by the leadership as too ‘soft’ on the issue of 
immigration were moved elsewhere. Two years later, when Thatcher dismissed Douglas 
Hurd from his position as Home Secretary, the media speculated that the ‘assumption’ that 
Hurd was ‘a tolerant and civilised fellow who represents the beleaguered cause of decency 
in a government not best known for such qualities’ was enough to get rid of him.191 Hurd (the 
‘small “l” liberal’) was shuffled off to the Foreign Office to be replaced by David 
Waddington (‘a tough and combative parliamentary operator’).192  
Thatcher is said to have greeted her appointment of Waddington with the words: ‘At last a 
right-winger at the Home Office’.193 Waddington’s time at the Home Office as a junior 
minister from 1983 to 1987 (for immigration, no less) had proved him to be ‘tough in 
implementing the Government’s immigration policy’ but not necessarily heartless; he 
maintained he did not approach his job feeling as though ‘the more people he kicked out the 
better’.194 Previously he had stood up to – and suffered jeers from – right-wing Conservative 
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rebels at Party conference who had demanded the repatriation of Commonwealth 
immigrants.195 Immigrant support groups, however, alleged that he was ‘much too close to 
the hard-line enforcers in the Immigration Service and took their side against the more liberal 
civil servants in the Home Office’.196 Some critics were even stronger: ‘In his previous period 
at the [Home Office], his decisions as minister responsible for immigration were miserable, 
repressive, illiberal and, in the case of Tamil refugees, almost certainly unlawful in terms of 
breaching the UN Convention on Human Rights’.197 
 
Electoral motivations 
From 1987, electoral considerations were less of an issue for a Party which was on course to 
win its third consecutive election. True, the Tories may have seemed ‘confused and divided’, 
but the divisions were not related so much to the substance of policy as to how to present that 
policy.198 While senior Conservative figures at the time discussed making more of the 
immigration issue in the run-up to the 1987 election, one leading politician argued that there 
was little need to do so: ‘there was quite a head of steam behind it [immigration], we didn’t 
want to encourage that […] because we believed we would win the election [without it]’ (my 
italics).199 
Despite the leadership’s attempts to depict Thatcher’s Cabinet as ‘in tune’ with the electorate 
on immigration, the gap between the decision-makers of the Conservative Party and the 
voting public was exposed during discussions over the Hong Kong issue in the late 1980s. 
The legal situation regarding the handover to China revealed a tension between ministers 
keen to fulfil their legal responsibilities towards people who were entitled to British passports 
(and those fleeing to Hong Kong from Vietnam) and a British public which was adamant that 
the Hong Kong British should not be allowed into the UK, let alone have the right of abode. 
One poll found that 65 per cent of the public rejected the right of three million Hong Kong 
British people to come to the UK. Backbenchers went so far as to ask the leadership whether 
the Party’s commitment to end large-scale immigration still existed. 
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1992 to 1997 
Leadership 
John Major’s leadership had something to do with the less visible presence of migration 
policy during this period. Aside from Major’s distaste for the subject of immigration controls, 
he had other concerns; as with his predecessor, he could not risk the immigration issue further 
dividing the Party. The Conservatives, were, in the run-up to the 1997 election, ‘riven by 
disunity’ and in a ‘state of disarray’.200 According to Charles Wardle, an immigration 
minister under his leadership, Major would not allow the immigration issue to take centre 
stage; he ‘had a personal hand in saying we don’t push immigration’.201 Despite Major’s 
reluctance, the Conservatives’ immigration policy became more restrictionist and more 
punitive during this period. 
 
Factions 
During the 1990s, factions were of more importance than previously, or perhaps, since. The 
immigration minister Charles Wardle recalled how the ‘right wing of the Conservative Party 
[were] demanding much harsher measures but actually not looking at the ground below the 
platform on which they are standing’.202 Meanwhile, the ‘libertarian wing’ of the Party would 
not allow for the introduction of identity cards, which were, according to ministers and civil 
servants, essential to discourage illegal immigration.203 Disputes between factions prevented 
at least one minister from making changes to immigration policy. Wardle’s predecessor, 
Peter Lloyd, who in his own words, was ‘slightly different from some of [his] colleagues’ in 
part because some thought him ‘too liberal’, found the primary purpose rule to be 
‘unpleasantly intrusive’.204 However, his concerns were not shared by many within the 
Conservative Party and he found that there was no possibility of his getting rid of the rule, 
nor (despite his position as immigration minister) was it in his power to push for it: it was 
‘the sort of thing that a cabinet committee decides’.205 
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Factions within the Conservative Party were intensified by the leadership contest of spring 
1995. John Major had forced the contest, following damaging and distracting ‘plots’ to 
depose him. His success ‘deepened the wounds between party factions’.206 Major, had, after 
all, won his leadership in 1990 on the backs of the right-wing faction of the party, and yet, 
five years later, he was re-elected by the Conservatives’ centrists and leftists. His victory 
‘reinforced the feeling on the right that he had betrayed their original expectations’.207 
 
Electoral motivations 
In the final stretch of this period – and despite Major’s dislike for the issue – the Conservative 
Party’s migration policy did undergo significant developments, particularly with respect to 
the asylum system and asylum seekers’ entitlements. However, these developments were not 
particularly visible, nor was much publicity given to them; the Party did not make an effort 
to extract votes on this issue. Some ministers thought there were more important issues; 
others thought that such a tactic would be self-defeating. One argued that such a move ‘didn’t 
gain you votes, it just made sure that the minorities were frightened of you’.208 Others, 
including a former Home Secretary, did not think there were votes in the issue – ‘most of the 
public were quite relaxed about it [immigration]’ – and so ‘immigration was just something 
we kept quietly ticking over’.209  
There were one-off incidents, however, of Conservatives politicians attempting to score 
points on this issue by positioning themselves as the defenders of Britain’s borders against 
an opposition that was wilfully obtuse and downright disloyal. To criticism from Labour MPs 
regarding the 1993 Asylum Act (particularly over the introduction of fingerprinting), Ken 
Clarke accused Labour of retreating to a ‘Mickey Mouse make-believe world in which 
everybody who applies for asylum in the UK is a traumatised victim who arrives trembling 
on our shores’.210 Tony Marlowe MP summed up: ‘we [the Conservative Party] are 
concerned with the wishes and desires of the people of this country, whereas the Opposition 
are concerned about foreigners’.211  
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6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the development of the Conservative Party’s immigration policy 
from 1979 to 1997. During this period, the Conservative Party experimented with the use of 
immigration policy as an electoral tool. Making use of the issue could swing the votes of 
those opposed to, or uncomfortable with, immigration and immigrants. But as ministers 
noted, it could discourage the more liberally-minded and further consolidate the Party’s 
relative unpopularity with ethnic minority voters. Policy-making during this period was 
mainly concerned with tying up loose ends, with much of the groundwork put in place by 
previous administrations. Levels of immigration to the UK during this time remained 
relatively steady, with little change to the flow of economic and family migration. However, 
towards the end of the period, the number of asylum applications shot up – a sign, according 
to some ministers that immigration policy was ‘working’, and that those who could no longer 
enter the UK legally were trying their luck with the asylum system. Despite the fact that 
levels of immigration were insubstantial (annual net migration during the 1980s was negative 
for half of the decade), the issue did not go undiscussed. The Conservative leadership 
maintained that being seen to be doing something about immigration was only right and 
proper: it would reassure the worried, and it would deter the frustrated from opting for far-
right options. 
This chapter has examined the proposition that the Conservative Party’s immigration policy 
is more restrictionist in opposition than in government, and found this to be the case. The 
governing status of the Party does impact on policy-making. While there were significant 
developments in immigration policy during this 18 year period, what was implemented was 
much far less far-reaching than what had been proposed in the run-up to the 1979 election. 
The Tories were unable to execute many of their immigration-related policies because of the 
restrictions imposed on a party in government. The register of dependants is an obvious 
casualty; it was both impractical, unenforceable and would have upset relations with the 
home countries of potential migrants. The Conservative government’s interest in the 
decisions of other countries was such that policy was modified in advance of expected 
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criticism from overseas governments. A further significant obstacle was existing legislation 
at a national and international level: legal matters served to delay and influence policy, with 
measures pre-emptively weakened so as to reduce the possibility of lengthy challenges.212 
The economic imperative also served to loosen planned immigration control measures. The 
Tories were less dogmatic than they had been in opposition; they were prepared to yield to 
the need for a flexible labour market at the expense of immigration policy objectives. The 
Conservatives were also forced to contend with parliamentarians who were considerably 
obstructive with regard to government policy on immigration.  
The Party’s response to these constraints was to adjust its way of formulating policy. During 
this period, the Tories won four successive general elections, and, following their 
accumulating experience in government, they grew used to what was and what was not 
realistic. Policy was developed so as to side-line certain expected obstacles. Deliberate 
procedural delays, for example, were introduced as means of reducing the level of 
immigration. Overall, the measures were more pragmatic; there were fewer grand 
undertakings and more technically-detailed initiatives that could be pursued without 
legislation. 
This chapter has also examined the usefulness of the three influencing factors with regard to 
party policy-making: the ‘fear of electoral defeat’, or, electoral calculations relating to recent 
or impending elections; the leader of the party’s take on the immigration issue as well as their 
managerial style; and lastly, the factions that, to some extent, run the party.  
The leadership was critical in setting the tone of migration policy – and ensuring it did not 
divide the Party. When the Tories were led by Thatcher, she had a profound influence on the 
framing, and sometimes the content, of immigration policy. There are some indications, 
however, that Thatcher was stymied by her colleagues in her attempts to go further on 
immigration controls. When, however, the disputes between different wings of the Party 
became more apparent in 1982, and it was feared that legislation would not pass, Thatcher 
took the decision to put immigration policy to one side. The priority, as she saw it, was the 
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unity of the Party. Under Major, the Party presented a more muted approach, even though 
policy was not significantly different, but merely responding to different events. 
While factions could, and did, block the leader (Whitelaw did not allow immigration to be 
used in the 1983 campaign), they were less influential than the leadership, with the exception 
of a few sporadic incidents. The different wings of the Party, and the interactions between 
them, were perhaps more of a substantial influence on immigration policy in the middle and 
final parts of the era, during which a more ideological, right-wing faction gained prominence 
over the one-nation wing of the Tory Party. In the 1990s, the right-wing of the Party 
demanded tougher measures, but the libertarian wing would not allow it, deeming identity 
cards to be illiberal. Disputes between factions prevented at least one minister from making 
changes to immigration policy. 
Electoral concerns were not much of a driver for immigration policy change – except and 
until immigration became a potential issue. Even though the Conservatives experienced 
fluctuating levels of support during their four terms in office, there is little evidence that fear 
of electoral defeat was a significant or consistent motivating factor behind changes to policy, 
other than a general need to show an operational and tough approach, which does not 
necessarily translate into stronger measures. There were occasional concerns about the 
Party’s immigration policy repelling ethnic minority voters, who were deemed to be of 
growing importance. While there were attempts to show the Party as less hostile on the topic, 
this was mostly rhetoric. When the opinion polls showed lower levels of support for the 
Tories, or at least, Conservative ministers believed that this was imminent, the immigration 
issue was revived. It was vital for the Conservative government to show that it shared the 
same concerns as the electorate, which they believed to be opposed to ‘coloured’ 
immigration. So, when in 1985 the deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka and the potential rush 
of non-white immigrants to the UK threatened polls ratings, the Tories quickly drafted hard-
line legislation and reversed policy that was less than a year old. 
 
 
204 
 
Notes 
1 Waddington, D. Memoirs: Dispatches from Margaret Thatcher’s Last Home Secretary. (London: Biteback, 
2012). 121. 
2 Interview with Brian Cubbon, 18 March 2015. 
3 Messina, A. Race and Party Competition in Britain. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 139. 
4 Conservative Party, The. The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1979. 1979. [online] 
http://bit.ly/1JvPOre Accessed 4 June 2014. 
5 Travis, A. ‘Margaret Thatcher reluctant to give boat people refuge in Britain’. The Guardian [online] 30 Dec. 
2009. Accessed 20 August 2012. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Winder, R. Bloody Foreigners. (London: Abacus, 2011). 402. 
8 The National Archives of the UK (TNA): FCO50/664, ‘Visit to Bangladesh by Mr Timothy Raison MP’, 24-
27 October 1979. 1979b. 
9 TNA: FCO50/664, ‘Record of Mr Raison’s visit to the Indian sub-continent’, from W R Fittall, Private 
Secretary, dated 15 November 1979. 1979d. 
10 TNA: FCO50/664, ‘Record of Mr Raison’s visit to the Indian sub-continent’, from W R Fittall, Private 
Secretary, dated 15 November 1979. 1979d. and also TNA: FCO50/664, ‘Meeting with Mr Raison in 
the conference room on Sunday 21 Oct 1979’. 1979a. 
11 TNA: FCO50/664, ‘Mr Shepherd from D W Partridge’, 30 October 1979. 1979e. 
12 Ibid. 
13Thatcher MSS: Letter from Tony Marlow MP to PM, 16 June 1980. 1980a. 
14 Thatcher MSS: Ian Gow MP’s record of meeting between PM and backbenchers on immigration, 8 July 1980. 
1980b. 
15 Conservative Party Archive (CPA): CRD 15/01/1981. Minutes from Executive Committee meeting of the 
National Union, 15 Jan 1981. 
16 Hansen, R. Citizenship and immigration in postwar Britain. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 222. 
17 Ibid. 231. 
18 Spencer, I. British immigration policy since 1939. (London: Routledge, 1997). 147-148. 
19 Ibid, 148. 
                                                 
205 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
20 Ibid. 148. and Hansen, 2000, op. cit. 213. 
21 Spencer, 1997, op. cit. 148. 
22 Ibid, p.148. 
23 Major, J. The Autobiography. (London: HarperCollins, 1999). 300, 80. 
24 While reiterating the Party’s line that ‘effective’ immigration control was necessary for good community 
relations, the manifesto praised its achievements in the previous parliament: ‘Since 1979, immigration 
for settlement has dropped sharply to the lowest level since control of immigration from the 
Commonwealth began more than twenty years ago.’ There was reference too made to the British 
Nationality Act of 1981, which had ‘created a secure system of rights and a sound basis for control in 
the future’. See Conservative Party, The. The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1983. 
1983. [online] http://bit.ly/1RsRUqJ Accessed 4 June 2014. 
25 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
26 See British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983, c.6. Available at http://bit.ly/1U9j7jG Accessed 25 May 
2016.  
27 Interview with Brian Cubbon, 18 March 2015. 
28 Paul, K. Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era. (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1997). 186. 
29 Hong Kong Act 1985, c.15. Available at http://bit.ly/1WmAfJm Accessed 12 October 2013. 
30 Cook, S. ‘Tamils fleeing terror may be sent back/ Refugees fleeing violence in Sri Lanka’. The Guardian 
[online] 18 May 1985 Accessed 20 October 2012. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Rose, D. ‘Britain attacked for hard line on Tamils/ Sri Lankan refugees’. The Guardian [online] 29 May 1985 
Accessed 20 October 2012. 
33 Ibid. 
34 HC Deb 3 June 1985, vol 80 cols 52-9, ‘Sri Lankan Tamils’.  
35 Keel, P. ‘Britain insists on entry visas from Tamils/Sri Lanka’s refugee problem.’ The Guardian [online] 30 
May 1985 Accessed 20 October 2012. 
36 Milne, S and Travis, A. ‘Tamil “blunder” inquiry ordered after deportation’. The Guardian [online] 7 June 
1985 Accessed 20 October 2012. 
37 Helm, S. ‘Visa move for Bangladeshis’. The Sunday Times [online] 27 October 1965 Accessed 12 May 2013. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Interview with David Waddington, 21 May 2014. 
206 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
40 Apparently, MPs submitted to ministers a ‘large amount of correspondence’ which took an ‘inordinate 
amount of time’ for staff to deal with. Interview with David Waddington, 21 May 2014. 
41 TNA: FCO50/664, ‘Visit of Timothy Raison, Home Office Minister to the Indian Subcontinent, October 
1979’, 30 Oct 1979. 1979c. 
42 David Waddington, cited in Travis, A. ‘MPs “abuse system to let in immigrants”’. The Guardian [online] 25 
Oct 1985. Accessed 20 October 2012. 
43 HC Deb 26 March 1986, vol 94 cols 952-1042, ‘Immigration (Members’ Representations)’. 
44 Rose, D. ‘Labour MPs to defy Hurd’. The Guardian [online] 14 March 1986 Accessed 12 March 2013. 
45 ‘Parliament: Too much scribbling in reply to MPs/ Immigration’. The Times [online] 21 March 1986. 
Accessed 20 October 2012. 
46 Oakley, R. ‘Hurd to curb action of MPs on immigrants’. The Times [online] 16 October 1986 and Oakley, R. 
‘Labour fight bar on MPs’ role over immigration’. The Times [online] 17 October 1986 Both accessed 
22 October 2012. 
47 Major, 1999, op. cit. 96. 
48 Conservative Party, The. The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1987. [online] 
http://bit.ly/1ZyooGM Accessed 4 June 2014. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Evans, R. ‘Hurd acts on “bogus” refugees’. The Times [online] 21 February 1987 Accessed 12 March 2014. 
51 ‘Parliament: Airlines will face 1,000 pound fines over fake refugees’. The Times [online] 4 March 1987 
Accessed 12 March 2014. 
52 ‘Parliament: Tamils not only reason for bringing in penalties bill, Hurd tells Commons – Refugees’. The 
Times [online] 17 March 1987 Accessed 22 October 2012. 
53 Spencer, 1997, op. cit. 148. 
54 Ashford, N. ‘11,000 pinning their hopes on British honour’. The Times [online] 31 March 1986 Accessed 22 
October 2012. 
55 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
56 Bevins, A. ‘Tory MP warns of backlash on Hong Kong’. The Independent [online] 16 December 1989 
Accessed 12 May 2013. 
57 Ashford, N. ‘11,000 pinning their hopes on British honour’. The Times [online] 31 March 1986 Accessed 22 
October 2012. 
58 White, M. ‘Britain will not give sanctuary’. The Guardian [online] 7 June 1989 Accessed 22 October 2012.  
59 ‘Right of abode “not the answer”. The Times [online] 7 June 1989 Accessed 22 October 2012.  
207 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
60 White, M. ‘Britain will not give sanctuary’. The Guardian [online] 7 June 1989 Accessed 22 October 2012. 
and ‘Right of abode “not the answer”’. The Times [online] 7 June 1989 Accessed 22 October 2012. 
61 Webster, P and McEwen, A. ‘Thatcher will think again on Hong Kong’. The Times [online] 9 June 1989 
Accessed 12 May 2013. 
62 Jones, M. ‘Britain’s shame: Gambling with Hong Kong’s six million lives’. The Sunday Times [online] 9 
July 1989 Accessed 14 May 2013. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Cited in Jones, M. ‘Britain’s shame: Gambling with Hong Kong’s six million lives’. The Sunday Times 
[online] 9 July 1989 Accessed 14 May 2013. 
66 Major, 1999, op. cit. 119. and Winder, 2011, op. cit. 426. 
67 Pick, H. ‘UK to extend right of abode to more Hong Kong people’. The Guardian [online] 25 October 1989 
Accessed 12 May 2013. 
68 Carvel, J. ‘Tory rebellion heightens Hong Kong exodus fears’. The Guardian [online] 16 December 1989 
Accessed 12 May 2013. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Bevins, A. ‘Tory MP warns of backlash on Hong Kong’. The Independent [online] 16 December 1989 
Accessed 12 May 2013.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Oakley, R. ‘Passports scheme is a delicate balancing act’. The Times [online] 21 Dec. 1989. Accessed 4 
August 2015. 
74 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
75 Winder, 2011, op. cit. 426. 
76 Oakley, R. ‘Passports scheme is a delicate balancing act’. The Times [online] 21 Dec. 1989. Accessed 4 
August 2015. 
77 Ibid and see also White, M. ‘Tebbit stirs row “in bid to be leader”’. The Guardian [online] 22 Dec. 1989. 
Accessed 4 August 2015.  
78 Brown, C. ‘Hong Kong “folly” is attacked by Tebbit. The Independent [online] 22 Dec. 1989. Accessed 4 
August 2015. 
79 Pienaar, J. ‘Tories split right and left over Hong Kong’. The Independent [online] 6 Jan. 1990. Accessed 12 
March 2014. 
208 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
80 Ibid. 
81 Ford, R and Smith, I and Evans, P. ‘Hurd defends raid on church to seize illegal immigrants’. The Times 
[online] 19 Jan 1989 Accessed 12 May 2013. 
82 Hattersley, R. ‘Failed test of a nation’s wisdom’.  The Guardian [online] 21 Jan. 1989. Accessed 12 March 
2014. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Pimlott, B. ‘Britain leads in politics of closed door’. The Sunday Times [online] 22 Jan 1989 Accessed 13 
March 2014. 
85 Baker, K. The Turbulent Years. (London: Faber and Faber, 1993). 444. 
86 Interview with Kenneth Baker, 22 December 2014. and Baker, 1993, op. cit. 444. 
87 Interview with Kenneth Baker, 22 December 2014. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. and Baker, 1993, op. cit. 445. 
91 Baker, 1993, op. cit. 445. 
92 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
93 See Utting, D. ‘Don’t make race issue, Tories told’. The Independent [online] 28 March 1992 Accessed 5 
September 2013. and also Bunting, M. ‘Parties sum up in final plea to the voters: Tories’. The Times 
[online]. 9 April 1992. Accessed 5 September 2013. And also Oakley, R. ‘Baker claims PR has aided 
fascists’. The Times [online]. 7 April 1992 Accessed 5 September 2013. and also Bale, T. The 
Conservative Party From Thatcher to Cameron. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). 40. 
Cohen, N. ‘Expulsion move put Baker in contempt’. 30 November 1991 Accessed 5 September 2013. 
94 Conservative Party, The. The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1992. 1992. [online] 
http://bit.ly/1mn3ege Accessed 4 June 2014. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
97 Winder, 2011, op. cit. 410. 
98 Ibid. 421. 
99 McSmith, A. Kenneth Clarke: A Political Biography. (London: Verso, 1994). 206. 
100 Interviews with Kenneth Baker, 22 December 2014 and Ken Clarke, 20 January 2015. 
209 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
101 Interview with Ann Widdecombe, 20 February 2015. 
102 Hansen, 2000, op. cit. 234. 
103 McSmith, 1994, op. cit. 206-7. 
104 See Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c.49. Available at http://bit.ly/28qe9JZ Accessed 12 October 2013.  
105 Ibid. 
106 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Thatcher MSS: Memorandum by the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary to Cabinet, 5 Nov 1980.  
111 TNA: FCO 50/665, ‘Immigration Rules: Draft White Paper’, 10 Sept. 1979, from an unnamed ‘Cabinet 
colleague’ to the Prime Minister. 
112 TNA: FCO 50/669, ‘Revised Immigration Rules’, undated, likely December 1979, from A Shepherd to Mr 
Murray. 
113 Thatcher MSS: ‘Whitelaw note circulated to Cabinet – C(79) 45 ‘White Paper on the Immigration Rules’, 
16 October 1979. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Interview with Brian Cubbon, 18 March 2015. 
117 TNA: FCO 50/665, Draft letter to John Chilcot, Private Secretary to Home Secretary from Foreign Office 
officials, undated, likely July 1979. 
118 TNA: FCO 50/665, To Archie Shepherd, MVD, FCO from Arthur Brown of British High Commission, New 
Delhi on ‘Changes in the Immigration Rules’, 18 Sept 1979. 
119 TNA: FCO 50/664, From M J Addison to Mr Halliday on ‘Harassment of Visitors and treatment of 
descendants’ queues, 29 Oct 1979. 
120 TNA: FCO 50/664, From C A K Cullimore to H J S Pearce on ‘Visit to the UK of Mr Barua’, 17 Oct 1979. 
121 Thatcher MSS: Minute from Carrington to Whitelaw on ‘UKPH in India’ 26 March 1981. 
122 TNA: CAB 128/71/12, ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 24 Sept 1981. 
123 Thatcher MSS: Press Office lobby briefing, 12 July 1979. 
210 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
124 TNA: FCO50/659, ‘Immigration Changes: Views of the High Commissioner in Delhi’, letter from G G H 
Wealden to A J Butler regarding ‘Nationality Bill’, 23 July 1979. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Dean, M. ‘Breaching of article 13’. The Guardian [online] 29 May 1985 Accessed 20 October 2013. 
127 Ibid. 
128 CPA: CRD 25/6/82, Memo on the ‘Government’s flexible response to criticism: changes to the White Paper’, 
25 June 1982. 
129 CPA: CRD 3/9/38, (undated), Draft reply for Alan Howarth (personal assistant to Chairman of CP/Director 
Research at CRD) to a ‘Mr Holden’ of Wigan, undated, likely 1979 or 1980.  
130 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
131 Rose, D. ‘Queues used to stem immigration; Home Office document reveals deliberate procedural delays’. 
The Guardian [online] 21 March 1985. Accessed 12 October 2013. 
132 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
133 Phillips, M. ‘Why the Tamils are the last straw’. The Guardian [online]. 4 September 1987 Accessed 12 
August 2014.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
136 Edward, P. ‘Three more Tamils win deportation reprieve’. The Guardian [online] 4 Sept. 1987. Accessed 4 
August 2015. 
137 ‘Parliament: Hurd changing MPs’ rights on migrant cases’. The Times [online] 17 November 1987 Accessed 
12 March 2013. 
138 McEwen, A and Oakley, R. ‘Thatcher rebukes US over refugees’. The Times [online] 25 Oct 1989 Accessed 
12 March 2013.  
139 Major, 1999, op. cit. 300. 
140 Ramsden, J. An Appetite for Power. (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 474, 476. 
141 Major, 1999, op. cit. 311. 
142 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
143 Cohen, N. ‘Expulsion move put Baker in contempt’. The Independent [online] 30 November 1991 Accessed 
5 September 2013. 
211 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
144 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
145 Clark, A. The Tories: Conservatives and the Nation State, 1922-1997. (London: Phoenix, 1999). 506. 
146 Blake, R. The Conservative Party from Peel to Major. (London: Faber and Faber, 2011). 402. 
147 Major, 1999, op. cit. 689. 
148 Blake, 2011, op. cit. 402. 
149 Clark, 1999, op. cit. 506. 
150 Blake, 2011, op. cit. 402. 
151 Thatcher MSS: ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 28 Oct 1982. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Hansen, 2000, op. cit. 211, 210. 
154 Conservative Party, The. The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1983. 1983. [online] 
http://bit.ly/1RsRUqJ Accessed 4 June 2014.  
155 Ibid. 210. 
156 Blake, 2011, op. cit. 338. 
157 Ibid. 338. and Ramsden, 1998, op. cit. 436. 
158 Charmley, J. A History of Conservative Politics since 1830. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 210, 
215. 
159 Thatcher MSS: ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 28 Oct 1982. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Thatcher MSS: ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 28 Oct 1982. 
163 CPA: NUA 2/1/83, Speech by Timothy Raison at Conservative Party Conference, 9-12 Oct 1979. 
164 In 1982, Peter Walker gave his thoughts to Margaret Thatcher on 16 February 1982, at a time when, he 
perceived, the Party ‘face[d] grimmer prospects’ than it had since World War Two. See Thatcher MSS: 
‘Walker minute to MT (“Memorandum on a Conservative Strategy for the Next Two Years’, 16 Feb 
1982. 
165 Ramsden, 1998, op. cit. 445. 
212 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
166 See CPA: PUB 178/31, ‘Who Do We Think We Are?: an inquiry into British Nationality Law’ by a 
Conservative Study Group under the Chairmanship of Edward Gardner MP, March 1980.  
167 Interview with Brian Cubbon, 18 March 2015. 
168 Spencer, 1997, op. cit. 147. 
169 CPA: CRD 4/9/38, A report by the Commission for Racial Equality by Muhammad Anwar, ‘Ethnic 
minorities and the General Election 1979’, Feb 1980. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 See CPA: CRD 25/6/82, Thatcher’s speech to the Anglo-Asian Society, 14 July 1978. As she put it, ‘These 
[Asian values] are all things Conservatives believe in.’ 
173  Interview with David Waddington, 21 May 2014. 
174 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
175 Hansen, 2000, op. cit. 201. 
176 Interview with David Waddington, 21 May 2014. 
177 Blake, 2011, op. cit. 366. 
178 Interview with David Waddington, 21 May 2014. 
179 Goodwin, S. ‘Parliament and Politics: Thatcher accused of inflaming rail row’. The Independent [online] 5 
July 1989 Accessed 12 March 2014. 
180 HC Deb 5 July 1989, vol 156 cols 368, ‘Immigration and DNA testing’. 
181 Baker, 1993, op. cit. 255. 
182 Ibid. 255. 
183 McCrystal, C. ‘John Major: The globes come off as two safe pairs of hands vie to unite the Tory party against 
Michael Heseltine’. The Sunday Times [online] 29 Oct 1989 Accessed 18 July 2013. 
184  Bale, 2010, op. cit. 32. 
185 Charmley, 2008, op. cit. 241. 
186 Ramsden, 1998, op. cit. 470. 
187 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
213 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
188 Rose, D. ‘The Day in Politics: Renton moves from FO to oversee immigration’. The Guardian [online] 17 
June 1987 Accessed 12 October 2013. 
189 Renton, D. ‘Firm but fair controls – the immigration Bill, the case for the change.’ The Guardian [online] 13 
Nov 1987 Accessed 12 October 2013. 
190 Rose, D. ‘The Day in Politics: Renton moves from FO to oversee immigration’. The Guardian [online] 17 
June 1987 Accessed 12 October 2013. 
191 Phillips, M. ‘Commentary: Alien tradition alive and well under Mr Hurd’. The Guardian [online] 19 May 
1989 Accessed 12 October 2013. 
192 Travis, A. ‘The Lawson Resignation: Waddington will stamp his personality on Home Office’. The Guardian 
[online] 27 October 1989. Accessed 12 March 2013. 
193 Baker, 1993, op. cit. 309. 
194 Interview with David Waddington, 21 May 2014. 
195 See Travis, A. ‘The Lawson Resignation: Waddington will stamp his personality on Home Office’. The 
Guardian [online] 27 October 1989. Accessed 12 March 2013. 
196 Carvel, J. ‘The Monday Profile: When the hanger is given some rope – Britain’s new Home Secretary has 
the reputation of being a hard man: he’s hard on murderers, on immigration, and protesting students. 
We’ve heard him bark. What will he do with an office that can bite?’ The Guardian [online] 30 Oct 1989 
Accessed 12 March 2012. 
197 ‘Home and away’. The Guardian [online] 3 November 1989 Accessed 12 March 2012. 
198 Blake, 2011, op. cit. 372. 
199 Interview with Douglas Hurd, 29 October 2014. 
200 Ramsden, 1998, op. cit. 490.  
201 Interview with Charles Wardle, 24 March 2015 and interview with Ken Clarke, 20 January 2015. 
202 Interview with Charles Wardle, 24 March 2015. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ramsden, 1998, op. cit. 475. 
207 Ibid. 475. 
208 Interview with Peter Lloyd, 20 June 2014. 
214 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
209 Interview with Ken Clarke, 20 January 2015. 
210 HC Deb 11 January 1993, vol 216, cols 677-95, ‘Fingerprinting’. 
211 HC Deb 11 January 1993, vol 216, cols 637-45, ‘Protection of claimants from deportation, etc’.  
212 In his 1998 text, Jopkke questions whether the acceptance by Western states of ‘unwanted’ immigration 
points towards a decline of sovereignty. That they do accept such immigration is, he believes, in 
contradiction to a fundamental component of the modern state: that is, the autonomy to admit or expel 
people. Joppke suggests that relatively open immigration policy is down to ‘self-limited sovereignty’. 
This, he argues, is partly down to legal constraints and moral obligations.  267, 292. See Joppke, C. 
‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration.’ World Politics. 1998. 50(1). 266-293. 
  
- 7 - 
1997 to 2015 
 
[F]rom time to time, odd, silly policies have been made.1 
– Ken Clarke 
 
This chapter will examine the development of the Conservative Party’s immigration policy 
from 1997 to 2015 – over five general elections, countless by-elections and under four 
different leaders – including one long period (over three electoral terms) in opposition and 
one period in government (albeit in coalition). This section considers the both the influences 
and the restraints on policy over a period of 18 years, during which there was considerable 
expansion of the European Union (from 15 to 28 member states) and growing public concern 
about the impact and implications of immigration. Coupled with that were the frequent bouts 
of international instability, which created new refugees in Syria, specifically, and the Middle 
East, more generally. By 2015, the Conservative Party had developed an immigration policy 
that was more restrictive and more comprehensive than anything before. 
Over the last two decades, immigration policy-making has been hyperactive – and never far 
from the minds of Tory politicians. Extensive development of policy reflects the huge 
expansion in the level of migration to the UK – particularly in the mid-2000s, when net 
migration climbed to a then unprecedented 267,000 a year in 2005 – and a global tendency 
towards more intensive migration management as well as a steep increase in concerns among 
the general public.2 The Conservatives considered, and, in some cases, implemented, a broad 
range of initiatives including, but not limited to: taking in a fixed number of asylum seekers; 
setting up off-shore detention centres; establishing a dedicated ‘removals agency’; 
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introducing a ‘border police force’ with powers of arrest; new rights for gay and lesbian 
asylum seekers; accelerated settlement for entrepreneurs and investors; an annual cap on the 
entry of economic migrants; a financial ‘bounty’ scheme; and the removal of benefits from 
certain EU migrants. The Conservatives’ intensive level of immigration policy-making was 
much more than a response to changing circumstances. Their predecessors were reluctant to 
use immigration for electoral gain, deeming it to be unseemly and potentially dangerous for 
community relations. The Tories of the last 20 years or so have a different view. More than 
ever before, immigration policy was driven by the Conservative Party’s need to win support 
at the ballot box, by securing the backing of former voters, including those who had 
transferred their support to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).3 
The Tories’ changes have made immigration policy more complex than ever before. It has 
become almost common wisdom nowadays – and not just in the UK – to divide immigrants 
into those considered beneficial to the country (generally the highly-skilled and highly-
educated) and those who are not (typically the low-skilled and low-paid) – ‘the brightest and 
the best’, as distinct from ‘the rest’. With many more dividing lines, it is worth considering 
changes to immigration policy by type, or sector.  
From 1997 to 2015, the Conservatives found that economic migrants posed something of a 
problem for them: businesses argued for fewer controls on their ability to bring in workers, 
yet given that economic migrants made up the bulk of the net migration figures (which 
include EU migrants), it was sensible to reduce the level – or impose swingeing cuts 
elsewhere. Furthermore, the UK government could not interfere with the free movement of 
EU workers, who made up around half of the total number of immigrants entering the country 
each year. Economic migrants bore the brunt of stricter regulations; their rights to settlement 
and citizenship were restricted. On the other hand, some economic migrants were encouraged 
to enter the UK with special promotional campaigns and offered new incentive schemes, 
including an online 24-hour visa scheme for favoured visitors. 
International students proved to be a soft target for the Conservatives; it was much easier to 
reduce the numbers in this category.4 They were regarded as bogus economic migrants and 
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potential security risks; to secure visas, they needed to have higher educational qualifications 
than previously and endure more intensive bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, graduates 
of UK universities no longer had the Tier 1 (Post-study work) route open to them; instead 
they needed a skilled job offer from a sponsoring employer to remain in the country. The 
number of student visas issued declined from 314,305 in 2009 to 218,773 in 2013 – a drop 
of 36 per cent.5 It is difficult to conclude that the restrictions on international students were 
intended to reduce abuse of the system, when students had little effect on long-term net 
migration, and yet their impact on the UK economy was a significant net gain. 
The asylum issue has been regularly picked up and then discarded by the Tories. Under 
William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith, there was a series of column-worthy initiatives which 
were intended to discourage unfounded asylum claims. Few of these lasted more than a year 
or two. Under David Cameron’s leadership, policy for asylum seekers remained largely 
unchanged, and although there was a new emphasis on locating and deporting failed asylum 
seekers and expediting the legal process, the backlog of cases remained. Labour-introduced 
targets for processing asylum applications within a set period of time were replaced by a 
series of ‘performance indicators’ which monitor outcomes. 
Family reunification achieved greater prominence in the Conservatives’ policy, which 
underwent significant change in that direction. Greater financial requirements were 
introduced for those who wished to bring a non-EU relative to the UK, a move which 
decreased the number of British citizens and residents who could act as sponsors; more 
rigorous English language tests and checks on marriages were also introduced. Appeal rights 
for those refused family visas to visit relatives in the UK were curtailed. Even those who did 
meet the requirements could only bring their partner into the UK after a ‘probationary period’ 
of several years. In 2012, changes to family migration policy were, according to government 
documents, primarily about ‘stop[ping] family criminals hiding behind human rights law to 
dodge deportation’ and ‘ensur[ing] only migrants who can pay their way are allowed’ to enter 
the UK.6 
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7.1 The development of Conservative immigration policy 
1997 to 2001 
The 1997 general election was the Conservatives’ worst electoral result in history. The Party 
lost more seats (178) than it managed to hold onto (165). Immigration had played next to no 
role in the Conservative electoral campaign. According to a former immigration minister 
from this period, this was no oversight: ‘We had made a clear decision that we did not want 
to use immigration as a main argument […] It is an area where obviously you can gain votes, 
but I think the view was that we should not do that. This was a John Major government and 
John Major himself felt that would be inappropriate.’7 Similarly, the 1997 manifesto 
contained minimal reference to immigration. Underneath the heading ‘Britain – A Tolerant 
Country’, there was a reiteration of the long-standing Conservative line that immigration 
controls are vital for decent community relations. There was, too, a firm commitment to 
ensure that certain ‘people’ could not, in an attempt to get past ‘normal immigration controls’, 
make use of provisions in place for ‘genuine’ asylum seekers.8  
There was to be little departure from these manifesto commitments during this parliament, 
despite a change in leadership following John Major’s resignation. William Hague became 
leader of the Party on 19 June 1997, just six weeks after the disastrous general election. His 
leadership campaign had not concentrated so much on policy as on the (in his view) much 
needed modernisation of the Party’s structures. He condemned the ‘constantly shifting fudge’ 
of recent years.9 Hague was chosen in part because he had the least number of enemies in 
comparison with his competitors. There was limited enthusiasm for him; the Party’s 
‘institutional rules ensured that inoffensiveness and novelty triumphed, producing a winner 
whose support was broad but not deep’.10 In what could be seen as something of a delayed 
post-mortem, Hague commissioned polling firm ICM to report on the standing of the Party 
a year after the 1997 defeat. The results revealed that the Tories were just as unpopular with 
the electorate at the time of the election. Around 63 per cent of respondents perceived the 
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Conservatives to be to their right, ideologically. Only around 20 per cent believed they stood 
on the same ground as the Conservative Party.  
The results were shocking to Party insiders, but perhaps more so was the response of the 
leadership. Instead of making efforts to move the Party towards the centre ground – where 
the bulk of voters is believed to lie – the Conservatives took steps to bring what they believed 
to be the ‘quiet majority’ further to the right. Hague switched to ‘more abrasive and demotic 
Toryism’: a populist kind of politics in which right-wing rhetoric was matched by right-wing 
policies.11 The target voters were those who had ‘apparently [been] abandoned and betrayed 
by a government presiding over stealth taxes, rising crime, and immigration, obsessed with 
minority rights and in thrall to the European Union’.12 Hague wooed them with comforting 
language: he described the imagined voters as decent people with sensible concerns. They 
were ‘Middle England’ and the ‘Mainstream Majority’. While immigration was not explicitly 
mentioned, the Conservatives seized on the topic of Europe, which acted as something of a 
proxy for dealing with concerns about immigration. In one speech, Hague used the term 
‘foreign land’ to refer to a dystopian UK of the future. While Hague insisted that this was a 
reference to the overreach of the EU on UK issues, journalists were briefed that this comment 
was about the impact of immigration.13 
Unfortunately for the Conservatives, their careful efforts were not picked up by the press or 
the public. Labour’s extremely comfortable win of 1997 – and generally high public 
satisfaction ratings in the early years of its return to government – meant that there was little 
room for the Conservatives to speak out and regain support. The problem, according to then 
Party Chairman, was that ‘the electorate were comfortable and simply didn’t want to listen’.14 
In response, the Tory leadership desperately fumbled for some issue to bring the electorate 
back on side. The Party Chairman explained that he and his colleagues were ‘trying to find 
anything that was going to shift what was a very rigid political situation […] there was an 
inertia […] so anything that was going to make them sit up a bit’.15 
The Conservatives’ search for an issue that would bring voters back onside led to a 
reappraisal of asylum policy. Focus groups that had been commissioned by the Party had 
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repeatedly raised asylum policy as a concern. Tories with close ties to the leadership believed 
that there were strong grounds to recommend that the Party should become associated with 
(solving) the asylum issue. A revised – and bold – asylum policy seemed to tick all the right 
boxes, according to the Shadow Home Secretary, Ann Widdecombe.16 First, the asylum 
system was ‘completely out of control’ and ‘we all knew [it]’.17 Second, the Tories ‘need[ed] 
to have a policy’ that would deal with the management of asylum seekers. 18 Third, there was 
an understanding within the Party that ‘such a policy would be popular with the public’.19 
The Shadow Cabinet concurred; the Conservative Party put a renewed emphasis on asylum 
seekers and the process for claiming asylum. Asylum was one of the Party’s five ‘common 
sense’ issues on which it chose to campaign in the run-up to the 2001 general election. Under 
the heading ‘A safe haven, not a soft touch, on asylum’, the Tory manifesto referred to the 
‘virtual collapse of the asylum system’.20 There was talk of ‘chaos’, of ‘crisis’ and of the 
‘blighting [of] many lives’.21 Beyond the rhetoric, there were fresh policy proposals too. New 
asylum applicants would be detained in secure centres while their applications were being 
processed. The application process itself would be expedited, and a brand new Removals 
Agency would have powers to remove those whose claims had been rejected. 22 The proposals 
were billed as ‘restor[ing] common sense to Britain’s asylum procedures’. 
The decision to give the asylum issue a new prominence was a risky move for the 
Conservative Party. In the dying days of this parliament, the Tories were some 20 percentage 
points behind Labour. They had tried to seize on a topic that was causing worry for some 
members of the electorate. As one senior member of the Shadow Cabinet put it, ‘[w]hat you 
are giving priority to at any given moment is driven hugely by public concern, and the nearer 
you get to an election, the more that is so.’23 Some of her colleagues were less than convinced 
that the focus on asylum was a measured and sincere response to voters’ fears. Ken Clarke 
viewed the move as a desperate, last-ditch attempt to make the Party look as if it were in 
touch with the electorate. He recalled that ‘[w]hen it became obvious we weren’t going to 
win the election [2001], they kind of panicked, and decided that we’d better start “blowing 
the dog-whistles” and getting the core vote back’.24 
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2001 to 2005 
It was not until the 2001 general election defeat – the second in a row for the Conservatives 
– that the Party realised that something was seriously wrong. The Conservatives had gained 
just a one percentage point increase in the vote share and one extra parliamentary seat on 
their previous result. No longer could the Tories dismiss the 1997 result as a fluke. Nor could 
they wait for voters to return to the fold. In a bid to secure their core vote, the Party had 
campaigned on familiar and traditional right-wing territory – asylum and immigration were 
joined by Europe and taxation – and they had failed. The day after the election, William 
Hague resigned as leader of the Party. The swift departure of Hague prevented the Party from 
carrying out an inquiry into why it had done so poorly – was it policy or presentation or 
something else? The subsequent leadership contest proved to be a distraction; it obscured 
what should, perhaps, have been the main issue – that is, the need for some critical thinking 
regarding the Party’s very recent electoral failure. Instead, Conservative parliamentarians and 
their supporters put all their  time and effort into the leadership contest. Although competing 
wings of the Party used the election defeat to justify their own positions and shore up support 
for their preferred leadership candidate, there was little serious consideration of why it had 
gone so badly wrong for the Conservatives.25 
The election of Iain Duncan Smith in September 2001 signalled a break with the past. Early 
in his leadership, Duncan Smith took the opportunity to put the Party’s policies under review. 
No policy was untouchable, not even the 2001 manifesto pledges, such as the commitment 
that all new asylum seekers would be locked up in secure detention centres until their claims 
had been processed, which, just a few months earlier, the Party had been keenly promoting. 
The ‘pause’ on policy not only allowed the Conservatives time to reflect on, and revise their 
policies; it was also intended to give the public some time to get used to the idea of a less 
extreme Tory Party. And finally, suspending current policy would, according to advisors, 
solve a separate problem: ‘if we came up with a good idea […] [it would be] contaminated 
or stolen’ by the government.26 
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While the Conservatives’ policies were put to one side for reworking, Iain Duncan Smith 
turned his attention to the Party’s image. He made efforts to depict a Conservative Party that 
was moderate, modern and tolerant. Gestures were made to undo the Party’s reputation for 
being prejudiced and bitter. Just a few weeks after he had been appointed leader, Duncan 
Smith distanced himself from the right-wing Monday Club by ordering it to suspend its 
(decades-long) links with the Conservative Party, until it had proved itself to be a less 
xenophobic organisation.27 Tory Chairman David Davis (a politician not usually associated 
with the moderate wing of the Party) said that the action was taken because ‘one of the things 
that is unacceptable to us is an association with racism or perceived racism’.28 
Iain Duncan Smith did not last long enough to see the results of the policy review process; 
just two years later, the Party had grown tired of his style of leadership and he was replaced 
by Michael Howard, who was seen as a firm right-winger within the Conservative Party. As 
with his predecessors, Hague and Duncan Smith, Howard initially trod a much softer line on 
the issue of immigration. However, the leadership deemed it unwise to hold back for too 
long. Howard’s situation was less than ideal: with just 18 months as party leader before the 
general election of 2005, he had little leeway and his ability to set the agenda was limited. 29 
Senior advisors thought it sensible to stick to the old favourites, so the immigration issue was 
revived. Howard had no issue with this – he believed that it was the right thing to do, given 
that immigration was a serious public concern that was, in his view, being ignored, or 
mismanaged, by the government. It was encouraging to him, too, that there seemed to be 
votes in the issue. 
The initiatives proposed by the Tories under Michael Howard’s leadership were 
unconventional. Many of the proposals, if implemented, would have been contrary to existing 
international law. The Conservatives proposed a fixed quota for the number of asylum 
seekers that the UK would take in, which received the response from one pressure group that 
‘[q]uotas are for cod fishing, not humanitarian protection’.30 Given that such a proposal 
would have been both illegal and impractical, it is difficult to see this as anything other than 
rhetoric. Later, the Tories called for the UK to stop considering asylum applications made 
within the country, and instead to take in only asylum seekers from UN refugee camps. Those 
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making applications for asylum in the UK would be detained in ‘centres’ close to their 
country of origin where their claims would be processed.  
Towards the end of this parliament, few within the Party were anything but confident in the 
decision to give emphasis to the asylum issue. Senior Tories maintained that it was a topic in 
need of timely intervention as well being an issue of concern to voters. Opinion polls 
commissioned by the Party seemed to show that a strong stance on asylum policy was popular 
with the electorate. The Tories had even been encouraged to pursue their restrictionist agenda 
by widespread focus group awareness of, and support for, the ‘“Australian system” of 
immigration decisions’.31 It was no surprise then that the Conservatives chose to make 
immigration and asylum one of their top five priorities in the 2005 electoral campaign. Tory 
billboards across the country proclaimed – in mock-handwritten text – that ‘It’s not racist to 
impose limits on immigration’. This phrase had either been plucked verbatim from a focus 
group session with voters or inspired by the comments of a future Conservative MP. 32  
 
2005 to 2010 
At the 2005 general election, the Conservatives were defeated for the third successive time . 
The Party gained some 33 seats, but the vote share (at 32.4 per cent) had hardly improved on 
the previous election. In the majority of the seats gained, the Tories’ percentage actually 
decreased.33 Although senior Tory figures have since claimed that the media took the issue 
and took off with it – the 2005 general election campaign saw a renewed emphasis on 
controlling immigration.34 Tory figures gave speeches that promoted a sense of urgency, with 
leader Michael Howard telling reporters that ‘Britain has reached a turning point. The pace 
of change is too great.’35 The Conservatives’ campaign did make headlines, but senior figures 
within the Party subsequently voiced regret at the tone: ‘we didn’t need to lose so heavily’; 
it was ‘a disastrous campaign’, ‘a complete error’.36 The day after the election result, Michael 
Howard announced his intention to resign. 
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Following a more extended leadership campaign than was typical for the Party, the 
Conservatives’ then Shadow Education Secretary, David Cameron, was elected leader in 
December 2005. Cameron – and his followers, dubbed in the media as ‘Cameroons’ – 
believed that they would need to take a fundamentally different approach to issues that the 
Conservatives had traditionally ‘owned’. The Party could no longer exploit these issues in 
the way they had previously done, even just a few months earlier – at least, not if the Party 
wanted to win votes. There would need to be significant changes made to the policies on 
immigration and asylum, as well as law and order, and Europe – or at least, changes in the 
way policies were presented. 
The Conservatives would put a ‘pause’ on discussing immigration and asylum, among other 
issues. Only then, when ‘we stopped going on about immigration’, would the public regain 
trust in the Party.37 Cameron’s objective was to reverse the damage that had been done to the 
Party’s image; he and his advisors believed that keeping quiet on immigration would make 
it possible to direct the focus to policy areas (such as the environment) with which the 
leadership could signal a fresh and modern approach. According to the then shadow 
immigration minister Damian Green, ‘we basically started from zero […] we said […] we’re 
just going to develop a new policy and so, by definition, all previous policy was, then, sort 
of, suspended’.38 Key initiatives, such as the proposed fixed limit for asylum seekers, were 
thrown out with next to no discussion. Attempts by indignant Conservative backbenchers and 
some elements within the media to steer the conversation back to the old favourites were 
rebuffed. Immigration was not a topic considered by the policy groups that Cameron set up, 
ostensibly to advise him and bring fresh ideas to the table, but in reality to buy time and give 
the public a chance to regain trust and respect in the Party. 
When Cameron deemed it right for the Tories to bring immigration back in to the Party’s 
repertoire, he did not rush. The leadership took on a subtle, more sophisticated strategy than 
previously. Cameron’s cautious intervention took place during a Newsnight interview on 
BBC Television. By making a distinction—accurate or otherwise—between, on the one 
hand, cultural or ethnic prejudice and, on the other, concern over apparently practical matters 
like health, housing and education, he made it difficult, if not impossible, for critics to accuse 
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him of playing the race card.39 In a later speech, he called for ‘a grown-up conversation’ 
about reducing immigration. 2008 saw the launch of a Conservative billboard poster which 
showed a picture of a young heterosexual family in silhouette (so no race implications could 
be drawn) alongside the tagline ‘REDUCE THE PRESSURE. PROPER CONTROLS ON 
IMMIGRATION SO OUR PUBLIC SERVICES CAN COPE. You can get it if you really 
want’.40 Cameron’s risky move paid off: each faction within the Party, as represented at 
parliamentary and local level, took from the interventions what they wanted to hear. 
Immigration policy had been ‘skilfully factored back into the carefully-balanced offer’.41 
When Cameron and his shadow ministers were not attributing concerns about immigration 
to pressure on public services rather than small-minded xenophobia, they were criticising the 
government for its incompetence and lack of credibility on the issue, instead of its policy per 
se. The Tories claimed that government policy was damaging and dangerous, and their claims 
were supported by media reports of illegal immigrants given employment in sensitive, high-
security areas.42 Furthermore, the government was condemned as ‘in denial’ as to the weak 
points within the system and their impact on communities. It worked well for the 
Conservatives that they were able to expose major operational shortcomings in the relevant 
departments. The Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, was dismissed from his post in the 2006 
government reshuffle after it emerged that foreign prisoners had been released without being 
considered for deportation.43 
There were occasions when this new and more strategic approach faltered in the face of what 
might be termed desperation, and initiatives were promised that were extremely popular with 
the public – but impossible to implement. Sometimes, the policy measures had been 
considered in little or no detail before they were announced. Cameron’s pledge in January 
2010, just four months before the general election, to bring down net migration from the 
‘hundreds of thousands’ (actually, then running at around a quarter of a million) to the ‘tens 
of thousands’ (fewer than 100,000) had undergone no serious analysis. It was a throwaway 
comment during an interview, in which, sources have said, his advisors reacted with horror 
behind the cameras when Cameron made it.44 As one senior Conservative figure put it, ‘this 
extraordinary promise […] that was a mistake’; the pledge had ‘failed to appreciate […] that 
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we’re now in a much more globalised economy’.45 One senior figure from the Migration 
Advisory Committee (MAC) regarded it as an attempt to ‘assuage the concerns of the great 
British public that […] we the government are going to […] do something about it’ (my 
italics).46 
Nonetheless, this and similar policies that resolved to tighten up immigration policy played 
well with the public. Broadsheets predicted that Cameron’s Party would win a number of 
marginal seats if he pledged to cap immigration.47 Two months before the 2010 general 
election, Ipsos MORI found that the Conservative lead over Labour on immigration and 
asylum was 11 percentage points, slightly higher than the party’s ten-point lead on crime, 
and considerably higher than its three-point lead on the economy.48 The Party’s return to the 
issue of immigration seemed to be working well. 
 
2010 to 2015 
In an unusual turn of events, the general election of 2010 left no party with an overall 
majority. The Conservatives took the greatest number of seats (306) with 36 per cent of the 
vote, Labour 257 seats with 29 per cent of the vote, and the Liberal Democrats were left with 
57 seats on 23 per cent of the vote. After five days of negotiation, a coalition government 
was formed – the first time in British history that a coalition had been formed directly from 
an election outcome. Immigration had played an important (though not the most important) 
part in the Tories’ election campaign, with a full page of the manifesto dedicated to setting 
out new proposals on the issue. Cameron’s personal pledge to reduce levels of net migration 
to the tens of thousands was a key component. In the words of a senior civil servant at the 
Home Office ‘everything was geared towards the net migration target’.49 In order to meet 
this objective, a number of new initiatives would be implemented.50 There would be a 
presumption in favour of those migrants who would ‘bring the most value to the British 
economy’ along with an annual limit on the number of economic migrants from non-EU 
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countries. The student visa system, seen as the greatest weakness in UK border controls, 
would be reformed.  
There were few policy areas in which the UK’s coalition partners had more disparate views 
than immigration: it would turn out to be ‘one of the most divisive issues within the 
coalition’.51 The differences were apparent during the (often fractious) televised leaders’ 
debates during the 2010 election campaign. Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg had called 
for ‘an immigration system which works’, while Cameron had condemned Liberal Democrat 
policy on the grounds that it would worsen the situation because the regularisation of illegal 
immigrants would lead to more, not less immigration. (Curiously, a few years later, Cameron 
was said to have suggested ‘a route to normalise things for people who have been in the 
country for so many years that they are not going to leave’ – to the laughter of the Liberal 
Democrat Cabinet ministers).52 Further, the Liberal Democrat proposal to bring in a regional 
work permit system for immigrants was mocked: it ‘sounds like they’re going to put up 
border controls along the M5’. Clegg had referred to the cap on immigration, a central 
Conservative policy, as unworkable.53 
Despite the profound differences between the two governing parties, the coalition agreement 
that eventually emerged was dominated by Tory policies. Not one of the Conservative 
proposals on immigration from the Party’s manifesto was omitted.54 There was little 
ambiguity in the coalition agreement of 2010: there would be an emphasis on tightening up 
immigration policy across the board.55 It was said that managed flows would ensure better 
community cohesion and lessen the strain on public services. The policies detailed an annual 
limit on the number of non-EU economic migrants admitted to the UK though not, notably, 
a commitment to reduce net migration to below 100,000 – a victory for the Liberal 
Democrats.56 A Border Police Force would be established, and an ‘e-borders’ system would 
be introduced, along with the reintroduction of exit checks (the Tories had removed them in 
1994). Notably, there would be a new emphasis on ‘abuse’ within the immigration system 
and measures would be put in place to expedite the processing of asylum claims. In light of 
the much higher than expected inflows of migrants from A8 countries from 2004 onwards, 
citizens from any new EU member states would be subject to transitional controls. The only 
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explicit evidence of Liberal Democrat influence was a line which promised an end to the 
detention of immigrant minors.57  
With enough significant obstacles to seriously delay the implementation of immigration 
policy, the Conservatives made efforts to depict themselves as tough and uncompromising. 
At various times, they considered trying to unpick EU laws on freedom of movement; an 
emergency ‘brake’ on the entry of low-skilled EU workers; a bounty scheme to discourage 
overstaying; and a cap on the number of international students. Most notably, the coalition 
government devoted an extraordinary amount of attention to the issue of illegal immigration. 
The Immigration Act of 2014 is a punitive piece of legislation, and explicit in its 
determination to make the UK a more ‘hostile’ place for illegal immigrants. The Act allowed 
for foreign, convicted criminals to be deported first and allowed to appeal later, once they 
are outside the UK. It also made it much more difficult, if not impossible, for irregular 
migrants to open a bank account, apply for a driving licence or rent private accommodation. 
The Conservatives’ efforts to discourage illegal immigrants from remaining in the UK may 
seem disproportionate given that this category make up a tiny proportion of the immigrant 
population. Legislation, not to mention enforcement, targeted at illegal immigrants requires 
a great deal of resources. Yet it was sensible for the Tories to expand their efforts on making 
life more difficult for irregular immigrants: the strategy was intended to reinforce a certain 
image of the Party as firm and competent: tough and punitive on those who do not ‘play by 
the rules’. Further, illegal immigrants were the target of much negative, even hostile, public 
opinion. Indeed, at least one Tory figure regarded the great volume of initiatives to deal with 
illegal immigration as a means of ‘shutting people up’.58 One senior Liberal Democrat agreed 
that the Tories’ policies would make little difference to the overall figures but that they were 
‘willing to take that on the chin […] they felt the threat from the right articulated by the 
popular press was sufficiently serious’.59 
The Tory-led coalition government did more than look hard-line and competent: it brought 
in a number of important changes to immigration policy in a relatively short timeframe. The 
then Business Secretary, Vince Cable said that the Home Secretary ‘kept coming back to this 
229 
 
issue every year with some new proposals for closing some new loophole that they’d found 
or making it more difficult generally’.60 The junior Home Office Minister Norman Baker 
recalled that ‘[t]hey [the Conservatives] wouldn’t leave it [immigration policy] alone, they 
had to pick away at it every week’.61 Many, if not all, of these measures were geared towards 
reducing levels of immigration to the UK, yet, while they were significant developments, 
they were not as effective as the Conservatives would have liked. By the end of this 
parliament, net migration was not significantly lower than it was at the start of the coalition’s 
term in 2010. In fact, in the 12 months to March 2015, net migration hit a record high of 
330,000.62  
Efforts to reduce immigration can, on this basis at least, be regarded as something of a failure, 
and an understandable one, given that the coalition government had little control over 
migration from within the rest of the EU which made up nearly half of total immigration. It 
is unclear, however, to what extent the government was punished for its failure to meet its 
target; voters, after all, attach more meaning to their lived experiences and perceptions than 
statistics.63 However, in the run-up to the 2015 election, the Tories retained the pledge to 
reduce net migration to the tens of thousands. According to a prominent backbencher, it was 
‘difficult to see without a very significant change in policy what could result in that target 
being achieved’.64 There would need to be a significant change to EU treaty negotiations.65 
In the aftermath of the UK’s referendum vote to leave the EU, it could be assumed that 
Cameron’s negotiations had been unsuccessful. 
 
7.2 Explaining Conservative immigration policy 
The dynamics of government versus opposition 
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My first proposition suggests that the different dynamics of government and opposition 
impact on the Conservative Party’s immigration policy. I find that ‘the politics of power’ 
versus the ‘politics of support’ dynamic is a useful way of explaining policy change (or lack 
of it) between 1997 to 2015.66 During this period, it is notable that there was a delay in the 
Conservatives’ coming to terms with the dynamics of being in opposition, particularly during 
the first parliament, when the Party operated as if it were still in government. In the 
penultimate parliament, from 2005 to 2010, the Conservatives’ policy-making seemed to 
switch between the two roles. The Party’s inability to adapt accordingly to its changed 
circumstances did seem to impact on its immigration policy, which was at times, fairly 
moderate if unremarkable and, on occasion, impractical but headline-grabbing. 
 
1997 to 2001 
During the first parliament of this period, the Conservatives did not depart from their ‘politics 
of power’ role – despite the fact that they were no longer in government. In no sense was the 
Conservative Party an effective opposition. On resigning the leadership, John Major said 
‘When the curtain falls it’s time to get off the stage and that is what I propose to do.’67 His 
colleagues, however, did not seem to have understood the severity of the situation. After 
nearly two decades in power, any election defeat (and especially one on such a scale as this) 
would have been something of a shock for the Conservatives. It took time for the Party to 
realise that different dynamics were in operation. Predictably, there was some degree of 
complacency among Conservative politicians. One MP later recalled that ‘[w]e didn't really 
believe that we needed to change very much […] If you look back there’s no indication really 
that the Party leadership accepted that the public had rather tired of quite significant parts of 
our overall outlook’.68 
The belief that voters would return to the Conservatives if the Party held tight greatly 
influenced the Party’s strategy, and, in turn, its immigration policy-making. Many within the 
parliamentary party accepted a narrative in which the 1997 general election defeat was an 
231 
 
exceptional event, and that normal service would be resumed soon, with the ‘natural party of 
government’ back in office. If, as many believed, the electorate had been only temporarily 
lured away from the Conservative Party and voters were still keen on the Tories and their 
policies, there would be no sense in changing them. As such, immigration policy in 
opposition continued much as it had when the Party was in government (generally pragmatic 
and events-driven, with language that was moderate and yet vague enough to mean anything 
to anyone.)  
It was only towards the end of this parliament that senior Tories began to come to terms with 
their new role as an opposition party – and the opportunities that were now available to them. 
Opposition freed the Conservatives from practical considerations. Their proposals would not 
need to be meticulously checked because they would probably not be implemented. Policies 
became less of a blueprint for action, and more of an opportunity for the Tories to work on 
their pet projects and, if possible, gain publicity for the Party. In the early 2000s, the 
Conservatives proposed that immigration officers should ‘meet the planes’. This would, 
supposedly, have prevented immigrants from destroying their paperwork and falsifying 
claims as to their origin so as to better increase their chances of receiving refugee status. The 
then Shadow Home Secretary later acknowledged that the policy was uncosted and 
unworkable: ‘It’s very expensive. And I didn’t realise that, until right up at the election itself, 
in 2001 [The cost was] huge, much bigger than I expected’.69 By promoting policies and 
initiatives that were popular with core voters, if not necessarily viable, the Conservatives 
were moving into the ‘politics of support’ role that opposition traditionally produces. 
 
2001 to 2005 
The loss of the 2001 election marked something of a turning point for the Conservatives. The 
1997 defeat could no longer be considered a fluke, and the need to operate as an effective 
and functional opposition party was more apparent than ever. The Party had become an 
inward-looking organisation, which was receiving little in the way of column inches or public 
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interest. It was at this point that the bulk of the Conservative parliamentary party realised that 
they could no longer behave like an embittered government which had found itself out of 
office. To combat this attitude, the leadership resolved to take on the ‘politics of support’ 
role typically associated with parties in opposition. Senior Tories worked on a two-pronged 
strategy.  
First, the Party brought in striking and populist policies that were headline-winning, if 
somewhat vague and unlikely or even impossible to implement. Ann Widdecombe, who was 
Shadow Home Secretary from 1999 to 2001, argued that the need to obtain media coverage 
was essential for the Party in opposition: the media were ‘always going to be a bigger factor 
[than in government] because you are wanting to say things which chime with public opinion, 
because you’re trying to change the government’.70 Hence, it was posited that a Conservative 
government would revoke the Geneva Convention and introduce a fixed quota for the number 
of asylum seekers that the UK would accept. All means of entry into the country (ports and 
airports) would be under 24-hour surveillance. Perhaps even more prominent than the swathe 
of asylum-related policies was the pledge to bring in a points-based system for economic 
migrants – with annual limits. There was little explanation of the criteria that would allow an 
applicant to obtain a visa, or an estimate of the likely threshold for the number of points 
required. 
Second, the Party made a deliberate effort to spend much of its time criticising the 
government – in a more nuanced and sophisticated way. The criticism was focused not so 
much on the policies of the government, as previously, but on the government’s 
incompetence. In 2004, leader Michael Howard argued that ‘You cannot have a credible 
immigration policy if anyone can circumvent it by entering our country illegally, uttering the 
words “I claim asylum” and be allowed to stay here even if they have no genuine claim’.71 
He remarked that the government had ‘failed to address [the problem], then it ignored it, now 
it is claiming to face up to it’.72 The intention was that the Party would, in holding the 
government to account in pointing out serious and systematic failures, be seen to be doing its 
democratic duty and upholding its role as the official opposition, while simultaneously 
offering solutions that were apparently simple and striking. 
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Whatever it was, it seemed to work – at least for a while; the strategy troubled the 
government, especially when, as in certain cases, focusing attention on the inadequacies of 
the government did more than win media attention for the Conservatives. Shadow Home 
Secretary David Davis ‘was able to claim the scalps of both junior and senior ministers’ after 
pointing out issues within the system. 73 In 2004, when it was found that proper checks in the 
visa system had been put aside, immigration minister Beverley Hughes was forced to resign. 
In the same year, Home Secretary David Blunkett left his post following claims that he had 
intervened to expedite the visa application of his former lover’s nanny. Unfortunately, media 
coverage did not translate into votes.74 One Conservative MP found it paradoxical that ‘the 
public can trust you on a particular issue, but banging on about it may not help you 
electorally’.75 Trust was not enough to transform the Conservatives into a credible and 
competent potential government. As one senior Conservative figure recalled, ‘we were bound 
to be defeated, we had not motivated ourselves to look electable.’76 
 
2005 to 2010 
Following the defeat at the 2005 general election, the Tories continued in opposition, and yet 
now they seemed to carry out a U-turn by moving towards the ‘politics of power’ role usually 
associated with governments. The Party deliberately made efforts to look statesmanlike; 
promises were made to deal with difficult issues in a quiet and sensible manner; its 
immigration policy would be grounded in reality and informed by evidence. Interventions on 
immigration policy were infrequent and subdued. One example is the Conservative Party 
report, Controlling Economic Migration, published in November 2006. Jointly-written by 
Shadow Home Secretary David Davis (‘who nobody would accuse of being soft’) and his 
junior colleague, Damian Green, the report attempted to move the focus away from asylum 
– an issue on which the Party now realised its tone had been particularly off-putting.77 The 
report is a moderate piece of work, which calls for the (re-)establishment of a consensus on 
immigration – one that would have been familiar to British politicians in, for example, the 
1960s, based as it was on the idea that decent community relations are best maintained by 
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strict control of immigration designed to benefit the economy without placing too much strain 
on public services.78 Even so, the media maintained that the report had been released quietly 
in order to receive minimum attention. 
By contrast, the second half of the parliament found the Conservatives in a position more 
typically associated with a party in opposition. During this period, the Tories returned – and 
not reluctantly – to the ‘politics of support’. The objective was to remodel the Party as an 
effective and energetic opposition: it would be (justifiably) critical of government and it 
would promote tempting policies. The Conservatives worked to develop populist and 
restrictive new measures, such as a quota for economic immigrants and the introduction of a 
border police force with the power to arrest and detain suspects. There was less emphasis on 
softer initiatives, such as David Cameron’s personal promise that gay people who had been 
persecuted on account of their sexuality should be given asylum in the UK.  
There are two possible explanations as to why Cameron’s Conservatives decided to 
(tentatively) re-introduce the issue of immigration towards the latter half of this period. First, 
it is conceivable that the leadership believed that the break from traditional Conservative 
policy areas (not only immigration, but Europe and crime too), combined with a new 
emphasis on ‘softer’ issues had worked to rehabilitate the Party’s public image. Voters had 
begun to regard the Tories as a respectable – and competent – political party, rather than a 
bitter, obsessive and retrograde organisation. With the public ready to listen to the Party 
again, it was time to return to the ‘old favourites’ – of which immigration policy was one – 
and be both responsive and responsible. 
The other explanation for the return to the immigration issue rests on the context, specifically 
the possibility of an election being called. As 2007 wore on, it seemed increasingly likely 
that Prime Minister Gordon Brown would call an early election, most likely that autumn. 
Cameron – who was under a great deal of pressure to finish the modernisation project and 
return to more familiar ground – wobbled. The Party had been doing well coming across in 
a more sensible, even statesmanlike way. In opposition under Cameron, it had been following 
the rules of the politics of power, more usually observed when in government. Now, with an 
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election apparently on the horizon, it was time to switch into the ‘politics of support’, and to 
push tried and tested issues up the agenda to score votes.  
In fact, these explanations can work well together. It is possible that the leadership did believe 
that it was time to carefully reintroduce the issue of immigration because the public would 
now listen to a more humble, more moderate Party – and yet simultaneously worry about 
electoral concerns and, as a kind of insurance, bring back those issues on which it had always 
been regarded with a higher degree of trust than its opposition. So, while Cameron refused 
to panic, he did decide to bring forward something he had been planning to do rather later 
on—namely the reincorporation of some of the party’s more populist policies. He did so—
having gained ‘permission to be heard’—partly in anticipation of an early contest and partly 
to quell mounting concern within his own ranks. 
Populist policies which were thought to chime with public opinion were of particular interest 
to the Conservatives in opposition. Public opinion had a greater impact as a driver of 
immigration policy change when the Party was in opposition than when the Party was in 
office. According to senior Tory politicians, this was partly down to the greater complexities 
of government. In the words of one prominent Conservative ‘in government, you’ve got other 
pressures on you, because it’s got to be practical, it’s got to be workable’.79 In opposition, 
public opinion was one factor among many to consider; in government, it was one factor 
among dozens to consider.80 The ‘tens of thousands’ net migration target is a key example – 
in opposition it was something of a dream – a recognisable and popular policy for which 
there was a ‘significant expectation that it should be achieved’.81 One senior Conservative 
said that ‘they [the politicians] didn’t think it was reckless, because, not knowing much about 
the subject, they assumed it would be quite easy to get back to the figures of the early 
1990s’.82 There was a different view within the civil service: it was ‘never really an 
achievable target’ because the levers were outside government controls.83  
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2010 to 2015 
In 2010, the realities of government presented complications for the Conservative Party 
which had been close to irrelevant when the Party was in opposition. Even when policies 
made their way onto the white papers, there were sufficient obstacles which delayed or even 
modified the resulting legislation. The Tories were unable to implement fully the pledges 
made in opposition; they could not restrict levels of immigration to the extent that they had 
promised. Yet the Tories could not abandon their key pledge: ‘it would look like you were 
giving up on the whole objective’ of reducing levels of migration, according to one 
Conservative MP.84 For Theresa May, it would be a personal failure if the target were not 
met. Vince Cable said: ‘She has taken this target seriously. She’s obviously fixated […] she’s 
very worried she can’t deliver a target which accidentally she kind of signed up to. The reason 
she keeps proposing basically silly things, like graduates not being allowed to work here is 
that it’s the only damn way of getting nearer to her target’.85 The ‘politics of power’ was a 
difficult role for the Tories to take on. 
The first obstacle was the unexpected need to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. 
Tory MPs, according to one Cabinet minister ‘don’t really think their party is in power right 
now’, as if a coalition was not real government. They did not express loyalty to their 
leadership, which they considered to have failed them. No wonder then that some 85 Tory 
rebels voted for an (non-government) amendment to the Immigration Bill of 2013 to make 
the deportation of foreign criminals mandatory.86 More directly, it might be expected that 
coalition with one or more parties would dilute the policies of the main party. And there was, 
apparently ‘continual conflict’ and ‘difficult exchanges’ between the two parties on 
immigration.87 Recent academic work has not found much evidence of Liberal Democrat 
influence on the coalition government’s immigration policy; they exerted little to no 
restraining influence over the Conservatives, though there is some evidence of minor 
initiatives being blocked.88 Indeed, as one minister found, ‘by and large, Theresa [May] got 
her way’.89 There are, however, some indications that the Liberal Democrats did have an 
impact on the Tories’ attempts to fully enact their policies. One Conservative minister with 
direct experience of forming immigration policy recalled how their junior partners repeatedly 
237 
 
delayed Tory efforts to cut levels of migration.90 Business Secretary and Liberal Democrat 
Vince Cable referred to himself and his colleagues having ‘stopped Theresa May doing what 
she wanted to do’, which in this case was to introduce a cap on the number of international 
students.91 
Outside of the meeting rooms, the Liberal Democrats undermined Conservative immigration 
policy with extensive public criticism. In the summer of 2013, the Home Office 
commissioned billboard vans, inscribed with the message ‘go home’, which were directed at 
illegal immigrants. The pilot scheme attracted criticism that it was xenophobic and crude; 
some questioned whether the scheme was more to do with polishing the Tories’ ‘tough’ 
credentials than actively reducing illegal immigration in the UK. The scheme proved to be 
too much for the Conservatives’ junior partners. Vince Cable alleged that the adverts had 
been designed ‘to create a sense of fear in the British population’.92 He maintained that the 
Liberal Democrat ministers within the government had not been consulted, and that the 
‘stupid and offensive’ campaign should be stopped.93 
There were issues for the coalition, too, when the Liberal Democrats experienced their own 
internal divisions – with key figures supporting and blocking the very same policy. In 2013, 
plans were made to introduce a security deposit, or bounty scheme as it was known within 
the coalition (‘Theresa May had this idea [that] everybody applying for a visa should deposit 
some vast sum of money, and if they went home, they’d get [it back]’). 94 The policy was 
something that leader Clegg ‘temporarily went along with’; he had been ‘persuaded to 
endorse it’.95 In advance of Clegg giving a speech on the scheme , Vince Cable, who as 
Business Secretary had a forthcoming trip to India, where the prospect of the scheme was 
likely to be greeted with dismay – publicly ‘denounced’ the policy.96 The scheme was ‘wound 
up eventually, because it had run into so much resistance’.97 
The second obstacle with which the Tories were presented was the continuing European 
economic crisis – and its prolonged and unforeseen consequences. Even without the 
difficulties in Europe, immigration was likely to have proved a bone of contention between 
the two coalition partners because it fed into another, possibly even more profound, 
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difference between them, namely their respective positions on the European Union. 
However, with Europe recovering slowly from the global economic downturn of 2008-9, net 
migration to the UK from its EU partners increased over this period as many of their citizens 
moved to a country that was doing marginally better than their own. As a result, the coalition 
government was unable to keep its pledge to reduce net migration figures. One former 
immigration minister viewed the European ‘crisis’ as directly responsible for the failure to 
bring net migration down to below 100,000.98 
Existing international legislation also proved to be a problem, with Cameron said to be 
severely constrained by what one interviewee referred to as the ‘Brussels straitjacket’.99 . 
Changes to various categories of non-EU migrants made little difference to the migration 
figures – and the Conservatives knew it. As Cable put it, the Tories ‘knew perfectly well that 
all this playing around with students and Tier 2 visas wasn’t the issue. The real issue, as 
Farage was pointing out, was migration from the European Union […] But they were stuck 
because they couldn’t really do anything about it. Because of freedom of movement’.100 The 
Conservative-led government may have acknowledged that the current rules limited its scope 
for action, but that did not prevent it from attempting to revise the rules.  In 2012, Home 
Secretary Theresa May began talking about curbs on EU migration, such as limiting access 
to the UK for dependants of EU citizens and access to benefits for EU citizens. Although free 
movement of EU workers is a central part of the EU’s single market, May was said to be 
considering ‘revers[ing] previous European Court of Justice judgements that have in effect 
redefined free movement as available to citizens rather than merely workers’ (my italics).101  
The constraining influence of rules on freedom of movement was of particular concern for 
the Tory government, with the then impending lifting of transitional controls on Romanians 
and Bulgarians provoking concern that there would be a new influx of migrants to the UK. 
Tabloid headlines stoked up fears by reporting on extra planes being booked to deal with 
demand from Romania and Bulgaria; independent investigations found no evidence for 
this.102 Nonetheless, the government had difficulty with the issue, and in January 2014 had 
to stave off a backbench rebellion.103 Cameron acknowledged the limitations of being a 
member state within the EU: ‘We've done the extent of what we can do within the rules’.104 
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In the final years of this government, immigration control became conflated with that of EU 
‘interference’ with national issues.  
Cameron’s plans to discourage EU workers exercising their freedom of movement by 
entering the UK were condemned internationally. European Commission president José 
Manuel Barroso described Tory plans to apply an ‘emergency brake’ or even bring in a cap 
on low-skilled EU workers as a ‘historic mistake’ and contrary to EU law.105 It was reported 
that the number of national insurance registrations issued to EU immigrants with low skills 
could be restricted in order to reduce immigration. Germany appeared to rule out Cameron's 
plan to limit EU migrants in the UK: German Chancellor Angela Merkel dismissed this idea, 
saying there could be no ‘tamper[ing]’ with the EU principle of free movement  – which may 
explain why David Cameron’s ‘big speech’ on immigration in late November 2014 made no 
mention of ideas that had been floated to impose quotas or some sort of emergency brake on 
the right of European citizens to enter the UK without hindrance but resorted instead to 
promising changes to the benefits system.106 
The third obstacle was the business community, whose interests were not aligned with overall 
Conservative policy to reduce migration figures. The City and accountancy firms were 
‘prominent in their lobbying’.107 Business Secretary Vince Cable and his team received 
information that ‘senior members of the Chinese government who wanted to come here and 
sign deals were being refused visas’.108 The policy on student immigration was said to be 
‘doing quite a lot of harm, it was wiping out the private sector’, and the Tier 2 visa system 
generated warnings from companies that this was ‘going to seriously affect their competence’ 
in recruiting graduates.109 Regular meetings with representatives of the business community 
resulted in something of a consolation prize. Following persistent lobbying, ICTs (intra-
company transfers), involving the transfer of individuals already employed by a company to 
other posts based in the UK, were not subject to the cap on non-EU immigration numbers. 
This loosening of controls was criticised by some within the Conservatives, but remained in 
place for the duration of the parliament and beyond.  
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The official granting of special privileges to business people, entrepreneurs and investors, 
however, had little or no precedent. In recent years, for example, changes meant that those 
with a Tier 1 (Investor) visa could apply for resident status after three years (the usual period 
was five years) if they invested £5 million in the UK.  For £10 million, visitors on Investor 
visas could pursue a fast-track settlement after two years. In addition, ‘high-potential’ 
business people no longer needed to bring funding of at least £200,000 for a visa to the UK; 
they could come at the comparatively knock-down rate of £50,000 if the funding came from 
a government-approved ‘reputable’ organisation. They were also welcome to bring along 
their business partners. Investors were now allowed to spend up to 180 days outside of the 
UK, a doubling of the previous limit of 90 days, without this having a negative impact on 
their right to settle in the UK.110 Never before had there been such an emphasis on those with 
significant financial resources being given preferential treatment and a clear route to Britain. 
 
Electoral considerations, leadership and factions 
My second proposition states that there are three key factors behind changes in immigration 
policy, namely, electoral motivations or the vote-winning imperative; the personal 
convictions and managerial style of the leadership of the Party; and the factions that, to a 
greater or lesser extent, run the Party. I find there to be differences in the way each of these 
factors impact on the development of policy. Electoral motivations did drive the making of 
Conservative Party immigration policy throughout this period. What changed was the 
strategy by which the Conservatives decide to pick up votes: whether to stick with the core 
vote, or to reach out to the centre ground, to pick up those on peripheries and whether to 
listen and follow public opinion – or to direct it. The leadership factor had a considerable 
impact too: there are notable differences in how the various leaders of the Party approached 
immigration as a topic – and the lengths they were prepared to go to exploit it. Further, 
different leaders were more or less susceptible to pressures from different factions of the 
Conservative Party. While I found little evidence that changes to the factions of the Party had 
an impact on immigration policy, it is, of course, worth remembering that the leading factions 
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support or reject the leader of their Party – and the leaders have particular factions to thank 
for their position. It does seem evident that immigration policy was used at times as a means 
to mollify certain wings of the Party by giving them what they wanted.  
 
1997 to 2001 
Electoral motivations 
To begin with, and counter-intuitively, given the scale of the Tories’ defeat, electoral 
motivations were less important as a driver behind immigration policy than at just about any 
other time. The consensus within the parliamentary party was that the loss was nothing more 
than a freak event; there was nothing ‘wrong’ with the Conservatives and in time, the 
electorate would return to them. The development of immigration policy was, like many other 
policies at this time, stymied by the existential questions that the Party was asking. As Hayton 
put it, a certain amount of ‘intellectual uncertainty over the direction and purpose of 
conservatism contributed to the difficulties the party experienced in terms of developing a 
new programme and narrative’.111 
Given, in part, Labour’s landslide of 1997, it was so difficult for the Conservatives to receive 
press attention – and so keen were they to have it – that media tactics became part of 
Conservative strategy on policy-making. There were reports of Party strategists coming up 
with headlines, and then developing policy to match the headlines.112 One particularly well-
used method of securing press coverage was ‘linking hard-line messages on immigration, 
law and order, and Europe, to breaking news stories’.113 No wonder then, that policy-making 
seemed fragmented and reactionary, and policies were just a desperate means of attracting 
attention.  
By the end of the parliament, the Conservative Party was some distance from the average 
voter on certain key policy issues, of which immigration and asylum was just one. Attempts 
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to drag the party further to the right were intended to bridge the gap between the Party and 
the public – but they were misjudged. The Party had made little visible progress at moving 
towards the centre – and there was little impetus from within the Party to do so. It continued 
to look hard-line, obsessive and out of touch – even to its core supporters.114 Even the usually 
pro-Conservative newspaper The Daily Mail recalled that there was ‘nothing extreme about 
Conservative policies […] but there was an abrasiveness of tone that sometimes gave the 
impression of extremism’.115 One less sympathetic broadsheet described the Tory campaign 
in 2001 as ‘unpopular populism’.116 
 
Leadership 
What is of greater importance with regard to immigration policy (in terms of the substance, 
the emphasis, the tone of the policy), at least, in the 1997 to 2001 period, was the leadership 
of the Party. John Major’s resignation soon after the general election left space for leadership 
contenders to run campaigns which would, in part, showcase their vision for the Party. It is 
worth noting, as Bale points out, that the 1997 leadership campaign was centred around 
Europe and the single currency – and there was remarkably little about the Party’s recent 
defeat and what it would need to do to win back voters.117 
Unfortunately for the Party, William Hague’s lack of a personal interest in immigration and 
the Party’s unsettled state meant that there was no clear and coherent approach to 
immigration. True, he was, in the words of a colleague ‘a right winger. Let’s not pretend he 
was a prisoner of the right’.118 Yet, Conservative Party advisors had concerns about Hague’s 
lack of authority (and hence, his capacity to command the Party) from the very start. Efforts 
to turn somebody who had been portrayed as a ‘Hansard-reading teenage conformist and 
tweed-jacketed Young Conservative’ into a more ordinary figure failed.119 
Hague’s efforts to portray the Conservative Party as tough on asylum seekers was a risky 
strategy. First, populist measures may have attracted supportive headlines but there were few 
votes in it. Second, such a move did not help to represent the Tories as a reasonable and 
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tolerant party – it was the very opposite of reassurance. Third, in perpetuating a certain image 
of the party, it restricted the Conservatives. By deciding to employ a heavy focus on asylum, 
the Party had little room for other issues – such as healthcare and the economy – which, 
unfortunately for the Conservatives, were of great importance to the public.120 Hague, then, 
found it ‘much harder to get coverage’, especially on issues that were not traditionally 
associated with the Conservatives. 
 
Factions 
The right-wing faction within the Conservative Party was responsible, to some degree, for 
the direction of Party policy on immigration during the 1997 parliament. While Hague had 
initially tried to rebrand the Conservatives as a more compassionate force, he moved back to 
concentrating on the Conservatives’ core vote, rather than the more moderate middle ground, 
following extensive pressure from the right-wing of the Party.121  Even if Hague had wanted 
to bring in a quite different immigration policy, he did not have the authority to pursue a real 
agenda with regard to concrete policy change. Furthermore, his attempts to keep all wings of 
the Party content came at the cost of seeming opportunistic as he switched between the 
different factions.122 Policy was ‘driven by short-term, electoral strategies and calculations, 
which themselves were disputed in Conservative ranks’.123 
 
2001 to 2005 
Electoral motivations 
Soon after the 2001 electoral defeat, the Vice Chairman of the Party, Steve Norris said:  
The key lesson of Thursday's defeat is that the issues we chose to campaign on - 
asylum, Europe, tax - were not the things that most people regarded as crucial, even 
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though they greatly excited Conservative activists. We may have been right about 
those issues, but what good is that when we are out of power.124  
Norris’ words seemed to go unheard. In fact, during this parliament, the Conservative Party 
took a more myopic and restrictionist take on immigration than previously. While some of 
the proposed measures may have been popular with the public, the issue of immigration was 
not a priority for many voters at this time. Further, the Tories’ tone on the issue came across 
as rough and unkind and was off-putting to some.  
Given the Party’s preoccupation with the possibility of further electoral failure, it was 
deemed sensible for the Conservatives to turn its hand back to immigration. The Party had 
endured two major electoral defeats in four years (1997, 2001) and did not want to lose a 
third, so it swung rightwards to make itself stand out. In the face of further defeat, the 
Conservative Party was ‘driven back to its heartland’, or, more charitably, it focused on its 
core vote.125 Hayton has argued that it was a ‘sound electoral calculation’.126 Nominally, 
immigration was a ‘safe’ issue for the Conservatives, and it also happened to be ‘a growing 
concern’ for the public.127 And this despite the fact that levels of migration were decreasing 
during this period. In January 2005 it was reported that asylum applications were down by 
40 per cent and immigration applications by ten per cent.128 However, public concern, and 
hence, the salience of the issue was high – despite the declining figures. In the two years 
leading up to the election (and approximately the period Michael Howard had been leader of 
the Party), 29 per cent of the public considered immigration to be an important issue.129 
Cowley and Green regard the decision to make use of immigration as an electoral issue as 
more of a desperate last ploy than a thoughtful reckoning: they have suggested that the 
Conservatives ‘had little choice’ other than to emphasise immigration, when it was one of 
the few issues where they retained a lead over Labour as the best party for the issue.130 
The Conservatives’ strategy fits tidily with salience theory, that is, that one must ‘raise the 
salience of your own issue strengths and neutralise or downplay the strengths of your 
opponent’.131 The second half of this statement, that is, the neutralising of the strengths of 
the opponents, had, according to Michael Howard occurred in the then recent past. Speaking 
about why the 2005 campaign had focused on immigration, rather than immigration and 
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Europe, he maintained that the issue of Europe and the euro had been neutralised by Labour’s 
pledge of a referendum, whereas this was not the case with immigration’.132 So this deliberate 
effort to do more on immigration, and less on Europe, was in part a response to the 2001 
defeat, when Europe played a greater role. Howard himself justified this: ‘There wasn’t going 
to be a referendum on immigration […] it was completely different’. 133 
True, the immigration issue may have made headlines for the Party, which it sorely needed 
in opposition, but the column inches did not translate into votes.134 The Conservatives turned 
their focus inward, to their core vote, but their ‘heartland seats’ were not representative of 
the country as a whole, and the Party could not win a plurality of seats with such an insular 
appaorach.135 The policies proposed in the 2005 campaign were particularly restrictive, but 
the seemingly unpleasant and even vindictive tone of the campaign obscured the details of 
the policy proposals. Iain Duncan Smith found that they ‘got terribly bogged down with 
asylum and immigration, which was a mistake’136. Damian Green echoed this opinion: ‘there 
was a feeling that the 2005 campaign got the tone wrong’.137 One senior Conservative figure, 
has recalled that Howard ‘slightly lost control of it […] I don’t think he intended to make it 
such an immigration dominated campaign. It cost us a lot of votes’.138 
 
Leadership 
The change in leadership is one explanatory factor behind the Conservatives’ move in a more 
restrictionist direction. Iain Duncan Smith was viewed by some within the parliamentary 
party as an ‘unthinking reactionary right-winger’ who leaned to the populist side.139 Months 
into Duncan Smith’s leadership, it was revealed that he had, in the mid-1990s, held meetings 
with the extremist French Front National (who were at the time campaigning against black 
immigration). Initially, Duncan Smith had made an effort to downplay his right-wing image. 
His leadership manifesto was launched at an event in multicultural Bradford, surrounded by 
leaders of the local Asian community.140 However, his early efforts to depict a more kindly 
and tolerant Conservative Party did not receive support from all quarters. Parliamentarians 
with close links to the leadership were concerned that fiddling with the Party’s image would 
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only worsen its electoral prospects – a modern and ‘politically correct’ Tory Party would not 
be able to exploit its lead on the traditional Conservative issues of immigration, Europe, and 
taxation. Ultimately, Duncan Smith performed in a similar way to his predecessor. Namely, 
immigration policy was left on the side-lines until the Party became nervous enough to bring 
it back.  
The leadership factor became more critical to immigration policy-making when the Party 
was led by Michael Howard. He did not have the qualms of his predecessor and saw little 
point in keeping all wings of the Party satisfied. Under his leadership, the Conservatives’ 
immigration policy became more hard-line and more restrictive in an attempt to bring voters 
back onside. Further, Howard had become leader in 2003, and had next to no time in the run-
up to the 2005 election to experiment with a new strategy, even if he had wanted to. Howard 
saw votes in immigration policy and was prepared to exploit it; he ‘was not a strategist but a 
tactician’, and an opportunist.141 At one meeting in 2004, the leadership’s inner circle 
discussed the Party’s lack of a defined vision. Howard was dismissive, arguing that his 
leadership would not involve such pretensions: ‘Talking about small concrete measures to 
improve people’s lives is what I am about, not having a big idea or a vision’.142 This was the 
moment when one member of the group realised ‘We were not going to have a strategy’.143  
 
Factions 
The right-wing factions of the Conservative Party would not tolerate Iain Duncan Smith’s 
experimentation with a more moderate approach. A sizeable proportion of the parliamentary 
party had grown frustrated by the Party’s new model of operation – and they did not keep 
quiet about it. Duncan Smith’s period of experimentation was short-lived. In May 2002, in 
an intervention widely seen as an opportunistic attempt to seize the moment, Duncan Smith 
was reported to have ‘thrown down the gauntlet over the immigration crisis’.144 He argued 
that the UK should not accept the 1,300 asylum seekers in the French camp of Sangatte; there 
should be no ‘white flag’. The Daily Mail described the piece Duncan Smith had penned for 
them as ‘his toughest and most uncompromising intervention on immigration’.145  
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The more centrist faction, with representation within the Shadow Cabinet and Conservative 
Central Office, was dismayed by the return to what they saw as an unpleasant way of doing 
politics. Some feared that Duncan Smith’s intervention signalled a return to the errors of 
William Hague, whose leadership had initially been marked by a more liberal approach – at 
least in tone – but which had become more authoritarian over time by reverting to the issues 
that chimed with the core voters. Hague’s heavy use of the asylum issue had gained few votes 
and stymied progress on regaining the centre ground.146 Now, efforts by Duncan Smith and 
those around him to reposition the Party as a more caring and more sensitive organisation 
had been held back by Duncan Smith’s comments, which one senior figure referred to as 
‘primitivism at its worst’.147 One frontbencher argued that it was ‘a mistake to go hard 
on asylum […] It conflicts with our strategy of campaigning on public services and standing 
up for the vulnerable. If you have a strategy, you have to stick to it’.148 
Ian Duncan Smith soon found it was not possible to develop policies that were both workable 
and consistent while keeping the different factions of the Party reasonably content. 
Frustration within the parliamentary party was directed at the leadership’s ‘confused and 
confusing’ message, and the struggle to keep policy relatively coherent.149 Commentators 
have noted that Duncan Smith’s ‘tendency to match each modernising move with something 
for the traditionalists’ further damaged the Party’s image.150 His ‘lack of judgement and 
inability to hold a consistent strategy’ were unfortunate characteristics for a leader trying to 
keep his party on message.151 
Michael Howard’s decision to depict the Conservatives as strict and traditional in focus 
disturbed relations between the different wings of the Party and may, in fact, have worsened 
divisions among his own supporters. Several senior figures cautioned against the Tories 
bringing immigration back in as a key policy area. Theresa May had told Conference in 2002: 
‘Twice we went to the country unchanged, unrepentant, just plain unattractive. And twice we 
got slaughtered’.152 Six months into his leadership, Howard told a meeting of the 1922 
Committee that he had ‘addressed’ the public services issue, and that it was now time to 
move on to more productive territory, such as immigration, Europe and crime.153 John 
Bercow, who was one of the backbenchers present, believes this to have been both premature 
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and a ‘mistake’.154 Others have concurred, arguing that the Party had ‘not sufficiently 
decontaminated itself to have permission to talk about the issue’.155 
The existence of serious divisions within the Conservative Party strengthened the 
leadership’s resolve to make use of immigration as an electoral issue. The previous leader, 
Iain Duncan Smith, had been stymied by a section within the Party which had remained 
unconvinced by his strategy and which had become more and more undisciplined.156 Yet 
Howard believed that frequent use of old familiar topics would bring his fractured party 
together and make it more manageable. If that was not possible, at the very least, the offering 
of familiar Conservative themes might ‘rapidly create the appearance of a united and 
disciplined party’ (my italics). 157 The strategy did not work, and defeat seemed inevitable. 
As one senior Conservative figure put it ‘we were bound to lose in 2005 because we carried 
on […] indulging in the same silly internal squabbles’.158 
 
 
2005 to 2010 
Electoral motivations 
The Conservatives had now lost three consecutive general elections: the Party desperately 
needed to do something different – and quickly. Focus group work commissioned by the 
Party had found that the Conservatives were now such a toxic brand that, while the public 
were generally supportive of many Tory policies, they reconsidered their support when told 
which party had proposed the policy.159 Cameron moved quickly to signal that he would push 
for a move towards a more moderate, more compassionate Party. And so in came a series of 
photo opportunities and speeches designed to show a leader embracing topics not usually 
associated with the Tories – ‘green’ concerns, gay rights, sympathy towards hooded 
sweatshirt-wearing youth. This was part of Cameron’s call for a ‘modern, compassionate 
Conservatism’.  
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Mid-way through the parliament, Cameron’s Conservatives made efforts to bring 
immigration back in. This was, in part, because the motivation to avoid electoral failure had 
become more perceptible just a few years before the next general election. It was also because 
public concern was sufficiently strong for senior Tories to fear that voters would drift towards 
anti-immigration alternatives. And so a series of immigration-related initiatives were 
produced in an effort to allay concerns. The Conservative leadership attempted to move 
closer to the general public on immigration, but the public had grown less liberal, more hard-
line – and were now much more worried by the issue of immigration. It was then a case of a 
party which had made a distinctive effort to be more moderate on the issue, deciding to wade 
back into the ‘dirty’ politics of populist and hard-line immigration rhetoric.  
The Party’s close attention to public opinion during this period cannot be overstated; there 
was close monitoring of opinion polls and focus groups. Senior figures working on 
immigration policy were convinced that they were being led by public concerns, rather than, 
perhaps, moulding concerns and taking the lead on the issue. It was not, in their opinion, 
‘politicians and newspapers whipping up public fever on immigration’, a view which was 
‘dead wrong’; it was instead the case that the immigration issue ‘bubble[d] up from the 
bottom’.160 There was very much a sense that the public were able to monitor the flow of 
migration and to make clear when it was ‘too high’ or ‘about right’ or ‘not a concern’.161 
Damian Green, saw immigration policy development as a response to emerging concerns: 
The public inevitably doesn’t have detailed views, it just wants immigration to be 
under control, so it would be a foolish politician who said, well, we’re going to ignore 
public opinion, particularly as it’s risen in salience over the period, so that’s a very 
important thing to care about.162 
Towards the end of 2008, this near deference to public opinion seemed to be working; the 
Conservatives had begun to build up a healthy lead in the opinion polls. Unfortunately, this 
was seen as substantiating the theories for different wings of the Party; that is, nearly 
everybody in the Party took from the polls what they wanted to see. So, the Tory right-
wingers found proof that the Party did best when it swung in their direction. The modernisers, 
that is Cameron, and those around him, found evidence that they were better off taking a 
‘tough and tender’ approach. By 2010, immigration was not ignored, but neither was it one 
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of the main campaigning topics – this was a deliberate move, based on an electoral 
calculation, on reaching out – ‘if we’d made that issue front and centre of our electoral 
campaign, it would have said something about us to some of the swing voters that we were 
trying to win over, which wouldn’t have been a very attractive thing’.163 
 
Leadership 
The leadership factor is critical to explaining the developments in immigration policy during 
the parliament of 2005 to 2010. David Cameron’s election as leader signalled the start of a 
new strategy in which the Tories would take on a modernising and tolerant approach. The 
Party sought ‘permission to be heard’ after a prolonged period of decontamination by 
pursuing a more moderate approach. Cameron was just 39 years old when he became leader 
of the Party, and had been an MP for only four years. Inexperienced he may have seemed, 
but he had spent several years in the Conservative Research Department and had 
subsequently worked closely with Michael Howard. Despite this, he portrayed himself as a 
new face for the Party, someone who, in his own words, was ‘fed up with the Punch and Judy 
politics of Westminster’.164 Cameron – a former public relations executive – understood well 
that the Conservatives needed to change their image. 
 
Factions 
The wings of the Conservative Party were mollified by Cameron’s decision to appoint 
Damian Green, widely viewed as a left-of-centre Tory and a moderate, to the post of shadow 
spokesperson for immigration. On one side were ‘the modernisers’ – those who believed that 
the Conservative Party, if it were to stand a chance of winning the next general election and 
elections beyond that, had to change the way it looked and sounded. For them, Cameron’s 
decision was all of a piece with a new, more reasonable-sounding and evidence-based 
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approach to immigration policy-making, with none of the hysteria of previous years that had 
proved so off-putting to many voters – especially the well-heeled and well-educated voters 
who had left the Conservatives in their droves from 1997 onwards. Other Tories, however, 
who may have worried that Cameron’s rebranding project had been taken too far, and that it 
was a mistake to trust such an important portfolio to a politician with notably liberal views, 
were reminded that Green did not have totally free rein. He was accountable to then Shadow 
Home Secretary, David Davies, who was widely seen as a populist politician in touch with 
the Conservative rank and file. As noted elsewhere, this was no error; the dual appointment 
of Green and Davies ‘embodied Cameron’s strategy of keeping the right onside while not 
alienating more liberal-minded voters’.165 
Green, who was to hold this position for the remainder of the opposition period before 
becoming immigration minister once the Tories had gained office, viewed his appointment 
as partly a reaction to the 2005 election in that it was about signalling a new sensitivity on 
immigration: 
The task I was given was to enable us to develop robust, controlling immigration 
policies but in a language that didn’t repel people. So, we could tell that we would 
need to introduce better controls than had been there before, but there was a huge 
sensitivity that we mustn’t be seen and mustn’t be, in any way, pandering to 
unpleasant elements […] that was the task I was given: to develop a tough policy but 
do it in moderate language.166 
 
2010 to 2015 
Electoral motivations 
Electoral motivations were a strong influence during this period, with the Conservatives 
having failed to win an outright majority. With the Tory brand considered less toxic, hard-
line immigration policies were seen to be popular with voters. Unfortunately for the Party, 
the hard-line approach did not seem to be satisfying voters; it may even have been making 
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them more concerned. In the preceding years, the number of people who considered 
immigration and immigrants to be one of the pressing issues in the UK had risen overall 
albeit with some variation.167 One might have expected that, with the Conservatives bringing 
in more and more restrictive policies, the public would have grown more relaxed about the 
issue but this was not been the case. In May 2010, just before the coalition government was 
formed and when immigration policies were discussed in the widely-watched TV debates 
between the leaders of the then three main parties, 38 per cent of the public said immigration 
was their number one concern. Within months, this percentage had fallen to the mid-high 
20s, rising to the mid-30s during the second half of 2013, reaching a peak of 41 per cent in 
early 2014, and then remaining in the high 30s thereafter. 
One reason for this public dissatisfaction with Conservative policy on immigration was 
almost certainly the Party’s perceived position on the electoral spectrum. Or, in other words, 
the prominence given to the issue by UKIP, which had taken a leaf out of the playbook of 
continental, radical, right-wing, populist parties and begun to mobilise heavily on migration 
as well as on what used to be its single signature issue, leaving the European Union. Frequent 
and high-profile amendments to immigration policy formed part of Tory efforts both to 
portray Labour as a soft touch on the issue and to prevent the loss of Conservative and 
potential Conservative voters to UKIP, both on immigration and on the linked issue of EU 
membership.168 Senior Liberal Democrats openly remarked that their partner’s tougher tone 
on immigration stemmed from electoral strategy rather than a pragmatic response to real-
world developments or policies based on evidence. The Liberal Democrat Secretary for 
Energy and Climate Change Ed Davey, for instance, put Conservative Defence Secretary 
Michael Fallon’s comments about immigration ‘swamping’ communities down to 
‘Conservative concerns of the UKIP threat in the Rochester by-election [rather than] the 
facts’.169 
The move to an openly more restrictionist direction is not a strategy that seems to have 
worked, not least with regard to perceptions of the Conservative leadership. A YouGov 
survey from October 2014 polled the public on which of the four main party leaders they 
trusted to take the right decisions on key issues. Cameron was most trusted on the economy, 
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defence and tackling crime (typically traditional Conservative issues), Clegg on none of the 
issues, and Farage for immigration and Europe.170 Moreover, both Tory defectors to UKIP, 
Douglas Carswell in Clacton and Mark Reckless in Rochester and Strood, won their by-
elections easily. After the first defection to UKIP, the Tories were ‘terrified by the threat 
from the right’.171 The second defection only emphasised the point – Reckless was explicit: 
‘I promised to cut immigration while treating people fairly and humanely. I cannot keep that 
promise as a Conservative’ (my italics).172 The decision to give a peerage to the chair of 
right-wing pressure group MigrationWatch, Andrew Green – seen by many as yet another 
attempt to reclaim the issue and bring in votes from the anti-PC brigade – looked no more 
likely to succeed.173 Indeed, UKIP may have gained the most from such a strategy. Those 
close to the Tory leadership sensed that bringing more attention to immigration would make 
matters worse.174  
 
Leadership 
Within a difficult context, David Cameron’s leadership was critical: he attempted to use the 
immigration issue (among others) to please the Party’s traditionalists without completely 
alienating its modernisers and, indeed, its business backers.175 This was no simple polarised 
scenario of liberally-minded elites struggling with anti-immigration backbenchers. Some 
backbenchers privately argued for foreign students to be removed from net migration 
figures.176 There were also the voluntary party members to contend with: Tory activists were, 
on the whole, more ‘sceptical’, in part, according to one parliamentarian because they did not 
receive the more balanced picture of the migration story.177 Tensions were exposed between 
party factions, particularly over the legislation forcing private landlords to check if their 
tenants were legal immigrants – it brought out ‘real friction’ with Communities Secretary, 
Eric Pickles, objecting ‘we’re supposed to be an anti-regulation government, and here we are 
wanting to check the passports of every one person, small company in Britain. It is 
completely mad’.178 Pickles was said to have ‘almost got into a shouting match with 
Cameron’ while May ‘insist[ed] that all these landlords are crooks, and that they’ve got to be 
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controlled, otherwise we’ll have millions of illegal immigrants here’.179 David Laws, 
Minister of State for the Cabinet Office, did not believe the proposal to be practical: checking 
entitlement to be in the UK would be difficult for most private individuals with little 
experience of genuine and false papers. He relayed his fears to immigration minister Mark 
Harper and was told not to worry.180 Months later, it was found that the existing rules were 
too complex for even an immigration minister to follow: Harper resigned in February 2014 
after it was discovered that his cleaner had no right to work in the UK.  
Leaving aside the troublesome frontbenchers, David Cameron was also forced to contend 
with difficulties from his backbenchers. During this parliament, there was an unprecedented 
level of backbench rebellion.181 Tory MPs voted against their government in some 25 per 
cent of votes.182 Why were the Tory backbenchers so troublesome? Conservative 
parliamentarians were motivated by electoral concerns, especially as they had not won a 
majority at the 2010 election. The failure to win the election outright meant that it was 
difficult for Conservative whips to employ traditional whipping tactics, such as ‘tell[ing] 
their MPs that they needed to support the Prime Minister who won them the election […] 
given that he had not’.183 Cameron could not ‘command the clout’ that would be expected of 
a Tory PM: he was ‘limited by the fact that it was a Conservative-led government, but not a 
Conservative government.’184 His powers of patronage were lessened in a government shared 
with another party, given the need to reserve posts for Liberal Democrats, thereby restricting 
posts for Tories.185 Furthermore, the Tory backbenchers of 2010 were a different breed. They 
were more ‘angry and independent-minded’ than their predecessors.186 There was an 
unusually high number of new MPs making up the parliamentary party – around 48 per cent 
– with many of them ‘as likely to ascribe their election success to their own efforts as to those 
of the party leader’ and consequently less loyal to the leader.187 
Cameron was able to implement many of the policy pledges precisely because of the difficult 
context. He was caught between right wing and frustrated backbenchers pushing for more 
restrictions on levels of immigration and Liberal Democrats concerned that the proposals 
were unworkable and cruel. (Vince Cable, the Liberal Democrat Business Secretary 
described himself during this period as being ‘more or less permanently at war with the Home 
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Secretary over aspects of immigration policy’.)188 Within this context, the leadership could 
only disappoint (somebody) – and so it resolved to put in place measures that were tough, 
but not too tough. The coalition government’s restrictionist initiatives on immigration were 
largely the outcome of Cameron and the faction around him judging that they would play 
well with not only the wider party, but also the general public. 
 
Factions 
The Conservative Party’s failure to win the 2010 election outright caused recriminations and 
further damaged relations between the different wings of the party. The Party was divided 
between rival factions which offered competing explanations for the loss of the 2005 election. 
Hence, immigration policy continued to be a source of tension for, or something of a tussle 
between, the different factions of the party. Some Tories blamed Cameron’s modernisation 
project, claiming that they had not been ‘Conservative’ enough to convince the public. On 
the other side, this was dismissed as ‘complete and utter nonsense. A myth always believed. 
The Conservative Right always believe [that] when you lose elections it’s because you 
weren’t right-wing enough’.189 Other Tories privately worried that Cameron’s rebranding 
project had been taken too far, that it was running too far ahead of the majority of voters, 
particularly on immigration, and that it was a mistake to trust such an important portfolio to 
a politician with notably liberal views (Damian Green had made it from shadow to minister).  
Their concerns had only increased when Prime Minister Cameron appointed as his first (and 
only) Home Secretary, a woman, Theresa May, who had first come to prominence back in 
2002 when, as Conservative Party Chairman she had warned delegates at the Tories’ annual 
conference that they needed to do all they could to rebut the charge that they had become 
‘the nasty party.’190 
It was the UKIP threat on its right flank that drove the Conservatives to adopt tougher and 
tougher positions – up to and including, a threat to make the ability to restrict free movement 
within the EU a ‘red line’ in Cameron’s putative renegotiation with Brussels in the run-up to 
the referendum. To modernisers, especially if they were also part of the small minority of 
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active Conservatives who were not, as a reflex, hostile to all things EU, this was worrying – 
a worry they shared with business, which, after all, has a vested interest in being able to 
recruit the brightest and the best without undue hindrance. Some Tory backbenchers believed 
that the existence of UKIP allowed the Tories to reposition themselves as a more moderate 
alternative, as well as to talk more openly about immigration. Senior Whip, Gavin Barwell 
believes the Conservative Party was ‘helped in being able to talk about it by the existence of 
UKIP […] UKIP provides an opportunity for us, if you look at the political spectrum on this 
issue, we are no longer the right-wing party, we are the centre-right party’.191 
The Conservative Party’s efforts to mimic the policies of its populist competitor confused 
policy development. Privately, some MPs recognised that ‘although UKIP clearly shifted the 
Tory Party’s position a bit, it didn’t shift it by anything as much as I thought it might’.192 
Nigel Farage was even able to condemn as ‘nasty’ and ‘unpleasant’ the coalition 
government’s billboard van campaign which urged illegal immigrants to ‘go home or face 
arrest’.193 Perhaps, he volunteered, the billboards should be replaced with the slogan, ‘Please 
don't vote UKIP. We’re doing something.’194 The Spectator’s Alex Massie noted that the 
Tory pitch could best be summarised as: ‘UKIP are right.  Don’t vote for them’.195 The 
Conservative Party’s immigration policy has, in trying to out-UKIP UKIP, become muddled, 
vindictive, and at times, unworkable. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the making of the Conservative Party’s immigration policy from 
1997 to 2015. During this period, the Tories rarely put immigration policy to one side. The 
Party made heavy use of the issue in their election campaigns, particularly when the Tories 
were low in the opinion polls. In contrast to previous times, during this 18-year period 
immigration policy was regarded as a safe prospect for winning votes on traditional 
Conservative territory. More than one leader seized upon immigration as a means to bring 
together the often fractious wings of the Party. On some occasions, however, immigration 
served to widen divisions between the different wings. Immigration policy during this period 
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was, on the whole, hard-line and hyperbolic. In more recent years, policy was driven more 
by the Conservatives’ concerns about losing voters (and even its own MPs) to UKIP than by 
anything else. 
This period serves particularly well as a way of emphasising the different dynamics that 
operate on the Conservative Party during periods in government and periods in opposition. 
The first proposition is a helpful way of explaining not only why there were changes made 
to policy, but also how the changes fit into the broader narrative of increasingly restrictionist 
rhetoric. The following points have been derived from the main sections of this chapter. 
After a long period in government followed by a general election defeat, it takes time for the 
Party to ‘switch gear’ and move into a role more usually observed in opposition. Policy is 
greatly influenced by this delay. During the first parliament of this period, this was 
particularly the case. Conservative politicians had grown complacent after long years in 
office and many struggled to adapt to the changed circumstances. They did what they knew 
best, and the Party operated like a ‘shadow government’ rather than an effective opposition. 
The general election defeat was not perceived by the Tories to be a rejection of them. Given 
that many Conservatives believed this defeat to have been something of an anomaly, there 
was little reason to change policy. Policy-wise, there was little departure from the 1997 
manifesto commitments for immigration (which were generally pragmatic and moderate, if 
vague) during this parliament. 
When the Party does adapt to the opposition, or ‘politics of support’ role, the difference in 
regard to policy is striking. In the early 2000s, the Party introduced headline-catching and 
populist policies that would be difficult or even impossible to implement. Similarly, in early 
2010, the Tory promise to cut net migration to below 100,000 a year was perceived by Party 
insiders to be a recognisable and popular policy and there was a ‘significant expectation that 
it should be achieved’.196 And yet, the net migration figures were not within the full control 
of the UK government and the target was not met within that parliament. Nonetheless, there 
was significant press attention – and widespread public support – given to this pledge. 
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Parties can ‘mix and match’ the different roles; skilful politicians can take on elements of the 
‘politics of power’ while in opposition, for example, with corresponding implications for 
policy. Most notably during this period, in the course of the parliament of 2005 to 2010, the 
Conservative Party did seem to switch between the two roles. After defeat at the 2005 
election, the Tories remained in opposition, but their strategy changed. In fact, they seemed 
to take on the ‘politics of power’ role usually associated with governments. The Party made 
efforts to look statesmanlike; promises were made to deal with difficult issues in a quiet and 
sensible manner: immigration policy would be grounded in reality and informed by evidence. 
Interventions to immigration policy were infrequent and subdued. Within a few years, the 
Tories reverted back to a strategy more typically associated with the party in opposition: the 
‘politics of support’. The Conservatives worked to develop broad-ranging, populist and 
restrictive new measures, such as a fixed quota for non-EU economic immigrants and the 
introduction of a border police force with the power to arrest and detain suspects. 
In government, the Party struggled to put in place those policies that it had promised in 
opposition; no skilful manoeuvring could allow for key pledges to be implemented in full. 
For the Conservatives of the 2010 parliament, there were sufficient obstacles which delayed 
or even modified the resulting legislation. The Tories could not restrict levels of immigration 
to the extent that they wished to do. They were prevented by a combination of three obstacles: 
the unexpected need to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, who had substantially 
different views on immigration; the economic crisis in Europe and its prolonged and 
damaging consequences as well as and the existence of (EU and international) legislation 
which protected the rights of migrants; and lastly, the corporate world, whose interests were 
not aligned with overall Conservative policy to reduce immigration figures.  
This chapter has also considered the three influencing factors with regard to party policy-
making: the ‘fear of electoral defeat’, or, electoral calculations relating to elections in the 
recent past or future; the party leader’s interest in, and stance on, the issue as well as their 
managerial style; and lastly, the factions that, to some extent, direct the party.  
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Electoral motivations do affect the making of policy during this period, but what changes is 
the strategy by which the Conservatives decide to pick up votes: whether to stick with the 
core vote, or to reach out to the centre ground, to pick up those on the peripheries and whether 
to listen and follow public opinion – or to direct it. In the 2001 parliament, the Conservative 
Party was inward-looking; while some of the proposed measures may have been popular with 
the public, the issue of immigration was not a priority for most voters at this time. It was a 
similar scenario in 2003, after change in the Party leadership, when there was also a focus on 
the core vote. Howard had no time in the run-up to the 2005 election to experiment with a 
new strategy. The Party had endured two major electoral defeats in four years (1997, 2001) 
and did not want to lose a third, so it swung rightwards to make itself stand out. Electoral 
motivations were strong influences on policy-making in the latter half of this period too. By 
2005, the Conservatives had lost three consecutive general elections: there was a desperate 
need to do something different and bring in voters not traditionally inclined to support the 
Tories of recent years. The Party moderated its tone on immigration. In coalition in 2010, 
with the Tory brand deemed slightly less toxic, hard-line immigration policies were seen to 
be popular with voters. The threat of Conservative voters switching support to UKIP also 
served to drive the Tories to adopt more hard-line positions. 
Less important, but by no means insignificant was the leadership factor, which had a notable 
impact on the making of Conservative immigration policy. There were differences in how 
the leaders of the Party perceived the ‘problem’ of immigration and how they framed the 
solution. Some leaders more than others were constrained by different pressures, from an 
impending general election to a powerful faction within the Party. Hague’s near indifference 
to immigration policy meant that there was no clear and coherent approach to the topic. Under 
extensive pressure from the right-wing of the Party, he abandoned his attempt to rebrand the 
Conservatives as a moderate and compassionate force. David Cameron was better able to 
resist the demands of the right-wing of his Party, and he was able to maintain a more modern 
stance on immigration until he deemed it right to bring immigration back into the policy fold. 
At first sight, there appears little to suggest that changes to the factions of the Party had an 
impact on immigration policy during this period, but that does not mean that this was 
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necessarily the case. After all, Cameron’s ability to withstand the pressures from one wing 
of his Party was in part down to his support from other factions. The right-wing of the Party 
certainly pushed Iain Duncan Smith to take the Tories in a more restrictionist direction, but 
it was not possible to introduce policies that would keep the different factions of the Party 
reasonably content. His successor, Michael Howard, took a different line; in making 
extensive use of topics that were familiar to the Tories, of which immigration happened to 
be one, he hoped to bring the Party together. When in 2010 the Conservatives had not 
managed to convert their support into enough seats for a government of their own, relations 
between the different wings of the Party were further damaged. As this chapter has noted 
earlier, Cameron’s leadership of the Party rested on his ability to keep all wings of the Party 
satisfied, at least as far as that was possible. Cameron managed to use the immigration issue 
as a means to contain the Party’s traditionalists and its liberals without upsetting its 
modernisers and its supporters in business and the media. 
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Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has examined the Conservative Party’s immigration and asylum policy-
making from 1945 to 2015 by providing an interpretivist account of the Party’s 
positioning on this issue. During this time, the UK was transformed: from a country with 
an expansive citizenship regime (which was open, at one point, to 600 million people), to 
a much more restrictive regime with an infrastructure designed to detain and remove those 
who enter illegally, or outstay their welcome. For much of this period, the Conservatives 
sought to control immigration with a view to reducing the number of migrants entering 
and settling in Britain. In the later decades, the Party promoted a more selective approach, 
by sifting migrants into the well-paid highflyers (who were welcomed) and the low-paid 
unskilled (who were discouraged). At the time this thesis was completed, in the immediate 
aftermath of the EU referendum, it appeared likely that this approach would continue, 
given the popular frustration with successive governments’ apparent failure to control 
immigration and with the Conservative leadership held by Theresa May, who was notable 
for having brought in restrictionist measures during her time as Home Secretary. 
This final chapter summarises the findings of this thesis in order to provide a response to 
the main research question: namely, what has driven the Conservative Party’s 
immigration policy? The interpretivist approach has been helpful as a means of 
conceiving policy-making as an unstable process of flux. The first section considers what 
can be understood by separating policy-making into periods when the Conservatives were 
in government and when they were in opposition. The second section assesses the ‘drivers 
of change’ (electoral considerations; the impact of leadership; the influence of factions) 
with regard to how well they can explain policy development. Next, the chapter moves 
on to the substantive findings of the study in terms of its contributions to knowledge. 
Finally, this chapter acknowledges the limitations of this thesis, the challenges that have 
been identified, and puts forwards suggestions for future investigation.  
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8.1 The dynamics of government versus opposition 
The use of Gamble’s theory of the ‘politics of power’ versus the ‘politics of support’ as a 
lens through which to view immigration policy-making has been essential to the 
development of this research. Political parties are, and always have been, critical to the 
development of state immigration policy. Since World War II, the Conservatives have 
enjoyed more time in office than any other political party; the Party has plainly had a 
substantial impact on British immigration policy. But many of the Tories’ policies have 
stemmed from their time in opposition, and it is these periods which have been overlooked 
by scholars. Periods in opposition have often been used as opportunities for the 
Conservative Party to revise and reinvent.1 In choosing to focus on the changes made to 
immigration policy when the Conservatives were in government and when they were in 
opposition, this thesis has demonstrated how the substance and framing of policy is often 
dependent on the status of the Party. 
The status of the Party does impact on policy-making and implementation: in 
government, the Conservatives’ immigration policy was significantly less restrictionist 
than in opposition. During the 70-year period in question, what was implemented by the 
Conservatives was less far-reaching and more liberal than what had been proposed. The 
different dynamics of being in – or out – of office did inform the development of 
immigration policy. The Tories simply could not deliver on the pledges that they had 
made in opposition, when they were unrestrained by electoral mandates, practical 
considerations or international concerns. In government, there were too many obstacles 
that delayed or blocked change. 
Over 70 years, the obstacles to developing immigration policy in government rarely 
differed. First, legal matters repeatedly delayed the policy-making process, with measures 
cautiously re-worked (and weakened) so as to reduce the possibility of lengthy challenges. 
Politicians and policy-makers sought ways to bypass domestic and international 
legislation – which was often at odds with Conservative plans – rather than revoke or 
renegotiate them. Second, economic imperatives often overruled tough initiatives which 
would have reduced the pool of migrant labour or produced difficulties for visitors 
deemed important to Britain’s national interest. Interventions from the business 
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community, whose interests were rarely aligned with Conservative objectives to reduce 
levels of migration, resulted in concessions that undermined policy. Third, international 
considerations – in which policy-makers did not want to destabilise existing economic, 
social or political relations – meant that policy was sometimes modified following (or 
even in expectance of) criticism from overseas governments. These hindrances on the 
policy-making process were rarely a consideration during periods in opposition. 
Policy-making was influenced by the resources available to the Conservative Party, which 
were dependent on whether it was in government (namely, the civil service) or in 
opposition (the Conservative Research Department and later, select think tanks). 
Developing policy was difficult in the late 1940s when, after an unexpected electoral 
defeat, the Tories no longer had access to civil servants and had to rely on a Conservative 
Research Department which had been neglected during the war-time years. In the early 
1960s, the Party began to lose faith in soft controls and there was a slow but steady push 
for restricting migration in the form of legislation, a shift that was encouraged by senior 
civil servants. With Tory ministers gently pushed to reconsider policies on the advice of 
their officials, the civil service helped create an environment in which the tightening of 
immigration controls was perceived to be the only option.2 
While Gamble’s theory would indicate that parties respond to their status (government or 
opposition) and take on a corresponding role (parties in office take on a ‘politics of power’ 
role and parties in opposition take on a ‘politics of support role’), this is not always the 
case with the Conservative Party between 1945 to 2015. Often, it takes a period of time 
for the Party to react to its new status, particularly after it has spent a long stint in either 
office or opposition. In 1997, after the Conservative Party lost office following nearly 
two decades in government, it was in no way an effective or functional opposition during 
the next parliament. After a second consecutive electoral defeat in 2001, senior 
Conservative figures resolved to change their strategy: they could no longer behave like 
an embittered government which had found itself out of office. The Tory leadership made 
a deliberate effort to take on the ‘politics of support’ role associated with opposition. The 
Party not only spent more time criticising the government, it also developed striking and 
populist policies (such as a fixed quota for asylum seekers) that were headline-winning, 
if difficult or impossible to implement.  
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On occasion, the Conservative leadership chooses to take on the role that does not 
correspond to the Party’s status. In 2005, the Conservative Party suffered a third 
consecutive electoral defeat and, later that year, the new leadership moved the Party onto 
a ‘politics of power’ footing usually associated with being in government. Efforts were 
made to represent the Conservative Party as restrained and responsible. Pledges were 
made to deal with difficult issues in a quiet and sensible manner: immigration policy 
would be informed by evidence. By contrast, during the second half of this parliament, 
when David Cameron and his advisors feared that Prime Minister Gordon Brown would 
call an early general election, the Tories returned to the ‘politics of support’ role. The 
Party was remodelled as an effective and energetic opposition: it would be critical of 
government and it would promote populist and restrictive new measures, such as a quota 
for economic immigrants and the introduction of a border police force with the power to 
arrest and detain suspects. 
Gamble’s theory is of less relevance when immigration is of low salience, as indicated by 
public opinion (from correspondence with MPs as well as opinion polls) and media 
reports. The degree to which immigration is an issue of concern does impact on the 
making of policy. In other words, the content and tone of policy and policy-making are 
dependent on the status of the party – but only when the policy issue is a priority for 
voters, and by consequence, a priority for the party. In situations in which immigration is 
of low salience, policy-making is less impacted by the differing dynamics of the ‘politics 
of power’ versus the ‘politics of support’. In the late 1940s, migration levels were not 
perceived to be problematic, and there were other priorities which prevented the 
Conservative opposition from developing policy on immigration. Likewise, while the 
level of immigration did increase during the period following the passing of the 1948 
British Nationality Act, it was of no immediate concern to the Conservative government 
of 1951. Similarly, when the Conservative opposition of 1964 took the opportunity to 
thoroughly review its policies, immigration received next to no attention. Given that the 
issue was not particularly salient, there was no incentive for the Conservatives to work 
on extensive proposals on the topic. 
The Party’s interest in maintaining decent international relations (which translates into an 
unwillingness to bring in further controls) is stronger when the Party is in office than 
when it is in opposition. When the Tories are more mindful of the reactions of other 
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countries, they are less likely to bring in substantial changes to immigration policy. 
Instead, policy is more moderate and any changes are generally modest. For the 
Conservative government of the mid-1950s, mantaining international relations was of 
great importance. Domestic concerns about rising levels of immigration, and the impact 
on British society, were superseded by the imperatives of foreign policy. Likewise, 
Heath’s government of 1970 was not able to convert its hard-hitting proposals into 
legislation due to fears about damaging relations with the Commonwealth. Although this 
factor had been of little concern when the Party was in opposition, in office it acted as a 
deterrent to attempts to redefine citizenship. 
Conversely, public opinion, which tends to support tough initatives to control 
immigration, does impact on the policy-making process, but more so when the Party is in 
opposition than when it is in government. If the party in opposition is inclined to practise 
a ‘politics of support’ role, it will likely take a greater interest in the concerns of those 
whose support it wishes to have. The diminished role of public opinion when the Party is 
in office is also a consequence of the complexities of government – the ‘politics of power’ 
– which involve countless, often competing, pressures. According to Ann Widdecombe, 
who served as both a minister and a shadow secretary of state, public opinion is one factor 
among many to consider when making policy; in government, it is one factor among 
dozens to consider.3 
Curiously, there is one trend that seems to be unreceptive to the transition from 
government to opposition and vice versa. Over the 70 years under consideration, there 
was a transformation in the Conservatives’ use of immigration as an electoral tool. 
Initially, the Tories did not want to be seen to be involved with immigration: it was not 
seemly and to do so might provoke public tensions. During the 1960s, the Conservatives 
were less reluctant to make use of their natural lead on immigration. At this point, being 
seen to be doing something about immigration was deemed only right and proper: it would 
reassure the worried, and it would deter the concerned from opting for the far-right. When 
public concern about immigration increased in the mid-1970s, the Conservative Party 
proposed much tougher controls. The exploitation of the immigration issue has been taken 
to extremes, but this approach has been detrimental to the Conservatoves’ electoral 
fortunes. The 2005 Tory election campaign was seen as crude and xenophobic – and even 
worse in their terms – off-putting to many voters. 
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8.2 The drivers of policy change 
In seeking to explain developments in the Conservative Party’s immigration policy, the 
use of a modified version of Harmel and Janda’s three ‘drivers of change’ has been 
invaluable. Each of the factors has proved to be more or less useful in explaining policy 
changes during the different parliaments within the period from 1945 to 2015. This thesis 
has examined the relationship between policy development and the three drivers by 
considering the impact of  
a. The Party's electoral motivations;  
b. The different leaders of the Party; and  
c. The Party’s management, or, the different factions leading – or aspiring to 
lead –  the Party 
Any attempt to isolate the factors so as to establish their relative importance to the policy-
making process is problematic, given the strong links between the different drivers. Tory 
leaders, for example, are often (though not always), of, or owe their position to, the 
dominant faction(s) within the Conservative Party at that time. Further, correlation cannot 
be taken to be causation: as has been noted elsewhere, the relationship between policy 
changes and the drivers of change is a ‘striking but often superficial relationship’.4 For 
example, the Party’s decision to depose one leader, and the subsequent change in 
immigration policy may be unrelated; the relevant policy work may well have preceded 
the new leader. Nonetheless, with caution, and with a degree of scepticism, this thesis has 
sought to extricate and evaluate the importance of the different drivers of change. 
Although, as previously noted, the impact of these drivers on the development of 
immigration policy varies over time, it has been possible to come to a tentative conclusion 
about their relative importance. On the whole, the leadership of the Party seems to be the 
single most significant influence on immigration policy-making. Factions are critical too 
in setting the direction or tone of policy, even if it is difficult at times to determine a 
dominant faction. Electoral motivations play less of a role than one might expect: it is 
rare to see a shift in policy after a defeat at the ballot box, but there is a (sometimes subtle) 
influence.  
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This thesis does not, however, contend that any one of these three drivers will dominate 
the others. Other factors are important too. It is not that the drivers proposed by the 
theoretical synthesis are unable to explain anything but that they are not enough to explain 
everything. For example, unforeseen developments in the global environment and 
historical international obligations also drive – and constrain – immigration policy. 
However, policy is ultimately determined by how the Party chooses to react to these 
developments – based on its leadership, its dominant faction(s) and its electoral 
motivations. 
 
Leadership 
The role of the leadership in directing Conservative Party immigration policy varies from 
the critical to the very critical. Leaders with a restrictionist line on policy tend to preside 
over a period in which their Party promotes just such a line. There are differences, of 
course, in how the leaders of the Party have perceived the ‘problem’ of immigration and 
how they have framed their solution. Some leaders have been greatly constrained by 
external pressures, from an impending general election (see Michael Howard in 2003) to 
a powerful opposing faction within the Party (see Churchill in the mid-1950s). It should 
be noted that policy change need not be driven by a change in the leadership. Instead, 
developments in policy may be down to a leader changing his or her mind, in response to 
the need to ‘listen’ to the electorate, or to manage the Party factions. Change may also be 
generated by sudden unexpected events, such as a worsening conflict abroad creating 
refugees. 
The leader of the Party, and their position on immigrants and immigration, does impact 
on policy, but only if their views (broadly) align with those of their colleagues. During 
the immediate post-war period, the then leader, Churchill, did not pay much attention to 
domestic affairs, and developed an interest in controlling immigration only towards the 
end of his leadership in 1954 – and by that time, he could not get his ministers to take it 
seriously. His successor, Eden had no desire to do anything about immigration: he was 
keen to retain his reputation for being a ‘moderate’ and wherever possible, wished to 
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avoid controversy. Macmillan, who became leader in 1957, had a substantial impact on 
the making of immigration policy. His call for a more modern way of dealing with the 
UK’s former colonies put paid to the idea that the citizens of these countries should 
receive special treatment (including unrestricted right of entry to, and settlement in, 
Britain). 
From 1964 onwards, leaders Douglas-Home and Heath had little interest in immigration. 
The latter had to be almost forced by his colleagues to set down a definitive line on 
immigration – and was reported to have resented it. Neither of the two men could be seen 
to be driving the Tories’ immigration policy – with the exception, perhaps, of Heath’s 
decision to admit the Ugandan Asians in 1971. Thatcher, who took control of the Party 
in 1975, understood that immigration was, or could be, a significant concern for many 
voters, and made efforts to ensure greater restrictions on immigration. She had a profound 
influence on the framing, and sometimes the content, of immigration policy. Her 
successor, Major deemed it unseemly to make immigration a priority issue, and under his 
leadership, the Party presented a much more muted and moderate approach, even though 
policy was not significantly different. 
Post-1997, the Party’s next two leaders took a very similar stance on immigration. 
Hague’s near indifference to immigration policy meant that there was no coherent 
approach. He, and Duncan Smith, under extensive pressure from the Party’s right-wing, 
abandoned their attempts to renew the Conservative Party as a more moderate 
organisation. Howard seized on a tough immigration policy as a means of obtaining 
column inches – and the media obliged. His successor, Cameron, was better able to resist 
the demands of the right-wingers, and when he deemed it timely and necessary, re-
introduced a hard-line immigration policy. Throughout this 70-year period, the leader’s 
position was dependent on maintaining the support of the different factions. 
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Factions 
While it has been difficult to consistently show the existence of, and interaction between, 
factions within the Conservative Party, the perceived management of the Party has been 
helpful as a means of explaining policy changes (or the lack of such changes). All leaders 
must acknowledge that their position relies on the continued support of the factions that 
more or less run the Party; making moves that might upset particular wings could well 
endanger their position. Further, elections are often fought and won on the basis of which 
faction appears to be in charge of the Party. Divided parties are weak and unpopular with 
the electorate. There were occasions during the period in question when immigration 
policy was put to one side so as not to split the Conservative Party. To most, if not all of 
the leaders in the period under study, it was preferable to keep the Party together than to 
risk further divisions by developing an undoubtedly controversial immigration policy. As 
a result, policy was often a careful compromise to contain those parliamentarians who 
were not above voting against the Party line.  
During the immediate post-war period, the influence of factions can well explain the lack 
of policy on immigration. Continuing struggles for power between different factions 
ensured that, for much of this time, migration controls were not under serious discussion 
and the ‘open door’ remained. When Eden’s government began considering restricting 
immigration, opposition from within the Party and the threat of resignation from the 
Colonial Secretary ensured that no action would be taken. From 1964 onwards, the impact 
of factions on immigration policy-making – and the potential for them to do serious 
damage to the unity of the Conservative Party – was a frequent consideration. Enoch 
Powell’s rise to prominence and strong anti-immigration rhetoric compelled Tory 
parliamentarians to declare their stance on the issue. It is unsurprising then that there soon 
emerged distinct dividing lines between those calling for immediate further immigration 
controls, their more moderate counterparts who were broadly in favour of controls, and 
those who rejected such calls. The existence of these factions made it difficult for the 
leadership to develop a policy that most of the parliamentary party would support. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the different wings of the Party, and the interactions between 
them, were a more substantial influence on immigration policy; it was an era in which a 
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more ideological, right-wing faction gained prominence over the more traditional one-
nation wing of the Tory Party. While factions could, and did, block the leader (Willie 
Whitelaw did not allow immigration to be an issue in the 1983 campaign), they tended to 
be less influential than the leadership – other than on a few exceptional occasions. In the 
1990s, the right-wing of the Party demanded tougher measures, but the libertarian wing 
would not allow it, deeming identity cards to be contrary to British values. Quarrels 
between factions prevented at least one minister from making changes to immigration 
policy. 
From 1997 onwards, there is less evidence to suggest that changes to the factions of the 
Party have had an impact on immigration policy. However, this is not to say that factions 
did not play a part in the development of policy. In the 2000s, the right-wing of the Party 
pushed Iain Duncan Smith to take the Tories in a more restrictionist direction – and he 
was somewhat obliged to do so. However, it was not possible for Duncan Smith to bring 
in policies that were both practical and consistent while keeping the different factions of 
the Party content. His successor, Howard, took a different line; in making extensive use 
of topics that were familiar to the Tories, of which immigration happened to be one, he 
hoped to bring his fractured party together and make it more manageable.  
When in 2010 the Conservatives failed to win enough seats for a majority government, 
relations between the different wings of the party were further damaged. Cameron’s 
ability to withstand the pressures from one wing of his Party was, in part, the result of his 
support from other factions. According to Matthew D’Ancona, since Major’s leadership, 
the Conservative Party has had a ‘core of irreconcilables, convinced that they were being 
sold out or stitched up’.5 The leadership must manage – and not simply mollify – this 
faction, if it is to be successful and win (or stay in) office.6 
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Electoral considerations  
Electoral motivation is the least useful driver in explaining developments in immigration 
policy. This is the case even though this thesis has expanded on Harmel and Janda’s 
theory by revising the ‘fear of electoral defeat’ factor so that it includes the much broader 
driver of electoral motivations. As this author and others have elucidated before, any 
theory of party policy change also needs to take more seriously the fact that, in a 
competitive democracy, politicians are ideologically and instrumentally motivated to 
continuously monitor and then to reflect public (and party) feeling, and that this may be 
every bit as important as the periodic signals that they are sent at elections.7 Electoral 
calculations cannot be discussed outside the context of party competition: as Messina 
finds in his 1989 text on race and party competition, Conservative Party strategy responds 
to their main competitior, Labour – and vice versa.8 Electoral motivations do matter: what 
changes over time is the strategy: whether to stick with the core vote, to reach out to the 
centre ground, or to pick up those on peripheries and whether to listen and follow public 
opinion – or to direct it. 
In the immediate post-war period, and despite the Conservative Party suffering an 
unexpected defeat, followed by a second term in opposition, immigration policy-making 
was not impacted by the motivation to win votes. The topic was considered close to a 
non-issue for much of this period and Tory politicians did not believe that they could gain 
electoral support on the back of it. If the Conservatives had been less concerned about the 
unseemliness of mobilising in such a way, they would have made more of immigration 
policy both before and following the introduction of legislation. What became the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act had not even been mentioned in the manifesto of 1959. 
In time, however, electoral considerations became a more significant factor. When senior 
Conservatives figures became concerned by what they perceived to be a divide between 
the Party and the electorate on attitudes to immigration, changes to policy were often 
made shortly afterwards, so that the Party more closely reflected the (supposed) position 
of the public. By the late-1960s, immigration had become a contentious and bipartisan 
issue and so, responding to the continuing popularity of Enoch Powell and his stance on 
the issue, the Conservatives were, in effect, compelled to harden their line and move 
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closer to what they perceived to be the position of the electorate. The leadership deemed 
it necessary to respond to the public mood and offer more restrictionist policies. The 
Tories became less reluctant to make use of their electoral lead on immigration control, 
particularly within a context in which they had lost two general elections (February and 
October 1974) in a row.  
From the late 1970s onwards, when the Tories were less reticent about making use of the 
immigration issue, it soon came to be regarded as a dependable way to bolster electoral 
support. When the opinion polls showed particularly low levels of support for the Tories, 
or at least, Conservative ministers believed that a fall in support was imminent, the 
immigration issue was brought back in, with the Party vocally expressing its support for 
a much tougher immigration policy. However, from 1979 onwards, and even though the 
Conservatives experienced fluctuating levels of support during their four terms in office, 
there is little evidence that electoral calculations were a significant or consistent 
motivating factor behind changes to immigration policy, other than driving a general need 
to show an operational and tough approach to the issue.  
It was clear to many Conservative figures that the Party’s position on immigration, if it 
was distinctive enough, could prevent the drift of votes from the Conservatives and even 
bring on board voters who were not traditionally inclined to support the Tories. Thatcher 
argued that the Tories’ reticence on immigration control was a motivating factor for voters 
opting for extreme-right parties. It was thus vital for the Conservative government to 
show that it shared the same concerns as the electorate, which was seen to be routinely 
hostile to ‘coloured’ immigration. When, in 1985, the deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka 
and the potential rush of non-white immigrants to the UK threatened poll ratings for the 
Conservatives, the Tories quickly drafted hard-line legislation and actioned the reversal 
of policy introduced less than a year before. 
During the early 2000s, while some of the proposed measures may have been popular 
with the public, immigration was not a priority issue for many voters. The Tory focus was 
on the core vote. Howard had no time in the run-up to the 2005 election to experiment 
with a new strategy. The Party had endured two major electoral defeats in four years 
(1997, 2001) and did not want to lose a third, so it swung rightwards to make itself stand 
out, emphasising restrictionist promises. It was not to be. After 2005, with three 
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consecutive election defeats under their belt, the Conservatives were desperate to bring 
in voters not traditionally inclined to support the Tories of recent years. Cameron’s silence 
on immigration (an attempt to detoxify the Party’s image) ended when Tory strategists 
believed Prime Minister Brown was about to call an election in late 2007. Once in 
coalition government in 2010, and with the Tory brand deemed less toxic, hard-line 
immigration policies deemed popular with voters were introduced. The threat of 
Conservative voters switching support to UKIP also served to drive the Tories to adopt 
restrictionist positions. However, the Party’s attempts to harden their line on immigration 
have rarely satisfied voters; tough policies may even have legitimised their fears and made 
them more concerned.9 
 
8.3 Further contributions 
In providing a new insight into immigration policy-making, the findings of this 
dissertation have offered four contributions to existing work in the political science and 
migration policy fields. First, this thesis has emphasised the critical significance of 
political parties to the development of state immigration policy. Parties are much more 
than a vehicle for politicians or a conveyor belt for ideas. Parties are responsive and 
complex coalitions of competing interests and tensions. In examining the internal 
workings of the UK Conservative Party (its leadership, its factions, and its motivations), 
this thesis has sought to reveal how immigration policy is made. 
Second, and by delineating policy-making into that which is done in government, and that 
which is done in opposition, this research project has offered an explanation as to why 
there often exists a gap between a party’s promised immigration policy, and its 
implementation of said policy. As had been suggested, there are different dynamics acting 
on the party when it is in, and when it is out, of office. Obstacles to the implementation 
of policy are more common during periods in government than periods in opposition. 
Different motivations are activated when there is (or there is likely to be) a change in the 
party’s status. This work has also considered the extent to which politicians and policy-
makers are aware of this transition and how it shapes the policy-making process. 
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Third, this thesis has sought to examine the impact of electoral positioning on the making 
of immigration policy: in other words, the extent to which parties’ policies are developed 
in relation to their position relative to other political parties. This work has found that the 
Conservative Party is sensitive to the development of policy by its competitor parties, 
modifying its own policy offering in response, usually in an attempt to put forward a 
distinctive position. At times, a tough immigration policy is perceived to be an obvious 
vote-winner, at other times, such a strategy is considered damaging. 
Lastly, this thesis has built on existing work in the theoretical literature by synthesising 
existing theories into a new hybrid approach to explain policy-making. Given that few 
scholars who have looked at immigration policy have used both a political science and a 
migration studies approach, and given that, within the former discipline, it is rare for work 
to draw on literature within the ‘political parties’ and the ‘policy’ field, this thesis is a 
timely contribution.  
 
8.4 Research challenges  
Inevitably, this dissertation has been subject to limitations and difficulties that have been 
encountered in the process of the research. In considering the development of the 
Conservative Party’s immigration policy, this work has tended to focus on policy-making 
from the perspective of the policy-makers. This thesis has made use of interviews with 
current and former politicians, many of whom have had roles within government, as well 
as senior civil servants, and has used material which has, in most cases, been produced 
by the same individuals. There has been little consideration given to a ‘bottom up’ 
approach to policy-making, in which Conservative Party activists, members and 
supporters have played a role. However, other scholars have found the influence of the 
grassroots of the Conservative Party on policy-making to have been minimal.10 
This thesis has made use of a hybrid theoretical framework as a means of explaining 
changes to immigration policy, but the propositions are imperfect and do not cover all 
possible developments. At times during the research process, there has been a temptation 
to stretch the point, to make explanations ‘fit’ with the propositions. Efforts have been 
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made to work against this, and there has been a deliberate attempt to consider factors 
outside of party political considerations (such as the influence of civil servants or experts). 
It should be acknowledged that electoral motivations, leadership and factions are not the 
only factors that matter to political parties; and the government versus opposition 
dynamic is not always applicable to explanations of policy change. There may be other 
means of accounting for developments, such as a change in circumstances (such as an 
economic downturn) or a sudden, unexpected series of events (such as the conflict in 
Syria). 
Lastly, it is regrettable that this thesis has not been able to rely on the same ‘types’ of 
source material throughout the period in question. It has not been possible to interview 
key figures who were critical to the Conservative Party immigration policy during the late 
1940s, for example: they are no longer alive. Nor has it been possible to look through 
archive material from the mid-1990s, for example, since Cabinet papers, are not available 
due to time restrictions on their release. As a result, this thesis is explicit about the fact 
that it tends to rely on different material at different times, and, in some cases, to rely 
more than would be desirable on secondary material. 
 
8.5 Suggestions for future research 
This thesis, which has built on propositions from within the political science and 
migration studies fields in order to provide an interpretivist account of the making of 
Conservative Party positioning on immigration, opens up possibilities for further 
research. First and foremost, it would be worth considering whether the framework could 
be used to explain changes in policy in a) different but no less controversial policy areas 
b) different mainstream political parties and c) countries outside of the UK. Further 
research could expand the focus on the political party by examining how parties 
developing immigration policy respond to competing pressures for more restrictionist or 
more liberal policy, for example, by tracking the vagaries of public opinion on migration 
or the interventions of interest groups. It is of little significance how many ‘immigrants’ 
there are; it merely matters to what extent the public deem immigrants to be having a 
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negative impact on their lives. The national mood, or the heuristics (that is, the ‘short-
cuts or cues voters use to overcome cognitive burdens of information’) often has more 
impact on policy-makers than the empirics of the situation – that is, whether immigration 
figures are increasing or decreasing (and at what rate) or the value of migrants’ net impact 
on the economy.11 Further research along these lines would bring new insights to the 
complex and at times, incoherent, world of politics and policy-making. 
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List of interviewees 
During the course of this research, I was fortunate to be able to interview many key 
figures who played a part in the making and implementation of the Conservative Party’s 
immigration policy. I am so grateful for their time and their support.  
Many of those I have spoken with have held a number of different roles; I have noted 
here only those titles which were of direct relevance to this thesis. 
With my thanks also to those who preferred to speak off the record.   
 
Baker, Kenneth, The Rt Hon., the Lord  
Home Secretary, 1990-1992 
Chairman of the Conservative Party, 1989-1990 
Member of Parliament, 1968-1997 
 
Baker, Norman 
Minister, Home Office, 2013-14  
Member of Parliament, 1997-2015 
 
Barwell, Gavin  
Government Whip, 2013-14 
Co-founder of Migration Matters Trust 
Member of Parliament, 2010- present 
Desk Officer, Conservative Research Department, 1993-1995 
 
Brady, Graham 
  Chairman of the 1922 Committee, 2010- present 
  Shadow Minister for Europe, 2004-2007 
Member of Parliament, 1997- present 
 
Cable, Vince, The Rt Hon. Sir 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010-2015 
Member of Parliament, 1997-2015 
 
Clarke, Kenneth, The Rt Hon.  
Minister without Portfolio, 2012-2014 
Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice, 2010-2012 
Home Secretary, 1992-1993 
Member of Parliament, 1970- present 
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Cubbon, Brian, Sir 
  Permanent Secretary to the Home Office, 1979-1988 
Senior civil servant, Cabinet Office, 1971-76 
 
Gieve, John, Sir 
  Permanent Secretary to the Home Office, 2001-2005 
 
Glenarthur, Simon, the Lord 
Minister, Foreign Office, 1987-1989 
Minister, Home Office, 1985-1986  
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Minister, Home Office (Immigration), 2010-12 
Shadow Minister for Immigration, 2005-2010 
Member of Parliament, 1997- present 
 
Hamilton, Archie, The Rt Hon., the Lord  
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  Leader of the Conservative Party in the European Parliament, 2004-2010
  Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Imm.), 1995-1997 
Member of Parliament, 1987-1997 
 
Kilpatrick, Helen 
  Governor of the Cayman Islands, 2013- present 
  Acting Permanent Secretary to the Home Office, 2012-2013 
 
Lloyd, Peter, The Rt Hon., Sir 
Minister, Home Office, 1992-1994 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Imm.), 1989-1992 
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Salt, John, Professor 
  Consultant to Home Office, 1999- present 
  Director, Migration Research Unit, UCL, 1989- present 
 
Sewill, Brendon 
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Silverman, Bernard, the Reverend Professor 
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Simmons, Jon 
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Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Imm.), 1992-1994 
Member of Parliament, 1983-2001 
 
Widdecombe, Ann, The Rt Hon. 
  Shadow Home Secretary, 1999-2001 
  Minister, Home Office (Prisons), 1995-1997 
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